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In January 1999, I took off my flight suit and changed my role from practitioner to educator 
and researcher.  I was afforded the privilege of teaching the soldiers, sailors, and airmen of 
NATO about special operations, air power, and the interdependence of the two.  Along the 
way, I was honoured to be included in an amazingly talented and discerning group of airmen 
from the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, Italy, and the United States who drafted, 
tested, and promulgated the first NATO doctrines and theories for special air warfare and the 
appropriate role for air power in conflicts of an irregular nature. 
Like so many others who have attempted the process of a PhD thesis, I could not have 
completed this journey of learning on my own.  I am grateful for all who listened and 
challenged me as I formed my ideas, who encouraged and held me up when it all seemed 
‘just too hard’, and who saw the value of this research.  Thank you. 
There are two, however, without whom this thesis would have been consigned to the recycle 
bin.  Dr David Jordan, Senior Lecturer in the Defence Studies Programme at King’s College 
London, agreed to become my supervisor at a time when the thesis and my thinking about air 
power and irregular warfare had become ‘lost in the clouds’.  Like all great instructor pilots, 
he guided, nudged, and when necessary, re-focused my efforts to get me and the thesis back 
on course and on glide path. 
It is Group Captain (RAF, retired) Graham Thwaites, though, who is most responsible for this 
thesis being attempted in the first place and whose influence—friendship, support, and the 
occasional ‘kick in the trousers’, kept me going during some especially trying episodes.  
Without his vision, counsel and encouragement, this thesis would not have been attempted 
and likely would have never been completed.   
The one who deserves the greatest credit though, is my wife.  Kathy was the one who told me 
to ‘go for it’ when the opportunity to attempt the PhD presented itself.  She suffered through 
the separations caused by the year in residence at King’s and my research trips, and also the 
years of missed evenings and weekends because I was at my desk writing.  She was always 
there, cheering, pushing, and supporting me through this effort.  Kathy, I thank you and I love 
you.    
At the end of the day, however, this thesis is the result of my own work and nothing herein is 
the result of collaboration or contribution of others except where specifically annotated in the 






Air power is the asymmetric advantage Western forces have enjoyed almost since the 
beginnings of military aviation. Through two World Wars, Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
NATO’s ‘small wars’ in the Balkans and North Africa, the aeroplane and air power have 
been decisive elements in military operations.  What have largely been missed however have 
been the preventative capabilities of air power, what Kipling observed as the possibility of 
social control that may serve to avoid rebellion or insurgency.   
This thesis will consider the application of air power to conflicts of irregular character, but 
focusing on pre-conflict and preventative applications of air power.  Modern airmen and air 
power analysts have  looked to the RAF's air control scheme between the two World Wars 
seeking ‘proof’ that air forces offered a credible and low-cost means of countering irregular 
adversaries without placing large numbers of soldiers in harm’s way.  These analysts have 
typically drawn parallels from the inter-war period to air policing operations in Iraq, the 
Balkans, Libya, and others—superficial comparisons at best.   
The premise of this thesis is that while there are some lessons to be learned from the RAF’s 
air control experiences during the inter-war period, modern airmen have not made a critical 
analysis of the RAF's air control scheme and have come to incorrect conclusions in order to 
meet pre-conceived notions. Although the RAF did bomb recalcitrant tribes in order to 
compel obedience, aerial bombing was only one, albeit the most visible, part of the air control 
scheme.  By the 1930s, air power had evolved to become a more subtle and nuanced tool for 
tribal control.   
What made air control ‘work’ was an innovation that has been missed, downplayed, or 
ignored by most historians and analysts of the Middle East air control experience.  The RAF 
created a unique, air-minded manifestation of the colonial control officers that the Army had 
long employed in imperial policing duties.  These Air Force Special Service Officers (SSOs) 
were acculturated airmen embedded with the local populations to provide situational 
awareness, intelligence, and communications in places too dangerous or isolated for civilian 
tribal control officers.  Where the RAF was responsible for imperial policing, the SSOs often 
made it possible for colonial authorities to address potential problems in the normal course of 
civil administration.  And, when air operations were required, these embedded airmen were 
trained and equipped to control and assess the application of air-delivered effects—an early 
manifestation of effects-based operations.  
The bombing of recalcitrant tribes has been the element of the RAF’s air control scheme that 
modern analysts have usually seized upon; mostly because bombing is most congruent with 
what they perceive as air power's primary conventional role—attack.  The historiography of 
air control has tended to neglect the non-kinetic and often preventative influencing aspects of 
air power.  This thesis shows that air control was more subtle and nuanced, rather than the 
blunt instrument most commentators have suggested.  In those instances where subtle 
applications of air power were effective at maintaining acceptable levels of security and 
stability in Britain’s colonies and Mandates, there were acculturated airmen embedded among 
the local populations, i.e., the right boots on the ground, providing the catalysts and enablers 
for effective air and civil integration.  





It must be remembered that from the ground every inhabitant of a native village is 
under the impression that the occupant of an aeroplane is actually looking at him, 
and the frequent appearance of aircraft apparently overhead will do much towards 




Royal Air Force Operations Manual, 1922 
Control without occupation, or sending a machine instead of a man, has remained a 
tantalising concept in warfare.
2
  In the aftermath of the First Gulf War (Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm, 1989 – 1990) airmen were not subtle in their advocacy of air power 
as a low cost means of addressing the complexity and ‘messiness’ of modern warfare.3  Tony 
Mason, in Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal, in order to initiate the discussion, offered that 
after Desert Storm ‘air power proved that it could substitute for land power’.4  Mason’s 
appraisal of air power’s utility in future warfare, that it was ‘likely to become a favourite 
instrument in optional warfare, minimising friendly casualties, providing a wide range of 
offensive options’ seemed prescient at the time, especially through the 1990s and during the 
                                                          
1
 C.D. 22, No. 805, Operations Manual, Royal Air Force, (London:  Air Ministry, July 1922), p. 133.  The quote 
is also in the earlier C.D. 21, The power of the air force and the application of this power to hold and police 
Mesopotamia, Mar 1920, found in TNA AIR 5/168 (June 1921), p. 4.  This ‘principle of inspection’, or the idea 
of shaping behaviour through perceived constant surveillance, may have origins in the writings of Jeremy 
Bentham, an 18
th
 century English philosopher, who proposed a panoptic prison in 1787.  The Bentham Project, 
University College London, found at www.ucl.ac.uk/bentham-project/who/panopticon. 
2
 TNA AIR 5/262, Air Ministry, Memorandum on the working of air control in Iraq, undated (circa Feb 1927), 
p. 1; also in TNA AIR 5/170, C.D. 72, Air Staff Memorandum (ASM) 46, Notes on Air Control of Undeveloped 
Countries, 24 Mar 1930, p. 4.  ‘Control without occupation’ was also a chapter title in ASM 46, pp. 3 – 5. 
3
 During the mid-1990s, the USAF’s Air University considered the concept of ‘air occupation’ and ‘air policing’ 
while examining peace-enforcement and peace-making operations.  This emphasis manifested in student papers 
from the different colleges and also in the USAF’s professional journal.  See for example, George R. Gagnon, 
Air Control:  Strategy for a Smaller United States Air Force, (Maxwell AFB, AL:  School of Advanced 
Airpower Studies, 1993); Jeffery R. Barnett, ‘Defeating Insurgents with Technology’, Airpower Journal, vol. 
10, no. 2, (Summer 1996); George Kramlinger, Sustained Coercive Air Presence, School of Advanced Air & 
Space Studies, 1997; Marc Dippold, ‘Air Occupation: Asking the Right Questions’, Airpower Journal, vol. 11, 
no. 4, (Winter 1997); Richard Walker, Facing the Future:  A Doctrine for Air Control in Limited Conflicts, 
School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1998; and Air Command & Staff College video, Col John A Warden III 
on Air Occupation, 1994. 
4
 Tony Mason, Air Power:  A Centennial Appraisal, (London: Brassey’s, Ltd., 1994), p. 166. 
 2  
 
opening rounds of the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
5
  It should not be a surprise 
that British Army doctrine from 2001, reflecting the Pollyanna-like optimism of the 
‘revolution in military affairs’, suggested that technological advances in surveillance, 
targeting, and precision strike offered the possibility ‘to reintroduce an era where air power 
could again have a major role’ in counter-insurgency operations, as it had had between the 
World Wars.
6
  By 2009 though, the British Army had reversed its position and relegated air 
power to ‘the supporting component [emphasis in original] within a wider counterinsurgency 
approach’.7  Historians Thomas Keaney and Eliot Cohen, in their analysis of the punitive air 
operations conducted during the 1990s observed that politicians had come to believe they 
could ‘titrate doses of air power in a way that they cannot do with ground combat’.8  Carl 
Builder, an air power analyst with RAND Corporation, went so far as to suggest that air 
forces had a requirement to offer alternative, independent, air-centric means for feeding, 
supplying, rescuing, policing, and punishing adversaries during crises and lesser conflicts, 
without committing people to the ground.
9
   
A decade later, as part of the rather heated debate over appropriate responses to the 
irregular conflicts on-going in Iraq and Afghanistan, air power analyst Phillip Meilinger 
suggested that the United States should adopt a ‘new’ air-centric approach to address the 
current spate of joint counter-insurgency operations.
 
 He and other thoughtful, professional, 
                                                          
5
 Mason, Air Power:  A Centennial Appraisal, p. 244.  Andrew Mumford reinforces Mason’s point by noting 
there are some ‘significant constants’ in the application of air power in irregular conflicts—politicians will use 
air power as a way to quickly demonstrate their decisiveness and air power offers a relatively inexpensive means 
of responding in terms of forces, finances, and casualties, in ‘Unnecessary or unsung?  The utilisation of 
airpower in Britain’s colonial counterinsurgencies’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 20, nos. 3-4, (Sep – Dec 
2009). 
6
 Army Field Manual, vol. 1, pt. 10, Counter-Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines, 
(London:  Ministry of Defence, July 2001), p. B-8-26. 
7
 British Army Field Manual, vol. 1, pt. 10, Countering Insurgency, (Warminster, UK:  Land Warfare Centre, 
Oct 2009), p. CS 1-2.   
8
 Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf, (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), p. 213.  This is the authors’ revised edition of the Gulf War Air Power 
Summary Report, originally published by the US Government Printing Office in 1993. 
9
 Carl H. Builder and Theodore W. Karasik, Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Air Force for Crises and 
Lesser Conflicts, (Santa Monica, CA:  RAND Corporation, 1995), p. 86. 
 3  
 
and dedicated airmen such as Major General Allen Peck from the USAF Doctrine Center and 
Major General Charles Dunlap from HQ USAF suggested that the ground-centric approach 
being applied to those conflicts was two-dimensional, prohibitively costly, and misinformed 
with regards to the actual and potential contributions of air power in small wars.
10
  Meilinger 
and others’ assertions of air power’s under-appreciated value in irregular conflict echoed 
arguments that had been made by British airmen in the 1920s and 30s as they advocated for 
and later defended their use of air power to control the frontier regions of the empire, i.e., that 
punitive expeditions by battalions of soldiers to police the empire, colloquially known at the 
time as ‘burn and scuttle’, were crude, time-consuming, and extremely costly from both a 
fiscal and resourcing perspective, plus they led to unnecessary casualties on both sides.
11
  
David Ian Hall noted that in the colonies, protectorates, and Mandates stretching from north-
eastern Africa through the Middle-East to north-western India, air power had offered Britain 
‘an effective and inexpensive solution to the seemingly intractable problems of imperial 
security’, a claim airmen would be similarly making 70 years later when seeking approaches 
to deal with irregular conflicts in the same regions.
12
  An Air Ministry note from the early 
1920s reported, 
The military [Army] method of subduing a tribe has been to send an expedition into 
their country, to burn their villages, destroy their crops, carry away their buried 
                                                          
10
 Maj Gen Allen Peck, at the time the commander of the US Air Force Doctrine Center, observed that the new 
Army-Marine Corps doctrine ‘reflected “a very two-dimensional view of how to fight a counterinsurgency”’ Air 
Force, vol. 90, no. 3, (Mar 2007), p. 15; see also Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., ‘Making Revolutionary Change: 
Airpower in COIN Today’, Parameters, Carlisle, PA:  US Army War College, (Summer 2008), p. 53.  
Interestingly, Army colonel Gian Gentile admonished his Service in the Army’s professional journal to ‘listen 
closely to what he [Dunlap] has to say’ about the shortcomings of the new counter-insurgency doctrine, ‘Listen 
to the Airman’, Military Review, (Mar/Apr 2008), p. 114.  
11
 Sir John C. Slessor, Central Blue:  Recollections and Reflections, (London:  Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1956), p. 
54.  See also J.A. Chamier, ‘The Use of the Air Force for Replacing Military Garrisons,’ Journal of the Royal 
United Service Institution, Vol. 66, No. 462, (May 1921), pp. 206 – 208; C.J. Mackay, ‘The Influence in the 
Future of Aircraft Upon Problems of Imperial Defence’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. 57, 
no. 466, (May 1922), pp. 298 – 299; R.H. Peck, ‘Aircraft in Small Wars’, Journal of the Royal United Service 
Institution, vol. 73, no. 491, (May 1928), pp. 539 – 540; A.P.C. Hannay, ‘Empire Air Policy’, Royal Air Force 
Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 4, (Oct 1930), p. 644. 
12
 David Ian Hall, ‘Review of Air Power and Colonial Control, by David Omissi’, 20th Century British History, 
vol. 3, no. 2, (1992), p. 214. 
 4  
 
supplies of grain and round up their flocks.  The inevitable result is that a large 
proportion of men, women, and children perish from starvation and exposure. … The 
moral effect of aerial bombardment may be unpleasant but they are surely less 
human [sic] than the older method. … Another aspect of an aerial offensive, 
particularly one directed against a semi-savage enemy is that it is productive of far 
less loss of life to the attackers as well as the attacked.  Is the mental anguish of our 
women folk whose sons, husbands, and breadwinners are engaged in fighting 
unscrupulous savages, who give no quarter and who will mutilate the dead, of no 




Interestingly, and also echoing sentiments from the inter-war period, the coalition ground 
commander in Afghanistan from 2006 – 2007 gave high marks to air power’s contributions 
and its effectiveness in reducing the number of soldiers on the ground.  But similar to the 
soldiers of the 1920s and 30s, he stopped short of claiming an independent role for air power 
in irregular warfare.
14
  T.R. Moreman noted that during the inter-war period the Army 
recommended air transport operations become a regular feature of tribal control operations on 
the North-West Frontier of India in order that land forces might increase their tactical 
mobility, reduce the numbers of pack animals required, and remove the need to protect lines 
of communication.
15
  Although Tony Mason suggested in 1994 that the need for air power 
zealotry was over,
16
 extended counter-insurgency operations in two theatres of operation 
since 2001 have re-ignited parochial arguments as to air power’s appropriate roles in irregular 
warfare.  The unhelpful and sometimes ill-mannered debate devolved into a land-centric, 
‘boots on the ground’ camp against an air-centric, ‘air power advantage’ camp.17  Modern air 
                                                          
13
 TNA AIR 9/7, Air Staff Note 12, Effects likely to be produced by intensive aerial bombing of semi-civilised 
people, (undated, circa 1922), p. 3. 
14
 Lt Gen Karl Eikenberry, the commander of Combined Forces Command Afghanistan, 2005 – 2007, noted that 
air power enabled a 90% reduction in the number of troops required for joint military operations in Afghanistan.  
NATO’s Future Joint Air & Space Power, (Kalkar, GE:  Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Apr 2008), p. 4.  
Also referenced in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-30, UK Air and Space Doctrine, (Shrivenham, UK:  
Ministry of Defence Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, July 2013), p. 4-6. 
15
 T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849 – 1947, (London:  
MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1998), p. 167. 
16
 Mason, Air Power:  A Centennial Appraisal, pp. 273 – 75. 
17
 Among the articles suggesting the US Army had developed a parochial, land-centric, and high-risk doctrine 
for counter-insurgency that ignored America’s traditional air power advantage were Dunlap’s ‘America’s 
 5  
 
power advocates often attempted to draw parallels with Britain’s imperial policing 
experiences in the Middle East and South Asia nine decades earlier as evidence of modern air 
power’s ability to go it alone in irregular conflicts.18  While similarities to the earlier conflicts 
in the Middle East and South-West Asia may be found due to the the locations and 
populations, ‘Unhealthy generalisations’, said Peter Gray, ‘… have been made to draw 
modern parallels where none exist’.19   
Many of the previous researchers and analysts who have examined the historiography of 
the RAF’s air control scheme usually did so with a technological perspective, most often 
focusing on aeroplanes’ abilities to overfly obstacles, range the depth and breadth of the 
battlespace, observe, report, and bomb nearly at will, especially in a low-threat environment, 
and in the process induce behaviours from recalcitrant locals.  Their optimistic conclusions 
usually tended towards offering the 1920’s air control scheme as ‘proof’ of air power’s ability 
to ‘go it alone’ in conflicts of an irregular nature.20  While aeroplanes admittedly were the 
most visible part of the air control scheme, technology-focused researchers usually neglected 
to mention that the squadrons were reinforced by armoured car companies, indigenous 
paramilitary forces, local police, and on occasion Army battalions.  Where the air control 
scheme was deemed most successful one sees evidence of effective integration of air forces, 
ground forces, the police, and political (colonial administration) elements.  This aspect of the 
historiography has been understudied which is a shame because as historian Richard Hallion 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
asymmetric advantage’, Armed Forces Journal, (Sep 2006); ‘Air-Minded Considerations for Joint 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine’, Air & Space Power Journal, (Winter 2007), pp. 63 – 74, and Shortchanging the 
Joint Fight: An Airman’s Perspective of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine, 
(Maxwell AFB, AL:  Airpower Research Institute, 2008).  Others with similar perspectives include Gian 
Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency, (2013), and Rebecca Grant, a civilian 
analyst, Airpower in Afghanistan: How a faraway war is remaking the Air Force, (Arlington, VA: Mitchell 
Institute Press, 2009).  
18
 For example, Phillip S. Meilinger, ‘COIN from Above’, Air Force, Vol. 91, No. 7, (July 2008), p. 36. 
19
 Peter W. Gray, ‘The Myths of Air Control and the Realities of Imperial Policing’, Royal Air Force Air Power 
Review, vol. 4, no. 2, (Summer 2001), p. 37.  See also James S. Corum, ‘Air Control: Reassessing the History’, 
Royal Air Force Air Power Review, vol. 4, no. 2, (Summer 2001), pp. 32 – 33. 
20
 Peter Gray, ‘The Myths of Air Control’, p. 27; Corum, ‘Air Control: Reassessing the History’, p. 16. 
 6  
 
suggested in his study of air-land cooperation and integration, ‘many of the methods of 
operational usage and control that governed subsequent air operations of this type [counter-
insurgency] first appeared in the small wars of the early 1920s, specifically the wars of Great 
Britain…’21   
The subject of air-land integration (ALI), usually called ‘army co-operation’ during the 
inter-war period, did generate a fair amount of study and debate within the Army and the Air 
Force, as evidenced by Sir John Slessor’s book, Air Power and Armies, the collection of 
lectures he delivered while on the Directing Staff at Camberley, and the number of articles in 
the professional journals of the time insisting that the primary role for aeroplanes was Army 
co-operation.
22
  The processes, tools, and doctrine necessary for effective co-operation 
between air and land forces began development during the First World War.
23
  The common 
belief is that between the wars the RAF ignored support to the Army.  In actuality, imperial 
policing provided the RAF great experience in air-land integration that was to pay later 
rewards during the Second World War.
24
   
In Iraq and Transjordan, the RAF created a unique manifestation of colonial control 
officers, a specialised cadre of airmen that were an ‘air-minded’ adaptation of an intelligence 
function the Army had long employed in its frontier constabulary duties—RAF Special 
Service Officers (SSOs), to replace or augment the political administrators in areas of the 
                                                          
21
 Richard P. Hallion, Strike From the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1910-1945, (Tuscaloosa, AL: 
University of Alabama Press, 1989), p. 59. 
22
 Sir John C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, (Tuscaloosa, AL:  University of Alabama Press, 2009); C.E. 
Vickery, ‘Small Wars’, The Army Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 2, (1923); C.T. Gompertz, ‘The Application of Science 
to Indian Frontier Warfare’, The Army Quarterly, vol. 10, (Apr – Jul 1925);  F.W. Bewsher, ‘Cooperation 
between the Royal Air Force and irregular troops in the desert’, The Army Quarterly, vol. 12, (Apr 1926); Henry 
Le Marchant Brock, ‘Air operations on the NWF, 1930’, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vol. 19, no. 
1, (1932); Rt Hon Sir Philip Sassoon, ‘Air power in the Middle East’, Journal of the Royal Central Asian 
Society, vol. 20, no. 3, (1933).   
23
 See Gary Sheffield and Peter Gray, eds., Changing War:  The British Army, the Hundred Days Campaign and 
the Birth of the Royal Air Force, 1918, (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 
24
 John Ferris, ‘The RAF Pursues a RMA’, The Fog of Peace and War Planning, Talbot C. Imlay and Monica 
Duffy Toft, eds., (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 171. 
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frontier where civilian officials could not or would not go.
25
  Beginning with the SSOs in Iraq 
and Transjordan, the RAF went beyond pure air-land integration with ground forces and 
learned to integrate with the civilian administrative organisations.
26
  As will be shown, this 
knowledge would expand beyond the RAF SSOs when the air control scheme was extended 
to other frontier regions of the empire and the local situation was such that civilian colonial 
administrators were able to safely live and work among the indigenous populations.  Once 
Iraq achieved its independence in 1932, former SSOs moved on to other positions and other 
locations, passing their experiences and cultural acumen on to other civilian officials.
27
 
Although the RAF SSOs of the inter-war period were considered part of the intelligence 
function, their actions and the effects they enabled went beyond pure intelligence functions.  
The RAF SSOs were embedded among the indigenous populations to provide local 
situational awareness and intelligence for British and colonial administrations and to serve as 
liaisons to the local tribes in order to prevent punitive military actions.
28
  As will also be 
shown, the RAF’s air control scheme included more than bombing and strafing, although the 
non-kinetics aspects of air power were often neglected or ignored, especially by critics of the 
air control scheme.  Even during this nascent era of air power, aircraft were used to map 
unknown regions of the empire, transport soldiers, policemen, government officials, and 
                                                          
25





, 1921, (11 July 1921), p. 77; Sir John Salmond, ‘The Air Force in Iraq’, Journal of the Royal United Service 
Institution, vol. 70, no. 479, (Aug 1925), p. 495; TNA AIR 75/27, Air Staff Memorandum, What Air Control 
Means in War and Peace and What it has Achieved, (30 June 1930), pp. 8 – 9; TNA AIR 9/12, Air Staff 
Memorandum 52, Air Control, (Apr 1933), p. 6.  
26
 Throughout the archival sources the civil administration of the colonies, mandates, and protectorates was 
delivered by civil servants who are described as political administrators, tribal control officers, political officers, 
civil political administrators, and other similar titles. 
27
 For example, Gerald de Gaury, an SSO in Iraq in the mid-1920s, later served as Britain’s political agent in 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq from 1936 – 39, and was the British Chargé d’Affaires in 1941.  In 1942, he 
raised a force of Druze irregulars in Syria and had Wilfred Thesiger, a former political officer in Sudan, as one 
of the squadron commanders.  Obituary, Asian Affairs, vol. 15, no. 2, (1984), pp. 227 – 28.  Interestingly, 
Thesiger’s boss in Sudan had been Guy Moore, another former SSO from Iraq, who ‘taught him to appreciate 
deserts and to treat the men with whom he lived and travelled as companions instead of servants’.  Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, Jan 2007), accessed at 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/92678 on 13 Sep 2015. 
28
 TNA AIR 23/298, Ltr from Glubb to I-branch, (13 Mar 1926), p. 2. 
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supplies to areas inaccessible by ground transport, evacuate sick and injured, and drop 
leaflets. And, when punitive air operations were approved, the RAF SSOs would normally 
control and assess the application of air-delivered effects.   
It is this understudied area, the mechanism by which the RAF integrated air power into 
the civilian colonial policing process that this thesis will explore.  It will be shown that the 
RAF recognised that the problem of tribal control was more than a military one and that the 
Air Force’s role was to support the civil political administration, especially in the ‘wilder’ 
regions of the empire.
29
  The importance of air-political integration was made clear from the 
very beginning.  In May 1920, in an addendum to the Preliminary Scheme for the Military 
control of Mesopotamia by the Royal Air Force he had submitted in March, Trenchard stated that 
‘the first essential in any scheme is the closest co-operations between the civil Government of 
the country and the Service responsible for the safety of that Government’.30  By 1930, the 
Air Ministry was clear in its guidance to airmen that air control included air power’s ‘use by 
political authorities in the ordinary cause of peace time administration’.31   
Air-political integration was by no means perfect—civilian non-combatants were killed 
and mistakes were made, but that does not negate the point that the RAF grasped the political 
nature of air power and colonial policing, and that it created an effective means of fusing the 
two.
32
  This thesis proposes that it was the RAF SSOs that ‘made air control work’ in Iraq, 
Transjordan, and Aden, and that lessons learned in this ‘successful prototype [of tribal control 
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from the air]’ encouraged the British to try and apply the air control scheme to other frontier 
regions of the empire as the SSOs moved on to other jobs and other regions, and the lessons 
of air-political integration were attempted beyond the Middle East.
33
  Therefore, this thesis 
will address this gap in the historiography of the period in order to determine how Britain 
worked with political officers and RAF SSOs to incorporate air power into the colonial 




Britain’s strategic situation between the World Wars—dire economic circumstances, 
increasing autonomy in the Dominions (in 1926, these were Canada, Australia, 
Newfoundland, the Union of South Africa, the Irish Free State, and New Zealand), growing 
Indian and Irish nationalism, and foreign entanglements in Russia, Turkey, and the newly 
mandated territories under British ‘protection’, distracted from her diplomatic and economic 
efforts to create the League of Nations and generated a popular preference for disarmament.  
Anthony Clayton, in The British Empire as a Superpower: 1919 – 1939, observed that British 
politicians focused on the empire and maintaining Britain’s international primacy as a means 
of arresting or concealing the realities of industrial unrest, very high unemployment, and a 
worsening economic predicament at home.
35
  The challenges Britain faced to control and 
maintain its disparate and global empire, especially in the ‘wilder’ and ‘uncivilised’ reaches, 
                                                          
33
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bear a tempting similarity to the military and political situations facing the United States and 





Clayton also noted that in order to maintain its desired primacy as an international 
power, Britain exploited new military technologies to create a perception of power to control 
the colonies and protectorates during the post-war reconfiguration.
37
  In the course of 
demobilising the massive army it had created to fight the First World War, aeroplanes and 
radio communications were combined to create an innovative and less costly means of 
policing the empire.  Then, as now, technology, or ‘mechanical contrivances’, offered a 
tempting alternative to military manpower.
38
   
During the inter-war period air forces replaced battalions of British and colonial soldiers 
that had traditionally served as frontier constabulary policing the empire.  In Mesopotamia 
(now Iraq), Transjordan (now Jordan), and Aden (now Yemen), Britain successfully 
substituted air forces for the ground forces it had traditionally used to control indigenous 
populations and maintain stable environments for British economic interests.
39
  While 
modern critics have decried the ethics of RAF imperial policing operations between the wars, 
in terms of what Britain needed from its air force in the 1920s and 30s—reducing the number 
of army battalions, decreasing the financial cost of imperial policing, minimising friendly 
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casualties during military operations, and providing stability in economically unprofitable 
territories, air control was ‘successful’.40  
Terminology 
Before continuing, it is helpful to define exactly what was meant by air control, at least 
as it was understood by British airmen of the inter-war period charged with implementing or 
supporting tribal control policies.
41
  Neither the 1928 nor 1940 versions of the RAF War 
Manual provided a formal definition of air control.  In their respective chapters dealing with 
operations in ‘undeveloped and semi-civilised countries’, both manuals described air 
operations ‘against an enemy who has little or no industrial organization, and whose social 
and political system is comparatively primitive in form’, but they gave no formal definition 
of air control.
42
  The manuals characterised the tactical environment as air operations against 
a ‘semi-civilized enemy’ as undertaken with the aim of either ‘creating or restoring law and 
order within a country’s borders [an internal control focus], or subduing a turbulent or 
troublesome people on or beyond a country’s frontiers [an external, defence, focus]’.43  The 
most helpful definition was found in 1930 Air Staff Memorandum 46, Notes on Air Control 
in Undeveloped Countries.  The first paragraph is titled, ‘Definition of Air Control’.  There it 
states that in the ‘political administration [emphasis added] of undeveloped countries 
inhabited by backward and semi-civilised populations…control is applied by aircraft as the 
primary arm, supplemented by forces on the ground’.44  This emphasis on air power as an aid 
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to political administration is important and the archival sources and journals from the inter-
war period are consistent in their advocacy of air power as an aid to civil authorities during 
peacetime.
45
  The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff further limited the definition of air control to 
tribal control, a local level focus that is generally missed by modern researchers attempting to 
apply the air control concept to sovereign nations,  
the term ‘Air Control’ is generally confined to the type of air operations which we use to 
maintain order in tribal districts, to support the political administration and possibly 
impose the will of the government in undeveloped countries inhabited by backward and 
semi-civilised populations’.46 
In 1922, when the RAF was assigned responsibility for imperial policing in Iraq, the pre-
requisite assumptions by the Colonial Office were ‘no imminence of danger from external 
attack’ and ‘the country free from organised rebellion, but liable to ordinary spasmodic 
disturbances’.47  The RAF’s two war manuals also reiterated the primacy of moral 
(psychological) factors when dealing with ‘a savage enemy’, a point that was first brought 
out six years prior in C.D. 22, the Royal Air Force’s Operations Manual,48 suggesting that 




David Omissi, in Air power and colonial control, defined air control as the point when 
the Air Ministry assumed responsibility for the defence of a particular region of the empire.  
He noted that air control was comprised of two broad elements, air policing—when aircraft 
were used to uphold the internal security of a state, and air substitution—when aircraft 
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replaced other forms of military force in imperial defence.
50
  Ian Philpott, in The Royal Air 
Force:  An Encyclopaedia of the Inter-war Years, Vol. I, took the narrower definition of air 
control, the ‘maintenance of internal security in a territory primarily through the use of 
aircraft’.51  Philpott differed with Omissi on the definition of air substitution, stating that it 
did not mean the total replacement of ground units.  Instead, Philpott defined air substitution 
in terms of command and control, i.e., reversing the traditional war-fighting arrangement of 
air forces supporting land forces by placing the Army in support of air forces, and avoiding 
the emotional issue of air power ‘going it alone’ in irregular warfare.52  As to be expected, 
this ‘reversed roles’ perspective is generally promoted by the RAF’s doctrinal literature of the 
era, 
the main striking arm to overcome resistance is air forces, the role of the forces on the 
ground (which term covers armoured vehicles, regular or irregular troops, armed police 
or tribal forces) being to provide the protection required at aerodromes, to maintain order 
in main centres, and, when necessary, to reap the fruits of an air operation after the main 
resistance has been overcome.
53
   
The historiography shows that such an arrangement was not universally successful, but under 
certain conditions it did force compliance from the tribes.  This thesis limits itself then, to the 
internal control perspective and thus defines air control as the sum total of air-oriented 
actions taken to influence the behaviour of local populations and adversaries to conform to 
desired standards of conduct. 
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The Leadership 
Many of the key senior leaders who served the RAF during the Second World War 
gained operational or senior staff experiences policing the colonies and the Mandates 
between the wars.  Sir John Slessor noted that the air control experience ‘had little effect on 
RAF strategy and doctrine, but was more important as a formative experience for many RAF 
officers’, serving as ‘little more than an extension of training’.54  Still, the possible impact of 
air policing and frontier constabulary operations on the RAF’s future leadership is worth 
considering.  For example, Sir Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris, who would lead Bomber Command 
during the war, commanded 31 Sqn on the NW Frontier and 45 Sqn in Iraq.  From 1938 – 39, 
Harris was the Air Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.  Sir Ralph Cochrane 
served under Harris at 45 Sqn in Iraq and then later commanded 8 Sqn in Aden.  During the 
Second World War Cochrane would command three bomber groups.  Sir John Slessor 
commanded 3 Wing in Waziristan.  He would command Coastal Command and also serve as 
the commander of the RAF in the Mediterranean and Middle East.  Slessor would go on to 
become the Chief of the Air Staff.  Sir Arthur Coningham commanded 55 Sqn in Iraq, was a 
staff officer at RAF Middle East, and was later a senior air staff officer in Sudan.  Coningham 
would command the Western Desert Air Force and later the 2
nd
 Tactical Air Force.  Charles 
Portal, 1
st
 Viscount of Hungerford, was the commander of British forces in Aden, 1934 – 36.  
Portal would serve as Chief of the Air Staff during the Second World War.  Short synopses of 
their biographies are at Appendix 1.  
The Literature 
In his 1957 autobiography, Sir John Slessor observed that the roles for air power 
between the wars went beyond air policing and included cooperation with the Army during 
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combat operations, reconnaissance and cartography, troop transport, disaster relief, surveying 
air routes, and maritime surveillance.
55
  Slessor’s earlier book Air Power and Armies, based 
on his Camberley lectures, noted that air power was intimately linked to land power.  On the 
first page he wrote, 
The object of an army in a land campaign is to defeat the enemy’s army; that of the air 
force contingent in the field is to assist and co-operate with that army in the defeat of the 
enemy’s army, and of such air forces as may be co-operating with it.56 
Although Air Power and Armies did not deny the importance of army co-operation during 
conventional conflict, Slessor’s purpose for writing it was to ‘was to draw attention to the 
other aspect of air power … [and] the positive influence which can be exerted by an air 
striking force in direct attack upon objectives on the ground’.57  Air Power and Armies 
outlined the principles of air power as: centralised control, concentration of physical and 
moral force against the enemy’s decisive points, and exploiting the speed, range, and 
flexibility of air forces to conduct both air and land-oriented tasks across a theatre of 
operations.
58
  Slessor also noted that a key strength of air power was its ability to reach an 
objective independently from lines of communication (LOCs) without having to defend its 
flanks.  Air power’s independence from land LOCs became an important point during the 
debates over the effectiveness of air forces substituting for land forces, especially in areas 
such as the North-West Frontier of India and Africa which were inaccessible to the political 
agents because of distance, difficulty, or danger.
59
  Slessor also acknowledged the relatively 
benign threat to aircraft when fighting guerrillas, observing that against a first-class enemy an 
air force would first need to divert some proportion of its energy to neutralising enemy air 
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forces ‘in order to reduce the numbers or the morale of the hostile air forces that it does 
[emphasis in original] encounter on the way to and from its primary objectives’.60 
David Omissi’s comprehensive analysis of the air control scheme, Air power and 
colonial control:  The Royal Air Force 1919 – 1939, has been a key reference document and 
the starting point for most other researchers’ efforts into air control.61  Omissi’s work 
confines much of its discussion to the kinetic effects of bombing and strafing misbehaving 
tribal groups.  The sections on air operations in Palestine and Ireland highlight the limitations 
of kinetically-based air control methods, especially in urban environments, reinforcing a 
point made early in the book that both Trenchard and Churchill recognised that air power and 
the RAF had limited utility to supress ‘industrial disturbances … in settled countries such as 
India, Egypt, Ireland, and England’.62  Omissi contends that the negative effects, the results 
of what we now label collateral damage to non-combatants, non-military infrastructure, and 
civilian livelihoods, served to galvanise opposition against British authorities and raised 
ethical questions regarding the methods used to implement air control methods.  In addition 
to its narrow emphasis on kinetic operations, the other major shortcoming with Omissi’s 
work is that it fails to consider the importance of the role played by the RAF’s Special 
Service Officers:  enabling, guiding, and reinforcing the full range of air power capabilities 
available at the time, and also helping to create a culture of co-operation with colonial 
administrators that reached well beyond Iraq. 
As will be seen in Chapters Two, Three, and Four, extensive use was made of archival 
records, predominantly from the Cabinet and Air Ministry papers.  As to be expected from 
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these largely official sources, the records held a bias towards justifying imperial policing 
policies and efforts to ensure a peacetime role for the Royal Air Force.  Of importance to this 
thesis though, is that examination of the archival sources shows the evolution of thought 
within the RAF from the beginning of the inter-war period to just before the Second World 
War.  At the beginning of the inter-war period the emphasis was on kinetic means as the basis 
of air policing, giving way to more positive air-oriented means of influencing the behaviour 
of indigenous peoples in co-operation with local political officers and colonial administrators 
as new and improved aircraft and aeronautical systems capabilities were developed, fielded, 
and tested, but also as the RAF put its cadre of acculturated airmen in place among the 
targeted populations.   
Contemporary dissent against the imperial policies and RAF’s policing methods was 
found among the press that was pushing the government to make good on wartime 
promises.
63
  Examples from The Times and the Daily Mail are shown in Chapters Two and 
Three.  It is also important to remember that few of the tribal populations ‘targeted’ under the 
air control scheme had access to Western journals or newspapers, even if they had been 
sufficiently literate in the English language to tell their ‘other side of the story’.   
The archival sources were supplemented with biographies, personal papers, oral 
histories, and journal articles of the period.  The Journal of the Royal United Service 
Institution (JRUSI), the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society (JRCAS), and the Journal 
of the United Service Institution of India (JUSII) proved to be the most helpful, although like 
the archival sources, these journals also exhibited expected biases related to maintaining the 
empire, protecting the independence of the RAF, and justifying the policy, strategy, and 
tactics of air control.  JRUSI is the one of the oldest and most respected defence journals in 
the world.  The RAF used the journal as a forum to defend its continued independence from 
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the Army and the Royal Navy, and also to explain and justify air policing operations during 
the inter-war years.  JRCAS was created in 1914 to ‘train men and inspire men … to support 
the interests of the Empire’, an overt acknowledgment of its imperialist perspective.64  That 
said, JRCAS seemed to offer a higher percentage of papers opposed to tribal control from the 
air than did JRUSI.  This might be explained by the diverse composition of the membership 
which included statesmen, diplomats, explorers, district officials, scholars, and desert 
surveyors, in addition to soldiers and airmen, a large percentage of whom had served in Asia, 
the Middle East, and Africa.
65
  While some claimed that the Royal Central Asia Society had 
an ‘atmosphere of gunpowder’, the percentage of military members ranged from about a third 
to half of the membership.  The number of articles opposed to tribal control from the air 
might also be because the Society saw its role as cutting across inter-departmental and 
functional boundaries, and offering its members the opportunity for sharing approaches and 
reconciling differences.
66
   
JUSII is a defence-oriented journal that has been published continuously for over 140 
years.  JUSII was helpful providing perspectives on tribal control operations, especially on 
the North-West Frontier, although its treatment of NWF operations tended towards an Army 
point of view because of the Army’s domination of military and political affairs in India.  To 
a lesser extent than in JRUSI, the RAF used JUSII as another forum to debate the application 
of air power to national defence challenges, especially those affecting India and Indian forces 
supporting imperial policies.
67
  As expected, the Royal Air Force Quarterly provided articles 
in favour of air policing and air substitution, while Army Quarterly leaned towards the Air 
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Force’s role as an important supporting arm (army co-operation) and usually decried any 
independent role for the Air Force in tribal control.   
The British Library produced two multi-volume collections of the archival intelligence 
records from the period, Afghanistan Strategic Intelligence, 1919 – 1970, and Iraq Defence 
Intelligence, 1920 – 1973, that proved to be extremely valuable by consolidating a great 
number of sources from the Air Ministry (AIR), Cabinet (CAB), Colonial Office (CO), 
Foreign Office (FO), and War Office (WO) records related to intelligence functions.  These 
volumes provide copies of the originals, including hand-written corrections and margin notes, 
rather than transcriptions of the originals, all collated in chronological order (vice by primary 
subject area).  This format allows researchers ready access to these valuable primary 
sources.
68
  Although the editors focused on theatre-level British sources, the copies of the 
original documents provided in these references offered valuable insight into the strategic and 
operational-level effects of air control operations from the British perspective. 
To comprehend the necessity for employing air power in imperial constabulary duties 
during the inter-war period it was necessary to understand the state of the British economy 
and British and commonwealth forces following the First World War.  As with others seeking 
to understand the ‘Gordian Knot of imperial defence needs’, Keith Jeffery’s work, The 
British Army and the Crisis of Empire, 1918 – 1922, offered insight as to the crisis in 
manpower, relationships with the Dominions and colonies, and the impact of fiscal austerity 
measures on an over-stretched army.
69
  Post-war, the appropriate role of air forces was a 
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source of lively and sometimes rancorous debate. An exciting mix of science fiction writers, 
airmen and soldiers, politicians, and inventors were all exploring possible applications and 
implications for the new technology.
70
  Michael Paris, in his book Winged Warfare:  The 
Literature and Theory of Aerial Warfare in Britain, 1859 – 1917, observed that,  
If [H.G.] Wells saw aviation as an offensive weapon, Rudyard Kipling saw it as a means of 
social control….Kipling’s concept of air power became a reality some twenty years later when 
the RAF became involved in the policing of the Middle East.  Interestingly, Hugh Trenchard, 
defending his ‘air control’ policy in [April] 1925, could write [in The Times] in such 
Kiplingesque terms:  ‘Air is the greatest civilizing influence these countries have ever 
known...Air methods are the reverse of the old punitive column.  Our policy is one of 
prevention.’   
Among the three Services, the question was often couched in binary terms—was air power 
able to bring about a strategic decision on its own or was it primarily an adjunct to land and 
naval power?  Airmen in Britain and the United States tended to argue that air forces could be 
equally as decisive as the army or the navy in forcing a military decision.  Unfortunately, the 
First World War ended before Britain’s strategic bomber force was able to carry out the full 
range of planned operations against all the strategic targets it had identified.  British airmen 
were constrained to demonstrating the validity of their hypothesis in the ‘laboratory’ they 
were given—imperial policing duties in the less ‘civilised’ regions of the empire.  That 
constraint was specified by Churchill in December 1919, in a statement to the House of 
Commons while serving as the Secretary of State for War and Air,  
I must remind the Honourable Members that we have still an Empire to defend.  …we 
have all those dependencies and possessions in our hands which existed before the war, 
and in addition we have large promises of new responsibilities to be placed upon us.  The 
first duty of the RAF is to garrison the Empire.
71
   
 
It was also helpful to review the character of irregular warfare and how insurgents 
combine violence and ideology to achieve political, social, or economic ends.  Joint 
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Publication 1, Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Unites States, defines irregular warfare as 
‘violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the 
relevant population’.72  Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, 
elaborates on the definition by adding ‘irregular warfare can include a variety of steady-state 
and surge DoD activities and operations:  counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; foreign 
internal defense; counterinsurgency; and stability operations that, in the context of IW, 
involve establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state’.73  Modern policy and doctrines 
for irregular warfare are based heavily on the classic writings such as Mao Zedong’s On 
Guerrilla Warfare, Charles Callwell’s Small Wars, David Galula’s Counterinsurgency 
Warfare, T.E. Lawrence’s ‘Evolution of a Revolt’, Bard E. O’Neill’s, Insurgency and 
Terrorism, and Frank Kitson’s Low-intensity Operations, to name but a few. 74   
Callwell’s Small Wars was another important reference to consider.  Originally written 





  Small Wars offered soldiers a version of doctrine to help address the 
challenges of guerrilla warfare.  As Small Wars originally written before the advent of 
powered, manned flight, it was naturally written from a soldier’s two-dimensional 
perspective.  That said, Small Wars offered some principles of irregular and counter-
insurgency operations that have proven to be enduring and agnostic of physical domain, such 
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as the importance of subjective forms of intelligence.
76
  Two to three decades later, airmen 
arguing for the application of air methods to colonial control turned land-centric documents 
such as these around, using similar arguments to suggest how air power might achieve results 
similar to what their Army counterparts realised against irregular opponents.   
Colin Gray observed that the distinction between irregular warfare and insurgency tends 
to be an academic exercise that lends little to understanding the complexity and subtle 
nuances of the subjects.  Official definitions, he said, tended to be ‘encyclopaedic and are 
utterly indigestible’, and the result was an array of terms with minor, subtle differences, all 
describing the same phenomenon.
77
  Professor Gray then goes on to ask, ‘Are we talking 
about irregular warfare, insurgency, low-intensity conflict, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and 
so forth?  The answer is yes, and more than those’.78  John Arquilla from the Naval 
Postgraduate School reinforced the point by noting ‘efforts to simplify the concept of 
irregular warfare have tended to slight the complex elements that are so necessary to a proper 
understanding of the phenomenon’.79  For the purpose of this study classic counter-
insurgency theory and doctrine, with a smattering of current perspectives added, forms the 
basis of the irregular warfare theory and doctrine considered. 
Understanding irregular warfare and insurgent strategies helps to link the air control 
lessons from the inter-war period with the current conflict environment, an important point if 
lessons from the period are to be of value to modern analysts.  The character of irregular 
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warfare and insurgency has been extensively and persuasively covered, from both sides of the 
issue – insurgent and counter-insurgent.80   
One would have expected the parallels between irregular warfare and the early concepts 
of employment for air power to spark previous research, but there is surprisingly little 
available when compared to the amount of writing and depth of analysis devoted to air power 
in conventional conflicts.  Perhaps this is to be expected given that until very recently most 
airmen tended towards a near singular focus on discussions of air power’s potential war-
winning capacity in interstate, conventional-regular warfare.  The official disdain towards 
small wars by airmen had its roots in the earliest doctrinal manuals—‘The principles laid 
down … for the conduct of air operations hold good whether the enemy is a highly developed 
nation, or an uncivilized tribe…’.81  And while there have been notable exceptions, such as 
presentations at the Royal United Service Institution, the Royal Central Asian Society, and 
the United Service Institution of India that considered the role of air power through the lens 
of Callwell’s Small Wars,82 chapters in the Royal Air Force’s doctrinal publications of the 
period,
83
 and references to aviation employment at the tactical level in the US Marine Corps’ 
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 air power’s appropriate role in irregular warfare, especially since the 
end of the Second World War, if considered at all, was near-universally relegated to a lesser-
included subset of an air force’s primary responsibilities.   
Meilinger, in ‘Trenchard and “Morale Bombing”,’ pointed out that ‘although air policing 
was a major RAF mission between the wars, it was not something the Service wanted to 
“hang its doctrinal hat on”…such operations were considered of far less importance than 
conventional air warfare’.85  In April 1962, the USAF created the Special Air Warfare Center 
in response to President Kennedy’s call to develop forces and tactics suitable for counter-
insurgency warfare.
86
  Simultaneously though, the Chief of Staff, General Curtis E. LeMay, 
directed his subordinate commanders that counter-insurgency was a ‘lesser form of warfare in 
an airman’s perspective, vice a different type’.87  David Dean, a researcher at the USAF’s Air 
University in the 1980s, suggested that in the aftermath of Vietnam, the US Air Force 
avoided consideration of the methods, means, and doctrines necessary for success in small 
wars.
88
  And, while there are excellent, relevant case studies regarding both the successful 
and unsuccessful applications of air power to irregular conflicts, the systematic and 
unemotional consideration of air power doctrine, organisation, force structure, training, and 
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equipment appropriate for irregular conflict has tended to be a subject of junior officer debate 
as successive generations of post-Second World War Air Force leaders concentrated on 
policy development and equipment procurement best suited for warfare at the high end of the 
technology spectrum.
89
  Greg Kennedy captured the general sense of disdain for irregular 
warfare among Cold War airmen when he observed that, ‘The Atomic Age was also the Air 
Age, and all small wars and minor roles were seen as either an annoyance or an interesting 
sidelight in the post-Second World War RAF world’.90 
In the 1943 edition of Makers of Modern Strategy, Edward Warner’s essay on the origins 
of air warfare theories, ‘Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky:  Theories of Air Warfare’, centred on 
the survival of the air arm as an independent Service.
91
  Warner’s essay looked at the 
influence of Italian air power theorist, Giulio Douhet, on the development of air power 
strategies in the US, Great Britain, France, and Germany.  Curiously though, Warner 
completely ignored Trenchard’s efforts to create and sustain the world’s first independent air 
force, his contributions to air power theory, and his influence upon Mitchell.  Other theorists 
of the era such as J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart took notice that the aeroplane had added 
a third, vertical, dimension to war-fighting.
92
  Liddell Hart wrote that the nation that 
developed their air power had the ability to achieve strategic results through tactical actions.  
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Aircraft would ‘jump over the army which shields the enemy government, industry, and 
people, and so strike direct and immediately at the seat of the opposing will and policy’.93  
[emphasis in original]  In Paris or The Future of War, Liddell Hart noted that the focus of 
military operations had changed from ‘destruction of the enemy’s armed forces in the main 
theatre of war’ to ‘subdue the enemy’s will to resist, with the least possible human and 
economic loss to itself’.94  This shift in emphasis is an important point to note and offers 
clues as to the roots of British strategic thinking about the role of air power.  J.F.C. Fuller 
takes a similar position, predicting a change to a ‘new means of war…based on destroying 
command …before it has been attacked’ using ‘novelty of means’ to economize military 
force.
95
  The shift in theoretical focus noted by Liddell Hart, Fuller, and others, from the 
enemy army to the willpower of the enemy leadership would be reflected in contemporary 
thinking related to air control.   
In Airmen and Air Theory:  A Review of the Sources, Meilinger pointed out that the 
difference between US and British air power theory before the Second World War was that 
American airmen focused on the physical domain, attacking industries, transportation 
networks, and communications nodes in order to destroy enemy war-making capabilities.  
British theory also advocated attacking enemy industries, transportations networks, and 
communications nodes, but as a means of affecting the moral domain by disrupting lives and 
livelihoods of the citizenry in order to make life so difficult and onerous that the populace 
would demand their leaders end the war.
96
  The research indicated that British emphasis on 
the moral domain, disrupting and inconveniencing the lives and routines of the populace in 
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order to force a decision by the leadership was reflected in tactics and strategies the RAF 
employed to control indigenous peoples on the frontiers of its empire.   
Research into the doctrinal foundations for air control revealed an interesting twist.  
Slessor wrote that in 1924, as a student at the RAF Staff College, the airmen in those early 
classes had no air-oriented doctrine to guide them.
97
  This is a remarkable assertion 
considering that C.D. 22, the RAF’s Operations Manual, was published in July 1922.  Allen 
English, in ‘The RAF Staff College and the Evolution of British Strategic Bombing Policy, 
1922 – 1929’, pointed out that C.D. 22 was one of ‘two key publications used on the first 
courses [at Andover] as references’.  After 1923, C.D. 22 was issued to every officer who 
attended the Staff College.
98
  It and other doctrinally relevant documents such as Air Staff 
Memoranda and Air Staff Notes were being produced and distributed to RAF officers at the 
time.
99
  And, although Omissi contends that the constabulary operations on the frontiers had 
no influence on the training and doctrine required for European war, the fact that the earliest 
RAF Operations Manual devoted a short chapter to ‘Aircraft in Warfare against an 
Uncivilised Enemy’, along with the experience future leaders of the RAF would gain during 
imperial policing duties, suggests there was likely some measure of inspiration and future 
influence, at the least in the British continued emphasis of the moral over the physical 
domain.  Slessor did acknowledge that a cadre of British airmen who had served under 
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Trenchard’s leadership and tutelage had the vision and the faith to evolve a ‘theory of air 
warfare based on the supremacy of the offensive, which was to be triumphantly vindicated 
twenty years later’.100 
Robin Higham, Malcolm Smith, and Tami Davis-Biddle all noted that while some of 
Douhet’s work may have been available in English in 1923, there is no evidence to suggest 
that Douhet had any significant influence on the development of the RAF’s theory and 
doctrine in the decade following the First World War.
101
  Higham goes so far as to claim 
Frederick Sykes and P.R.C. Groves had begun work on a British theory of air power before 
the war and ‘submitted it as a Cabinet paper in 1918, long before Douhet’s work was 
known’.102  Slessor denied any influence by Douhet on the RAF during those early years, 
stating, ‘We were not (strange though it may seem) nurtured on the pure milk of Douhet.  I 
had never heard of him in those days and even now have never read him’.103  During the 
1930s, the Royal Air Force Quarterly published articles based upon Douhet’s theories, but by 
that time the RAF had firmly established its own, indigenous, theoretical foundation and the 
articles about Douhet may have been little more than discussion pieces to show that others 
had developed similar intellectual theories for the employment of air power.
104
  In America, 
the Air Corps Tactical School had copies of the 1923 English translation of Douhet’s 
Command of the Air and were studying, copying, and distributing excerpts from it in order to 
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apply the theories to the American strategic situation.
105
  While the air power debates of the 
period, at least in Great Britain and the United States, focused on the future role of air forces 
as a decisive force in conventional, interstate warfare, a few airmen made the linkage 
between aerial warfare and guerrilla warfare. 
In 1920, A.E. Borton, who had commanded British air forces in Palestine during the war 
and worked with T.E. Lawrence to support the Arab irregulars during the Palestine campaign, 
gave a lecture at Royal United Service Institution (RUSI) which showed how air power might 
be employed in small war scenarios.
106
  He was one of the first in a series of British airmen 
who, over the next few years, would lecture at RUSI, the Royal Central Asian Society, and 
elsewhere to make the case for air power’s role policing the frontiers.107 
Lawrence published ‘Evolution of a Revolt’ in the Army Quarterly and Defence Journal 
in 1920.  In 1935, he published an expanded recollection of his experiences, Seven Pillars of 
Wisdom:  A Triumph, which described the lessons he had derived from his experiences with 
the Arabs during the First World War.  In both of these publications Lawrence noted that 
irregular forces could be anywhere, but also nowhere, forcing the enemy to defend 
everywhere at great cost of manpower and resources.  This notion of an indefensible threat 
would echo in later arguments made by air power advocates.   
Irregular forces, wrote Lawrence, held the initiative as to when and where to give battle, 
containing the enemy ‘by the silent threat of a vast unknown desert, not disclosing ourselves 
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till we attacked’.108  Irregular warfare was war of detachment waged by maintaining 
separation from one’s opponent and sustaining an ever-likely threat of combat vice the 
conventional-regular strategy of war of attachment, based upon maintaining constant contact 
with the enemy in order to avert tactical surprises.
109
  From 1916 until the end of the First 
World War, Lawrence honed and refined his ‘doctrine’ of irregular warfare, drawing a 
distinction between ‘modern war’, the conventional, highly technical, war of attachment 
between nations and the irregular, detached, Arab way of war.
110
   
What was also interesting to note was Lawrence’s growing inclination towards air power 
and the germination of a theme he would later build upon when advocating the air control 
scheme to sceptics.  In the spring of 1918, during General Allenby’s Palestine campaign, 
Lawrence had the opportunity to witness the efficacy of air power, especially in the context 
of irregular warfare.  He recorded that Arab irregulars would often quit the fight and return 
home whenever the Turks or Germans attacked them from the air.
111
  Likening the enemy’s 
air threat to his irregulars to the threat those same irregulars posed to the conventional 
Turkish forces, Lawrence realised the characteristics of air power made it possible to hold his 
entire guerrilla force at risk.
112
  But, he also saw the value of friendly air power as what today 
is called a force multiplier—providing reconnaissance, fire support, re-supply, and 
communications to the Arabs.
113
  Among the airmen assigned to Allenby, working with and 
supporting Lawrence, was Borton, whom Lawrence labelled a man ‘avid of novelty’ because 
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of his tendency to find innovative solutions to complex problems.
114
  In 1922, Borton would 
serve as the commander of Air Force forces under Sir John Salmond when the RAF took over 
imperial policing duties in Iraq. 
Lawrence recognised that irregular warfare, with its emphasis on the threat of force 
rather than actual application of force, shifted conflict into the moral (psychological) domain 
by denying an enemy the opportunity for physical contact.  Upon calculating the number of 
men a conventional Turkish army would need to control the Arabian Peninsula against Arab 
irregulars supported by British air power, what Lawrence called the ‘algebraic’ element, 
Lawrence realised that the number was staggering—in the range of 600,000 men.115  The 
Turks, unable to find and fight the Arabs, and with their units essentially confined to a few 
cities and the fortified outposts along the railway lines became ‘like plants, immobile, firm-
rooted, nourished through long stems to the head’.  The Arab irregulars could control the 
‘biological’ element of the fight by taking away the Turks’ ability to apply superior military 
capabilities and tactics in combat.
116
  Hard pressed to strike a decisive blow and living under 
the near constant threat of an Arab irregular force that might mass and overwhelm an outpost 
or detachment, and also faced with the added reality that British air power was able to 
reconnoitre and strike with near impunity throughout the region, Turkish forces ceded control 
of the region. 
Lawrence claimed that he suggested to Churchill, while the latter was still the Secretary 
of State for War and Air, and before the 1921 Cairo Conference, that aeroplanes could 
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substitute for battalions as a means of controlling tribal behaviour in the Middle Eastern 
Mandates.
117
  Lawrence told his biographer,  
The war showed me that a combination of armoured cars and aircraft could rule the 
desert:  but that they must be under non-army control, and without infantry support. 
… As soon as I was able to have a voice on the Middle East, I approached Trenchard 
on the point, and with Winston’s eager support persuaded the Cabinet swiftly into 
approving (against the wiles of Henry Wilson [Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff])—and it has worked very well.118 
Considering that as early as August 1919, Trenchard had suggested to Churchill that air 
power could be an effective deterrent against hostile actions by ‘semi-civilised’ opponents,119 
Lawrence’s claim to be the originator of the air control scheme may not be completely 
accurate.
120
  His contention though, that aircraft, as ‘winged irregulars’ would do tomorrow 
what the Arabs had recently done to the Turks in the Great War, ‘yet more swiftly…with an 
intangibly ubiquitous distribution of force—pressing everywhere yet assailable nowhere’, 
proved to be a prescient glimpse of RAF air control operations.
121
 
Lawrence’s theories and his predictions about the efficacy of air power in an irregular 
context dovetailed nicely with the theoretical constructs being considered by those who 
envisioned a more strategic role for air power.  The early air power theorists noted that air 
power had a similar, perceived ubiquity as guerrillas and aeroplanes’ abilities to range the 
depth and breadth of the battlespace with seeming impunity made it possible for them to 
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strike at the time and place of the attacker’s choosing.  In a 1932 speech to the House of 
Commons, Stanley Baldwin noted the challenge of defending against air power, 
In the next war you will find any town within the reach of an aerodrome can be bombed 
within the first five minutes of war to an extent inconceivable in the last war and the 
question is whose morale will be shattered quickest by preliminary bombing. … I think it 
well also for the man in the street to realize there is no power on earth that can protect 
him from bombing, whatever people may tell him.  The bomber will always get through, 
and it is very easy to understand if you realize area and space.
122
 
Just as Lawrence’s irregulars were seemingly able to be everywhere, yet nowhere, Baldwin’s 
speech pointed out air power’s perceived ability to hold an entire nation at risk without being 
physically present.  The similarities between irregular forces and air power did not go 
completely unnoticed however, which may help to explain why those seeking innovative 
solutions to the problems of policing the empire would propose air power as a tool to counter 
the power of the irregular adversaries on the frontiers of the empire.
123
 
Toby Dodge, in Inventing Iraq:  The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied, 
observed that British state-building efforts in Iraq after the First World War suffered from a 
tension brought about by London’s commitment to join the three provinces of Iraq:  Mosul, 
Baghdad, and Basra, into a modern, independent state and also from resistance by colonial 
administrators who had been brought up in the long-standing traditions of the Indian colonial 
model opposed to indigenous self-determination.
124
  Within the British government, there 
was no consensus on the future governance of Iraq, due in part to the competing influences of 
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the major policy-making centres of the British Empire—London and Delhi.125  The League of 
Nations intended, and the British accepted, that at some point the Mandates would gain their 
independence.
126
  Therefore, during the summer of 1920 the British replaced A.T. Wilson 
with Percy Cox as the High Commissioner in Baghdad.  Cox was directed to implement a 
series of programmes that would find new ways to reduce the cost of administering the Iraq 
Mandate and would lead that nation to an independent state.
127
  Accordingly, by 1928 all 
British and Indian army units had departed Iraq.  Differences between British interests in the 




Peter Sluglett, in Britain in Iraq:  Contriving King and Country, summarised the 
dilemma Churchill faced in the aftermath of the war.  For his own political survival, but also 
for British economic reasons, he needed to reduce the cost of imperial defence while also 
maintaining Britain’s commercial interests and political prestige abroad.129  With multiple 
competing demands on the Exchequer, large imperial expenditures for the Middle East could 
not be defended in Parliament or to the British taxpayers.  During a December 1920 Cabinet 
meeting, Churchill questioned of the cost of policing Mesopotamia by the War Office,  
Criticism of the Government’s expenditure was becoming every day more insistent, 
particularly from the Government’s own supporters, and it was clear that the country 
would demand that the permanent military expenditure of the future should be 
vigorously reduced.  This was especially the case as regards Mesopotamia.
130
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Churchill needed a means that would establish and maintain peace among the indigenous 
people of the Mandates, at minimal cost.
131
  With Cabinet policy assuming there would be no 
major threat to Britain for at least ten years, 
 
a need to find financial economies in the Army 
and Air Force Estimates, and the Air Force offering an innovative solution, Churchill found a 
willing collaborator in Trenchard.
132
 
Philip Towle, Peter Sluglett, Priya Satia, and Martin Thomas’ related works all add to 
the understanding of British air control and air policing policy between the World Wars, how 
the air control scheme was implemented in the Middle East, and their perspectives on the 
resulting effects.
 133
  These modern references provide historical and cultural analyses of what 
happened.  None, however, looked much beyond bombing and strafing in their discussions of 
air control.  Their discussions of intelligence and air integration tended towards political 
intelligence and the use of spies, rather than how the RAF used SSOs and civil administrators 
to assess local situations, recommend appropriate air-delivered effects, and direct the 
application of air power. 
T.R. Moreman’s research into the development of frontier warfare techniques on the 
North-west Frontier of India provided great insight into the challenges of tribal control in that 
theatre of British Empire, especially the ‘inability of the local political administration to 
                                                          
131
 Sir Frederick Sykes, as Chief of the Air Staff from Apr 1918 to Jan 1919, had raised the issue of air forces 
‘for Imperial police work, mail carrying, and other public duties’, to deal with post-war frontier administration 
and control issues in India, the Middle East, West Africa, East Africa, and South Africa.  TNA CAB 24/71/79, 
GT 6477, Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff on Air Power Requirements of the Empire, (9 Dec 1918), 
pp. 7 – 13.   
132
 TNA AIR 9/14, Minute from Winston S. Churchill, Secretary of State for War, 29 Feb 1920, p. 1.  ‘I shall be 
glad if you will, without delay, submit a scheme and state whether you consider the internal security of the 
country [Mesopotamia] could be maintained by it [the Royal Air Force]’.  Keith Jeffery, The British Army and 
the Crisis of Empire, 1918 – 1922, (Manchester, UK:  Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 65 – 66. 
133
 Philip Anthony Towle, Pilots and Rebels:  The use of aircraft in unconventional warfare, 1918 – 1988, 
(Oxford, UK:  Brassey’s Ltd., 1989); Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq:  Contriving King and Country, (London:  
I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 2007); Priya Satia, Spies in Arabia:  The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of 
Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2008); Martin Thomas, 
Empires of Intelligence, (Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 2008). 
 36  
 
pacify the tribal territory’.134  Moreman documents how the relationship between military and 
civilian agencies in the tribal regions changed over time due to changing policies and 
priorities among the political leadership, and how this affected the armed Services attempting 
to control reluctant subjects through various means of persuasion and coercion.  
Newly published research by Robert S.G. Fletcher offered insight into British civilian 
administration of remote desert regions and control of the nomadic peoples who lived in the 
Middle East.
135
  In British Imperialism and ‘The Tribal Question’, Fletcher deals with the 
challenges of an expanding empire as Britain accepted responsibility for the Mandates.  In the 
course of describing how British officials overcame deficiencies in their knowledge and 
understanding of the empire’s desert corridor’ from Western Egypt to Iraq, and the Bedouin 
communities that had inhabited the region for centuries.
136
  The book notes how a mixture of 
coercion, collaboration, and control had been used for centuries to influence the behaviour of 
the Bedouin.  ‘Tribal Question’ is a valuable addition to the understanding of the era in that it 
offers a perspective of the desert peoples Britain was charged to oversee in the region—an 
angle overlooked by the predominant analyses that focused on burgeoning Arab nationalism, 
Britain’s post-war financial challenges, and post-war disarmament and globalism.  Fletcher 
affirms a point this thesis also makes, that in Iraq the RAF created the SSOs to take on many 
of the ‘duties formerly exercised by British Political Officers, including influencing tribal 
policy, directing military operations, and liaising between local inhabitants and groups’.137 
Another fairly modern work that attempts to analyse the experiences of Britain’s air 
control methods in order to glean lessons relevant to modern airmen is Airpower in Small 
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Wars:  Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists, by James Corum and Wray Johnson.
138
  In their 
chapter on British air control between the wars, Corum and Johnson briefly lay out the 
historical context and then conclude with an assessment of air control methods and how 
airmen have taken the wrong lessons from Britain’s air control experience.  They offer that 
air control was ‘good doctrine for casualty avoidance’, but as a strategy it failed to hold up in 
all but the most minor kinds of tribal policing operations, a theme that was picked up by some 
of their students at the USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies.
139
  Corum and 
Johnson’s chapter covering the inter-war period also includes a comparison with French, 
Spanish, and Italian air control efforts.
140
  Corum and Johnson make no mention of the SSOs, 
which is most likely due to the encyclopaedic nature of their work than to oversight.  Because 
the book covers so many case studies of air power in small wars, beginning with the 
Americans’ campaign against Pancho Villa in 1916 and ending with Israel’s intervention in 
Lebanon in 1982, the descriptions and analyses were necessarily brief.  The value of the book 
though, was that it re-invigorated the professional discussion of air power’s role in irregular 
conflict at a time when the US Army and US Marine Corps were leading the development of 
new ground-centric doctrine for counter-insurgency in the United States.  
In 2002, Stephen Biddle from the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute 
examined the initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the US intervention in 
Afghanistan to take down al Qaeda and the Taliban, as a potential model for the use of 
modern air power in unconventional warfare.
141
  In his monograph, Biddle proposed an 
‘Afghan Model’, the combination of special operations forces (SOF) embedded with 
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indigenous allies, re-enforced by precision air power, as constituting a new template for 
modern war.
142
  Biddle conceded that much of what happened in northern Afghanistan during 
this opening phase of OEF, while asymmetric in character, was also very conventional in 
execution.
143
  The role of US SOF was to advise Afghan leaders, control coalition air power, 
and coordinate the operations of disparate indigenous armed groups.  The value of Biddle’s 
work is that it affirmed the importance of embedded, acculturated airmen, able to integrate 
the requirements of indigenous ground forces with the processes and procedures necessary to 
plan for, employ, and assess the effects of modern air power.  Biddle provided another 
affirmation of one of this thesis’ key premises—that airmen on the ground and among the 
indigenous population, gaining and maintaining situational awareness, and able to integrate 
the full range of air-delivered effects, was a crucial requirement for effective air operations in 
irregular conflict.  Biddle, like the air control advocates between the wars, acknowledged a 
requirement for some ‘boots on the ground’, and hinted at the possibility that there may be 
situations when air power could be the leading element.  Biddle’s contribution, although a 
state versus state perspective, is that he affirms what the RAF discovered—that it took 
knowledgeable airmen on the ground in order to effectively bring the full potential of air 
power to bear in irregular conflict. 
The second, and perhaps the most important contention in this thesis, is that contrary to 
much of what has been said in the historiography of the air control scheme, even in the recent 
examinations of the concept, the RAF’s efforts to control recalcitrant guerrillas on the edges 
of the empire clearly showed that the employment of SSOs in and among the subject peoples 
was significantly more sophisticated that the RAF is given credit for—a point largely 
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overlooked in most examinations of the era and the scheme.  While the use of SSOs should 
not be seen as adding a layer of humanity to imperial policing and tribal control, for these 
men were products of their time and reflected the prevailing attitudes of the era towards 
indigenous peoples, the RAF’s efforts were more comprehensive and multifaceted than 
simply rigid or brutal applications of punishment of those who resisted British colonial 
control.  Over the course of the inter-war period the RAF learned to take a more 
comprehensive approach, adding breadth and subtlety to the use of aircraft by combining 
kinetic and non-kinetic actions in order to achieve the desired political effects.  Much of what 
modern commentators suggest is the proper role for air power in modern ‘small wars’:  
surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, air transport, and army co-operation, can 
be seen in the work the RAF did over eighty years ago in the Middle East. 
Structure of the Thesis 
In order to address the key issues, this thesis will synthesise the existing body of 
literature and then use archival sources to fill in any gaps or to resolve discrepancies between 
sources.  This will offer a more complete and original interpretation and assessment of air 
power in constabulary, normally irregular, types of operations.  It will highlight the 
significance of kinetic and non-kinetic applications, as well as the importance of military, 
social, and economic intelligence, as well as cultural understanding in the planning for and 
delivery of air effects.  The thesis will also demonstrate that a subtler and more nuanced 
understanding of air control during the inter-war period has greater applicability when 
considering the use of air power in irregular warfare today.  
It begins with an examination of the rise of air control as a methodology by the British 
government, delivered through the newly-created Royal Air Force. It considers the reasons 
for moving towards what was a controversial and contentious approach to policing the 
colonies and mandated territories for which Britain gained responsibility in the aftermath of 
 40  
 
the First World War.  New approaches toward constabulary efforts on the frontiers of the 
empire were certainly required, since the old methods of dealing with uprisings, insurrections 
and other violent, localised expressions of dissent against British governance were simply not 
acceptable, both in terms of the financial costs to the British taxpayers or the potential 
casualties among British troops in a nation exhausted by the huge losses it sustained during 
the First World War.  
What Britain needed during the inter-war years from the restive tribes and rickety 
governments in the Middle East and the North-West Frontier was tranquillity and co-
operation sufficient to significantly reduce the cost of garrisoning these areas.
144
  She also 
needed a level of stability that allowed the creation and maintenance of safe, reliable, and 
open commercial air routes to South Africa, the Far East, and India.
145
  This was often 
defined as the locals paying their taxes and not raiding neighbouring tribes.
146
 
Iraqi and British restrictions against tribal raiding ran directly counter to Bedouin 
traditions.  Glubb makes the point that raiding was a natural and accepted form of resource 
management, 
In the days of uncontrolled tribal wars, no man need despair of a livelihood, no matter 
what material disasters might overtake him.  He could always recoup his fortunes at the 
expense of another tribe.  Only with the prohibition of raiding, thirty years ago, were 
poor Bedouins for the first time reduced to hunger and despair.
147
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A rare glimpse of the Bedouin attitude towards traditional raiding is found in a letter from 
Sheikh Ajaimi bin Suwait of the Dhafir tribe in Iraq.  He wrote to the Special Service Officer, 
Ernest Howes, complaining that raiding was ‘hereditary’ to the Dhafari culture and enforcing 
a ban on raiding ‘would be difficult.’148 
Because the actions of the populace tended to be determined by local leadership, it was 
vital that the British adopt an approach which allowed them to influence decision-makers at 
the lowest possible levels. Tribal uprisings were not expressions of localised democracy, but 
of the will of the elders and local leaders who held sway over their communities.  This thesis 
argues that the British responded in an appropriate manner – one which has perhaps not been 
given sufficient recognition. 
 David Galula, in Counterinsurgency Warfare, makes the case that insurgents, 
recognising their relative weakness realise it is foolish to fight the government conventionally 
and thus must ‘carry the fight to a different ground where he has a better chance to balance 
the physical odds against him’.149  Galula, like many other counter-insurgency theorists and 
practitioners, proposed that the different ground was the population.  More recently, Sir 
Rupert Smith, like Galula, described the phenomenon of irregular warfare as ‘war amongst 
the people’.150  As will be discussed, this emphasis on the moral over the physical domain 
and influencing the decision makers, dominated the RAF’s thinking as it applied air power to 
its imperial policing efforts.  The RAF SSOs, by orchestrating the combination of bombing 
and non-kinetic means to address each local situation, shaped the perceptions and influenced 
the actions of those indigenous peoples being controlled. 
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The thesis moves on to consider the RAF’s work in Iraq and Transjordan where the dual 
elements of the air control scheme, air substitution and air policing, were first tried and then 
refined, before British politicians and airmen began trying to apply what they had learned in 
other frontier regions of the empire.  Beginning with the political and financial conditions 
that drove British politicians to attempt the air control scheme, the thesis moves from the 
Cabinet meetings near the end of the War, the air control experiment in British Somaliland, to 
the Cairo Conference, and to Sir John Salmond’s assumption of command of British forces in 
Iraq.  Where Somaliland and Iraq proved to be successful applications of air control methods, 
as will be shown, the application of air control in the urban and ideologically charged 
environment of Palestine was not.  And on the North-West Frontier of India, despite one 
relatively successful instance of independent air operations in 1925, the colonial government 
chose to limit the RAF to an army co-operation role.  The case of Palestine is presented to 
help understand air control in an environment constrained by social, political, and economic 
factors.  The NWF case study, on the other hand, serves as a good demonstration of air 
control constrained by internal political factors.  The thesis then moves on to an analysis of 
air control’s evolution through the late 1930s, after Trenchard’s ‘Last Will and Testament’, 
the nickname his staff gave to a 1929 Cabinet Paper he submitted, The Fuller Employment of 
Air Power in Imperial Defence.
151
   
This is then followed by consideration of how the RAF integrated processes, people, and 
equipment to execute the air control scheme.  It is here that the RAF SSOs’ role in executing 
the air control processes is examined in detail.  The chapter was challenging to write because 
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most RAF SSOs rarely wrote much more than was necessary.
152
  This may have been because 
reports from the field were usually transmitted by telegraph or because the primary role of the 
RAF SSOs in Iraq and Transjordan was to be in the field observing and learning, rather than 
being in an office writing reports.  Thus, while the archives contain large numbers of daily 
and weekly intelligence summaries and telegrams, they lack depth and the SSO reports 
tended towards superficial summaries of local activities and such quantifiable data as 
numbers of sorties flown, weapons employed, and tactics utilised rather than contemporary 
reflection and analysis on the interaction of government civilians, the military, and police 
with the villagers.
153
  This added to the challenge of interpreting the role of the SSOs, since at 
first sight it appears to support the kinetic and thus quantitative aspects of the air control 
scheme that is also the natural predilection of most airmen who tend to be mechanically and 
scientifically oriented.  This in turn has led most researchers and analysts to assumptions 
about the overwhelmingly kinetic nature of the air control scheme.   
An exception to this trend is the writings of Sir John Bagot Glubb, an Army officer who 
was seconded to the RAF as an SSO.  Glubb’s books, journal articles, and oral history offer a 
comprehensive picture by which to interpret many of the drier and somewhat terse 
operational SSO reports found in the archives.
154
  Glubb’s survey reports and travel 
summaries were detailed, accompanied by photographs, and comprehensive.  Many were 
reproduced in JRCAS, sometimes under pseudonyms, in order that Glubb might ‘compare 
ideas with my brother officers in the Arab countries’.155   Unfortunately, Glubb’s first books, 
A Soldier with the Arabs (1957), Britain and the Arabs: A Study of Fifty Years, 1908 to 1958 
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(1959), and War in the Desert:  An RAF Frontier Campaign (1960) were all written decades 
after his time as an SSO had ended, in 1930.  Gerald de Gaury was another SSO who 
published accounts of his time in the Middle East, especially his relationship with Ibn Sa’ud, 
the king of Saudi Arabia.  His book on Iraq, Three Kings in Baghdad:  The Tragedy of Iraq’s 
Monarchy, mentions his time as an SSO, but it was not written until 1961, more than three 
decades after the fact.  In order to better capture the personal perspectives of the men who 
served as SSOs in Iraq, oral histories found in the Imperial War Museum (IWM) were used to 




The oral histories at the IWM provided an informal and unofficial counterpoint to the 
approved documents found in the official government records.  Most of the histories on file 
were recorded three to four decades after the inter-war period, so recollections of actual 
events were not as important to the thesis and discerning the attitudes of the pilots, crewmen, 
and technicians towards the tribal control mission and the indigenous peoples where they 
served.  The oral histories and personal diaries of the aircrews and technicians offered 
workaday insight into the hardships of barracks and mess life on the frontiers of the empire 
and the difficulties of flying and maintaining fragile aeroplanes in very austere conditions at 
the end of a precarious logistic chain.
157
  The rank and file perspectives found in the IWM 
oral histories offer an often uncomfortable reminder of the social context of the inter-war 
period, a time when attitudes towards indigenous people tended towards ‘savages’, 
‘uncivilised’, and worse, and air power was seen as a ‘civilising influence’.  This is a 
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difficult, but necessary understanding of the context of the era for modern analysts seeking 
insights from RAF imperial policing of the frontier regions between the wars.  What was 
acceptable practice in the 1920s and 30s is not tolerated today, an important caveat as one 
seeks appropriate lessons from previous tribal control operations in the Middle East and the 
North-West Frontier. 
A new book by military historian and journalist Barry Renfrew attempts to offer ‘the 
first narrative history of Air Control’ using the oral histories and private papers found at 
IWM.
158
  While there is much to recommend about Renfrew’s treatment of imperial policing 
from the air, the book suffers from superficial comparisons between the inter-war period and 
the current wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan, exactly the false comparisons Peter 
Gray and James Corum warned against.
159
  What Wings of Empire does contribute to the 
historiography of air control during the inter-war period is its presentation of the workaday 
perspectives on imperial policing found in interviews, personal papers, and letters of the rank 
and file airmen not previously provided by Omissi, Towle, et al.  The book also affirms this 
thesis’ assertion that comprehensive and introspective analyses of the policies and 
implications of tribal control from the air by the SSOs who were on the ground are lacking 
and that the bulk of the SSO materials in the archives tends to be quantitative in the reporting 
and are generally lacking reflective consideration. 
The thesis concludes by synthesising what was learned from the research into the key 
aspects of the various applications of air control within the colonies, protectorates, and 
Mandates.  It is clear that there was much more to the RAF’s efforts than is often popularly 
portrayed, and, indeed, some of the lessons are appropriate for modern airmen, who might 
benefit from seeking insights from the RAF’s air control experience.  It also demonstrates 
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that although the air control scheme was proposed, tested, and refined before the Second 
World War, modern understanding of air control is incomplete.  This thesis seeks to offer a 
re-evaluation of how one we should view air power’s employment by the British during the 
period 1920 – 1939. 
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Chapter Two 
Air Control between the Wars 
 
The story of air control began as the First World War was drawing to a close.  On 15 
August 1919, the British War Cabinet drafted what would become known as the ‘ten-year 
rule’.1  The essential core of what became the ten-year rule was the statement, ‘… for framing 
revised Estimates [budgets requests], that the British Empire will not be engaged in any great 
war during the next ten years, and that no Expeditionary Force is required for this purpose’.2  
The document was short, only one and a half pages of Cabinet Conclusions intended to guide 
British post-war defence planning.  The result, however, had an impact well beyond the 
brevity of the document.   
Historians such as G.C. Peden, John Ferris, and Brian Bond have noted that the ten-year 
rule forced a tension between the politicians and the Services.
3
  Imperialists in the British 
government maintained that the defence of India and the transportation routes via Egypt and 
the Middle East were the key to continued British wealth, prestige, and status as a great 
power.
4
  But, post-war exhaustion and economic challenges severely influenced government 
spending on defence throughout the inter-war period.
5
  Brian Bond observed that ‘the urgent 
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need for rapid and drastic financial economies’ dominated all other British strategic 
considerations.
6
  The magnitude of Treasury’s influence on the Services’ Estimates is not 
clear-cut.  John Ferris takes the position that the ten-year rule influenced, but did not 
dominate British defence policy.
7
   
Ferris suggests that the impact of the ten-year rule has been misunderstood by historians 
and given more credit for controlling Service Estimates than it actually possessed.  He noted 
that,  
The Treasury demanded much from the services. Its ability to enforce these demands 
was limited. … The core of the Treasury’s strength was its position in the formation of 
budgets and estimates.  … The Treasury could control the services only if the Cabinet let 
it do so.  Since the Cabinet did not do so between 1919 and 1924, Treasury control over 
the services was weak. …  Between 1919 and 1921 the Treasury did not control any of 
the services; during 1922 to 1925 it did not control them all.
8
   
 
George Peden, on the other hand, describes a more directive role for the policy, 
suggesting the Treasury was heavy-handed in its application of the ten-year rule, even to the 
point of extending it indefinitely in 1928.
9
  Whether the rule was merely a strong suggestion 
or a severe constraint on the Services’ ability to perform their assigned missions, the fact 
remains that the policy did exist and it was applied as and when needed between the wars to 
shape the Services and British military commitments.  In general, the ten-year rule was 
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selectively used as a sliding bracket as the government dealt with the severe economic, social, 
and fiscal issues of post-war Britain.
10
 
Embedded in the War Cabinet direction, WC 616A, were two principles that supported 
the RAF’s proposed air control scheme and its two primary elements, air policing and air 
substitution.  The first principle was the previously mentioned requirement for Britain’s 
military and air forces to garrison the empire.
11
  This statement reaffirmed the Army’s 
traditional and primary role as an imperial gendarmerie force throughout the colonies.
12
  
More importantly, though, it provided Trenchard and the RAF the guidance needed to 
develop a commensurate, imperial defence role for the post-war Royal Air Force.
13
  
According to Andrew Boyle, Trenchard’s zeal to preserve the RAF as separate Service, with 
the political support of Churchill, ‘served notice that the traditional preserves of the army 
were no longer safe’.14 
In 1923, C.E. Vickery published an article about tactics appropriate for ‘small wars’ in 
the Army Quarterly.  There he reminded the readers that prior to the First World War the 
Army was continuously engaged in small wars.  Attempting to capture the personal aspect of 
the small wars tradition, he noted, 
The soldier of to-day may look round and bemoan the absence of any fresh countries 
which might afford a potential outlet for his energies and for his training.  Certainly the 
halcyon years of 1880 to 1910 are gone and their equal will not be seen, but there will 
remain for many years wars and rumours of war on the frontier of India and 
elsewhere…15 
                                                          
10
 Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, p. 7. 
11
 TNA CAB 23/15, WC 616A, Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet, p. 1;  also, Churchill’s speech to 
House of Commons, quoted in Andrew Boyle, Trenchard: Man of Vision, (London:  Collins, 1962), p. 354. 
12
 Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, (London:  Headline Book Publishing, 2001), p. 210.  
13
 T.R. Moreman, ‘“Small Wars” and “Imperial Policing”:  The British Army and the Theory and Practice of 
Colonial Warfare in the British Empire, 1919 – 1939’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 19, no. 4, (1996), p. 
105; and Anthony Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919 – 39, (Athens, GA:  University of 
Georgia Press, 1986), p. 11. 
14
 Boyle, Trenchard, p. 354. 
15
 C.E. Vickery, ‘Small Wars’, The Army Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 2, (1923), p. 307. 
 50  
 
Vickery’s comments seem to capture the Army’s dilemma—what should they be going 
forward, a professional, conventional army equipped, trained, and ready for another 
conventional, most likely mechanised, war against a European opponent or a frontier 
constabulary?  
The professional army Britain ended the war with was contrary to anything the British 
Army had done in the preceding hundred years.
16
  The size of the force and the headquarters 
structure needed to fight a continental war, plus Britain’s political, civil, and social 
commitment to the First World War, was ‘a unique occurrence, even an aberration’.17 The 
Army’s post-war return to regimental soldiering, with the concomitant emphasis on imperial 
policing over preparations for a future European war, meant it was ‘simply no longer suitable 
for the demands of modern continental warfare’.18  As early as 1920, the Cabinet noted that 
‘the pre-war Army, though organised to meet an emergency on the Continent, had been 
designed, so far as its strength was concerned, solely with a view to the defence of the 
Empire’.19  The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in 1926, went so far as to say, the ‘war 
against Germany was “abnormal”’ and that ‘normal wars’ were small commitments to be 
reinforced when necessary by larger formations.
20
  In his guidance to the Expeditionary Force 
Committee CIGS stated that the defence of India was the Army’s priority and in keeping with 
the fiscal guidance, the committee should assume ‘a continental war is of extreme 
improbability’.  Moreover, preparations should be for ‘operations in an undeveloped 
country’.21  The Army’s 1922 reply to an examination of British defence requirements stated,  
                                                          
16
 Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars, p. 26. 
17
 Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars, p. 36. 
18
 G.C. Peden, ‘The Burden of Imperial Defence and the Continental Commitment Reconsidered’, The 
Historical Journal, vol. 27, issue 2, (1984), pp. 410 – 411. 
19
 TNA CAB 24/98, Conclusions of a meeting of the Finance Committee, 9 Feb 1920, p. 1. 
20
 Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars, p. 36. 
21
 Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars, p. 81. 
 51  
 
For the last hundred years the British Regular Army has been maintained, not for 
intervention in a European war, but for the protection of our overseas territories, and 
British territory at home and abroad.  The size of the Army has been regulated by our 
oversea [sic] commitments, and not by the threat of any Continental Power.…  But the 
size [emphasis in original] of the Expeditionary Force had no relation whatever to the 




As part of the transition from a war-time back to a peacetime footing the Army and the 
RAF were closing stations and ridding the Services of excess equipment.  Sir Arthur Harris’ 
biography noted that the primary task for the airmen under his command in the months after the 
Armistice was to receive and burn great numbers of surplus aircraft, some of them brand new, as the 
government was keeping production lines open in order to provide jobs and work for the factories.
23
  
With the ten-year rule providing fiscal guidance and ‘widespread public faith that the 
Covenant of the League of Nations obviated the need for national armies’ effectively 
preventing any thoughtful or serious consideration of potential threats to the survival of 
Britain proper, the Cabinet focused on ways to reduce the cost of defending the British 
Empire.
24
  The Cabinet concluded that ‘the only method of effecting savings on a 
considerable scale is in the War Departments’.25  At the same time, however, Trenchard was 
trying to preserve the RAF’s independence as a separate Service in the face of Royal Navy 
and Army efforts to bring their air arms back under Service control, as well as resentment by 
the older Services at the added competition for declining defence expenditures.
26
  According 
to John Ferris, application of the ten-year rule allowed the RAF to delay costly preparations 
for the next European war and concentrate on establishing itself as an equal in imperial 
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  In a note to Sir Eric Geddes, Chairman of the Cabinet Committee for National 
Expenditure, Trenchard made the point that savings, ‘…could be made if the War Office and 
Admiralty alike would treat the air service as a partner, and an equal partner, instead of 
continuously cavilling at air proposals, obstructing their adoption, and considering the air 
service only as an auxiliary to their own larger forces…’. 28   
The second key principle was that, ‘In order to save man-power, the utmost possible use 
is to be made of mechanical contrivances, which should be regarded as a means of reducing 
Estimates’.29  This directive to seek alternatives to putting soldiers on the ground would 
eventually provide Trenchard and the RAF an unanticipated opportunity in British 
Somaliland to demonstrate the utility of air forces as a substitute for ground forces in imperial 
policing.
30
  Trenchard rightly recognised that severe, post-war fiscal constraints would be a 
major, if not the primary, factor in the future survival of the Air Force.  He was determined to 
demonstrate air forces could police the empire as effectively as the Army, at considerably 
less cost.  In 1921, in response to the War Cabinet’s direction to make use of mechanical 
contrivances, Trenchard wrote the following to Sir Eric Geddes,  
We shall always have to police the Empire, and the intermittent recurrence of these small 
wars is unavoidable.  Prior to 1914 the expense in man power, in lives and in money, 
was relatively small, and we could perhaps afford ourselves the luxury of treating these 
problems on what I may be permitted to call ‘Army’ lines, quite apart from the fact that 
we then had no alternative at our disposal…the time will come – if it has not come 
already – when our resources will not permit us to uphold our prestige or maintain the 
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Opportunity 
Andrew Boyle’s biography of Trenchard 
relates how during the summer of 1919 the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Alfred 
Milner, asked the Air Ministry for an innovative 
and cheaper solution to deal with a militant war-
lord and his Dervish followers that continued to 
give difficulties to colonial officials in British 
Somaliland.
32
  Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, a 
radical cleric, had been causing trouble for the 
British for nearly 20 years.
33
  Hassan, known derisively in the British press at the time as the 
‘Mad Mullah’, had organised Dervish opposition to British rule in the region.34  Four 
previous land expeditions in the past two decades had failed to achieve any lasting controls 
on Hassan and the Dervishes.  Moreover, the punitive expeditions by the Army had been 
prohibitively costly in terms of resources expended and in military and civilian casualties.   
During the First World War, with nearly all British forces fighting elsewhere, Hassan 
had consolidated his hold on the eastern region of British Somaliland by recruiting thousands 
of soldiers and building a series of stone fortresses to control the road networks.  A punitive 
expedition to take care of the Hassan problem was requested by the Governor of the 
                                                          
32
 Boyle, Trenchard, p. 366, and David E. Omissi, Air power and colonial control:  The Royal Air Force 1919-
1939, (Manchester, UK:  Manchester University Press, 1990), p. 14. 
33
 TNA AIR 9/18, Air Staff Memorandum, Scheme for Air Control, (4 Mar 1930), p. 2; also C.A.L. Howard, 
‘Operations in British Somaliland, 1920’, Journal of the United Service Institution of India, vol. 60, no. 238, 
(Jan 1925), p. 129.  This was the third in the series of articles of the same name, a public debate in JUSII 
between Howard and Chamier over the efficacy of independent air operations as a means of colonial control. 
34
 Boyle, Trenchard, p. 365; Philip Anthony Towle, Pilots and Rebels:  The use of aircraft in unconventional 
warfare, 1918-1988, (London:  Brassey’s, Ltd., 1989), p. 12; Jeffrey Bartholet, ‘It’s a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad 
World’, Newsweek, (12 Oct 2009). 
Figure 2.1,  
British Somaliland, 1919 
 54  
 
Protectorate, Mr Geoffrey Archer, in 1919.
35
  The Army was less than enthusiastic about 
taking on another Somali venture however,
36
 and thus submitted what seemed to Milner to be 
an inflated requirement of two divisions and construction of a railroad across British 
Somaliland, at the cost of several million pounds, as its proposal for the operation.
37
 
The Army’s proposal was fiscally, militarily, and politically untenable for the Lloyd 
George government.  It was a fortunate co-incidence that Milner, who had not been an 
advocate for the Air Force, needed a quick and relatively inexpensive means to discipline the 
‘Mad Mullah’, while at the same time Trenchard needed a way to show how the RAF could 
substitute ‘mechanical contrivances’ for ground forces in imperial policing duties.38  The 
‘Mad Mullah’ issue offered Trenchard a way to demonstrate a strategic role for the Air 
Force.
39
  When Milner asked Trenchard if he had ideas about alternative means of 
disciplining and controlling the Dervishes, Trenchard proposed an idea he and the Air Staff 
had already partly planned to allow the Air Force take over the entire operation.
40
  Despite 
opposition from the Army, Milner, with Churchill’s blessing, gave Trenchard and the RAF its 
chance.   
It is worthwhile to note that Churchill was enthusiastic about the military potential of the 
aeroplane and may have been pre-disposed to support Trenchard’s gambit.41  Before the war 
and despite his wife’s reluctance, Churchill took flying lessons, although he never completed 
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  Despite not earning his wings Churchill remained an avid supporter of 
military and naval aviation throughout his career.
43
 
In March 1914, while serving as First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill had 
commissioned a report on the possible use of aircraft to assist the Army’s punitive 
expeditions in Somaliland.
44
  The conclusion by two naval aviators who travelled to 
Somaliland to evaluate the proposal was that air power could be effective, but they 
recommended airships rather than aeroplanes as the preferred technology because of the 
greater reliability and corresponding lower risk to the crews.
45
  The First World War 
intervened however, and Churchill’s proposal was not re-addressed until six years later. 
According to the operations narrative supplied by Group Captain Robert Gordon, 
commander of Z-Unit, the RAF squadron sent to conduct the Somaliland operation, eight 
DH-9A aircraft arrived in Berbera, the capital and main port of British Somaliland, on 30 
December 1919, transported via the Royal Navy’s seaplane carrier and tender, HMS Ark 
Royal.
46
  Within weeks, the aircraft and crews were ready for operations.  The first air attack 
was carried out against the main camp at Medishe on 21 January 1920.
47
  Attacks continued 
over the following two days against the Dervish fort at Jidali.
48
  The three days of bombing 
forced the Dervishes out of their strongholds and drove them towards the Somaliland Field 
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Force, a ground force made of up the Somaliland Camel Corps, the King’s African Rifles, 
and a half battalion of Indian grenadiers.
49
  For the next two weeks, the RAF conducted co-
operative operations with the Somaliland Field Force—providing reconnaissance, 
communications between elements of the Field Force, medical evacuation, and attacking any 
elements of the Dervishes they could find and positively identify.  Z-Unit aircraft would 
locate the different field formations and then communicate their locations to the commander 
of the Somaliland Field by dropping messages and also conveying despatches between the 
commanders in order to co-ordinate manoeuvres.
50
  On 1 February, Z-Unit’s ‘hospital 
aeroplane’, was first used to evacuate an officer from the field to medical care at Eil Dur 
Elan.
51
  The medical officer, William Tyrrell, wrote that over the course of the campaign, 
three serious cases were further evacuated from Eil Dur Elan to Berbera and five others 
evacuated from the field, but not admitted to hospital.
52
   
During the first week of February, the Z-Unit bombed the Dervishes’ fort at Tale 
[Taleh], approximately 350 km east of Berbera.  Z-Unit continued to co-ordinate with and 
between the detachments of the Somaliland Field Force that were closing on Tale.  By 18 
February, most of the Dervish forces had surrendered to the British, Hassan had fled to 
Abyssinia (now Ethiopia), and the RAF had flown Mr Archer, the governor, out to meet with 
local leaders and reaffirm civilian [British] governance in the region.
53
  According to the 
governor, credit for defeating the Dervishes and making Hassan a fugitive ‘… is primarily 
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due to the Royal Air Force, who were the main instrument of attack and the decisive factor’.54  
The RAF exercised an ‘immediate and moral effect over the Dervishes, who in the ordinary 
course are good fighting men, demoralising them in the first few days’.55   
With operations concluded, the Z-Unit returned to their main base at Berbera.  F.A. 
Skoulding, one of the participants in the operation, later wrote in the Royal Air Force 
Quarterly, ‘when one remembers that a whole division of troops had previously been unable 
to subdue the mullah, this early instance of the application of air power stands out as an 
excellent example of the potency of aircraft in such circumstances’.56  For the next twenty 
years, until Somaliland was invaded by the Italians in 1940, the colony enjoyed stability and 
relative prosperity based upon the economic activities associated with the port of Berbera.
57
 
Both the War Office and the Air Ministry interpreted and publicised the results of the 
Somaliland campaign to best fit their respective political agendas.
58
  Major C.A.L. Howard, 
an Army officer serving with the Somaliland Camel Corps during the operation was 
particularly condemning of Air Ministry claims, going so far in his lecture to the Staff 
College at Quetta, published in Journal of the United Service Institution of India, to state that 
independent air operations were ‘a great mistake and seriously prejudiced the success of the 
[Somaliland] operations as a whole. … Used in conjunction with ground troops, aeroplanes 
were invaluable in many ways, especially in maintaining liaison; but in their independent role 
they could not and did not obtain important results’.59  This opinion was publicly taken to 
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task by Air Commodore J.A. Chamier in the JUSII, which was then further rebutted by Major 
Howard in the Jan 1925 issue of same journal.
60
  Unsurprisingly, the Army highlighted the 
supporting and subordinate role of the air forces, while the RAF pointed to the Air Force’s 
ability to achieve decisive results against an unsophisticated opponent—an early edition of 
the roles and missions debates that seem to re-occur each time policies or budgets force the 
Services to constrict.
61
   
Despite the different interpretations of the results, the reality was that over about two 
months Z-Unit showed that an RAF squadron could deploy from Britain and made a credible 
case that an air force could discipline unruly natives just as well as could the Army.  More 
importantly than substituting air power for ground forces during punitive expeditions though, 
especially from the perspective of the British Cabinet, was that the total cost of the 
Somaliland operation had only been £70,000.
62
  In a government driven by a near-obsessive 
need to cut expenditures, yet reluctant to alter its status as a colonial power, this Somaliland 
campaign was successful beyond some politicians’ expectations.63  The Secretary of State for 
War, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, a staunch opponent of independent air force operations, 
grudgingly admitted the RAF was able to achieve more than what the Army had 
accomplished before the war and at 1 – 2% of the cost.64  Perhaps the most optimistic 
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assessment came from then Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Leopold Amery.  In 
his memoirs, Amery called the Somaliland campaign the ‘cheapest war in history’.65  But one 
successful venture was not enough to demonstrate the strategic utility of the RAF.  In order to 
survive as an independent Service, the savings realised by substituting the RAF for ground 
forces in Somaliland needed to be projected onto other imperial policing opportunities.  And, 
because economic considerations helped shape British policies between the wars, especially 
with regards to imperial policing, the cost savings realised in Somaliland created a 
willingness by the Cabinet to try aerial substitution elsewhere, even if not fully in agreement 
with Trenchard’s air control scheme. 
Capitalising on the Success  
On 19 February 1920, as Z-Unit was concluding operations in Somaliland, Trenchard 
received a Minute from Churchill’s office asking if the RAF was ‘prepared to take on 
Mesopotamia’ and offering to announce the proposal in Parliament the following Monday if 
the RAF was up to the task.
66
  Trenchard accepted Churchill’s offer and on 29 February 
Churchill wrote directly to Trenchard asking him to ‘without delay, submit a scheme and 
state whether you consider the internal security of the country [Mesopotamia] could be 
maintained by it [the Royal Air Force]’.67  In this memorandum, Churchill offered Trenchard 
two important incentives:  first, that an airman would be appointed as the Commander-in-
Chief for all British forces in Mesopotamia and second, offering to increase the RAF budget 
by £5 – 7 million.68  Trenchard realised that these two elements would constitute tangible 
evidence as to the government’s faith in the equality of the RAF as a policing force and an 
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airman’s ability to effectively command both ground and air forces.  With these incentives 
offered and enjoying the success of Z-Unit’s operations in Somaliland, less than two weeks 
later, on 12 March, Trenchard delivered A Preliminary Scheme for the Military Control of 
Mesopotamia by the Royal Air Force to Churchill.
69
  In his covering memorandum which 
forwarded Trenchard’s proposal to the Cabinet, Churchill referenced the RAF’s previous 
success and the low cost of the Somaliland expedition as justifying his proposal to give 
responsibility for policing Mesopotamia to the fledgling RAF.
70
 
Mesopotamia presented the British with some difficult challenges.
71
  It had been a 
province of the Ottoman Empire and not a British colony before the war.  As a result of the 
political manoeuvrings by Britain and France before and during the war to limit Russian 
expansion, and to further its own ambitions in the Middle East and South Asia, Britain 
needed a compliant Mesopotamia as a geographically and politically stable link between 
India and Egypt.  Churchill, at least on paper, noted that the solution to governing Iraq would 
require collaboration between the British and the Iraqis.  In 1921, when the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, he said, ‘…I have from the outset contemplated holding Mesopotamia not 
by sheer force but by the acquiescence of the people of Mesopotamia as a whole in a 
Government and ruler whom they have freely accepted, and who will be supported by the Air 
Force…’72  The political aspirations of Hussein, Sharif of Mecca, which at the time was not 
part of what is modern Saudi Arabia, aided British desires for the region.  Hussein and his 
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sons, Abdullah and Feisal, were willing to cooperate with and assist the British to secure the 
Levant and the Arabian Peninsula in order to maintain their ruling positions.   
As a result of the Treaty of Versailles, Mesopotamia and other sections of the Ottoman 
Empire were mandated (assigned) to Britain and other victors of the First World War.
73
  
According to The Covenant of the League of Nations, the European powers were to help the 
former colonies of the Ottoman Empire transition to self-rule.  Britain was given 
responsibility for Palestine and Transjordan, at the time a single province, and Mesopotamia.  
France was mandated Syria and Lebanon by the San Remo Treaty in 1920 which 
implemented the League of Nations Covenant.
74
   
As the British Cabinet looked to the future, restoring and preserving the empire, 
especially the ties to India, and maintaining control of the Suez Canal in Egypt, were seen as 
key to Great Britain’s future position in the world.75  Other imperial territories and the 
Dominions may have had military, commercial, or prestige value; however the cost to 
maintain a worldwide network of colonies that were a net drain on the Exchequer or required 
significant military garrisons to maintain some sort of acceptable peace were viewed with no 
small measure of scepticism.
76
  Post-war Britain had little appetite for further military 
adventures and a large, conscript army, nor were the economy or the Army in sufficient shape 
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Despite the economic and military challenges, regaining some semblance of control over 
the disparate colonies and territories while also fulfilling its obligations in the Mandates, were 
seen as primary responsibilities for Britain as a global leader.
78
  Thus, how to balance 
domestic issues with global responsibilities was a source of frequent debate in the Cabinet 
and also in the major newspapers.
79
  In January 1919, during a meeting of the executive 
committee forming the League of Nations, Lloyd George stated that the cost of maintaining 
over one million British and colonial troops to keep peace in the colonies and newly occupied 
territories ‘would be something enormous’.80  The Prime Minister informed the conference 
that the British people would not accept the cost of controlling the former German and 
Ottoman colonies and that there was a grassroots sentiment that the ‘British Empire was “big 
enough”.’81  The more sceptical among Britons questioned the value returned to the British 
people by those regions where desirable natural resources or lucrative markets for British 
products were scarce, but threats to internal stability and requirements for large garrisons 
were great.
82
  Anthony Clayton makes the point in The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919 
– 39, that for the first decade after the war the public was strongly anti-military and pacifist.83  
Evidence of this sentiment includes Britain becoming one of the signatories to the Kellogg-
Briand Pact.  This treaty had as its first article the renunciation of war as an instrument of 
                                                          
77
 Clayton, British Empire as a Superpower, p. 11; and Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, p. 112. 
78
 Darwin, ‘Imperialism in Decline’, pp. 659 – 660. 
79
 See for example, The Times, ‘Report from House of Commons’, (24 June 1920), p. 9. 
80
 D.H. Miller, ‘The Origin of the Mandate System’. 
81
 D.H. Miller, ‘The Origin of the Mandate System’.  
82
 The Times, ‘Reckless Waste’, an address by H.H. Asquith, former Liberal Prime Minister, (21 June 1920). 
83
 Clayton, British Empire as a Superpower, p. 251. 




  It was not until 1936, after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and German re-
occupation of the Rhineland that public mood in Britain began to change.
85
   
In the first few years after the war, the ‘British press was almost unanimously hostile to 
the continued occupation of Iraq’.86  The Times published a series of four articles with the 
leading headline, ‘The Development of Mesopotamia…Exaggerated Hopes…The Orgy of 
Waste’.87  Other editorials posed rhetorical questions such as, ‘How much longer are valuable 
lives to be sacrificed in the vain endeavour to impose upon the Arab population an elaborate 
and expensive administration which they never asked for and do not want?’88  In 1923, the 
Daily Mail sent a special correspondent, Sir Percival Phillips, to Mesopotamia to ‘investigate 
the facts as to our occupation’.89  Phillips’ reports, published with titles like ‘The Millstone 
Round the Taxpayer’s Neck’ and ‘Tax-Collecting by Bomb’, highlighted the government’s 
primary challenge, justifying the financial and physical costs of the occupation.
90
  The 
Middle East, even with the possibility of future oil revenues, was a region of the empire 
where the cost-benefit analysis was questionable.
91
   
Complicating British post-war manoeuvring for territory, Bolshevik Russia began to 
seek access to those regions formerly controlled by the Ottomans and where it had been 
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denied access during the 19
th
 century.  Also, a resurgent, post-Ottoman Turkey was 
consolidating its power under Kemal Ataturk and seeking to mitigate the losses it had 
suffered as a result of the First World War.  And, France saw new opportunities to expand its 
influence in the Middle East with the demise of the Ottoman Empire.   
Within the May 1920 staff package forwarding Trenchard’s Preliminary Scheme for the 
Military Control of Mesopotamia by the Royal Air Force to the Cabinet was Churchill’s 
assessment of the security situation in Mesopotamia and the costs of maintaining imperial 
control.   
Each of these distant forces must be strong enough to resist every conceivable attack.  
All of them are supplied by long lines of communication…  All along these lines of 
communication garrisons have to be established, each of which must be strong enough to 
resist the maximum potential force that could be brought to bear…  The result of this 
vicious system is that a score of mud villages, sandwiched in between a swampy river 
and a blistering desert, inhabited by a few hundred half naked native families, usually 
starving, are now occupied … by Anglo-Indian garrisons on a scale which in India 




The debate in the Cabinet was impassioned.
93
  John Darwin observed, ‘Bitter arguments 
raged inside British government over the costs of Iraq … and the shoestring empire of “hot 
air, aeroplanes, and Arabs”.’94  Although Churchill presented the case for air control in fiscal 
terms, the Army felt compelled to dissent with its civilian leadership and offered an imperial 
security perspective to defend its position.  The Army countered Churchill’s fiscal austerity 
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points by raising the spectre of external threats to the region from Turkey and Russia.
95
  The 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, further opposed 
Churchill’s position and made the somewhat far-fetched suggestion that Turkish and Russian 
aggression in Mesopotamia constituted a direct threat to the British Isles.  Wilson maintained 
that a large ground force was required to keep the peace in Mesopotamia and Palestine.   
Owing once more to our Turkish Treaty which, even at this date, contains no frontier 
between  Turkey and Armenia; owing to our very ill-defined relations to the Kurds and 
Arabs; owing to our Foreign Office commitments in Persia; owing to the deplorable 
weakness in our own Administrative Services and the consequent depletion of our 
fighting units to such an extent that many of them exist only on paper; and finally owing 
to the steady advance of Bolshevism to the south and the fall of Denikin, the Cossacks, 
the Caucasus and—I do not know what next—our position in Mesopotamia is none too 




During the negotiations to create the League of Nations, the Allies made a decision to 
not grant the Hashemite Arabs the independence they believed had been promised for 
supporting the Allies against the Ottomans.  Instead, the Allies granted provisional 
recognition to those Arab parts of the former Ottoman Empire which were fairly developed 
and established a timetable via the Mandates for helping the former Ottoman territories 
achieve independence and become successful modern states.  The Mandate system also 
allowed the Allies, overtly in the case of France or unofficially in Britain’s case, to expand 
their colonial presence and control in the region.  The League of Nations Covenant justified 
the Europeans’ actions with paternalistic rhetoric and mandated that the British and French 
provide advice and assistance to the native governments until such time as the Allies deemed 
they were ready for full independence. 
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To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to 
be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are 
inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions 
of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and 
development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the 
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.  
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such 
peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their 
experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who 
are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories 
on behalf of the League.
97
 
Sharif Hussein and the Arabs who had supported the British felt a sense of betrayal when the 
post-war peace conferences failed to follow through on the promises of independence.
98
 
Similarly, the Kurds, located predominantly in northern Iraq, had expected to be granted 
self-determination after the war, but their ambitions were blocked by competing Turkish, 
Russian, British, and French interests.  Jean Allain, in International Law in the Middle East:  
Closer to Power than Justice, noted that during the preparations for the peace conference the 
British failed to mention Kurdistan as one of the states that should be included as one of the 
post-war Mandates.
99
  Although Kurds are ethnically distinct from Arabs and Turks, there 
had never been a recognized state known as Kurdistan.  What may have hurt the Kurds’ case 
for a nation of their own, perhaps more so than any lack of precedent for an independent 
Kurdistan, was that there was no single leader able to represent the interests of the different 
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The Minutes from the Council of Ten, the central body of major powers during the 
deliberations to create the League of Nations, noted that during the early sessions to draft the 
Covenant of the League of Nations Lloyd George acknowledged,  
He had left out one country in Turkey which ought to have been inserted.  He did not 
realize that it was separate. … He referred to Kurdestan (sic), which was between 
Mesopotamia and Armenia.  Therefore, if there was no objection, he proposed to insert 
the words ‘and Kurdestan’.101   
The other major powers at the League of Nations conference rejected Lloyd George’s 
proposed amendment and the Kurds were assigned to the British Mandate of Iraq, but kept 
separate from the Iraqis for administrative purposes. 
The Arab Revolt in Mesopotamia began during the summer of 1920, motivated in part 
by the broken promise of Arab independence.
102
  At the time, there were only two squadrons 
of aircraft available in Iraq, with a third squadron expected from Egypt.  In July, the British 
Army and the RAF began conducting a conventional, punitive campaign to quell the fighting.  
The Army’s assessment of RAF contributions to the operations was complimentary, but still 
they maintained that air power’s primary contribution remained as an adjunct to the ground 
forces—reconnaissance, communications between field elements, aerial fires to support 
manoeuvre, distant attacks (interdiction), and providing air transport and medical evacuation.  
Trenchard disagreed with the Army’s assessment and countered by suggesting that the RAF’s 
use of demonstrations and bombing had made significant contributions to subduing the tribes, 
disrupting enemy formations before they were able to attack British troops, and pursuing 
defeated insurgents to ensure they did not re-group and counterattack.
103
  A year later, during 
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the 1922 – 23 fighting season, when the Army sent two columns of troops against Turkish 
irregular forces in Kurdistan, transport aircraft dropped ‘barley, boots, and ghee [clarified 
butter]’, along with radios, horse shoes, and 7,500 pairs of socks to re-supply the columns on 
the march.  The RAF also evacuated 250 British soldiers suffering from dysentery, saving the 
soldiers a long, arduous, and dangerous land journey back to the hospital at Hinaidi, the main 
British base in Iraq at the time.
104
   
The commander of the British Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, Lt Gen Sir Aylmer 
Haldane, concluded his report on the Arab Revolt by stating, ‘…aeroplanes as an auxiliary to 
troops on the ground are of great value, but I do not consider that as a primary force they 
have the qualities which will enable them without the assistance of land forces to bring into 
subjection tribes who have committed themselves to insurrection’.105  The Deputy Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff concurred with Haldane’s assessment that ‘aircraft cannot to any 
great extent replace troops as the permanent controlling force in the government of the 
country’.106  Trenchard refused to concede the point and in his conclusion to the report he 
noted the successes the RAF had achieved through threats of force and aerial attacks despite 
the demands of supporting the ground formations with such a small air force.
107
  To 
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emphasise the RAF’s position, Trenchard played up the fiscal concerns raised by Churchill 
and made a point of including in his assessment that the gains achieved by the land forces 
came at ‘enormous expenditure of money and considerable sacrifice of life’ and that events 
had shown a small air force was able to ‘control a country of this kind economically without 
the use of large military columns’.108  Trenchard also offered the principle that formed the 
basis of the air control scheme and guided the employment of British air power through 
during the inter-war period, ‘…the Royal Air Force in sufficient strength and correctly used 
will undoubtedly, with the assistance of local levies, be able to undertake a great deal of the 
work which in the past has been done by the Army’.109  The evidence implies that Trenchard, 
with Churchill’s approval, offered that the air control scheme ‘can only be proved if it is 
tried’ [emphasis in the original], thereby setting Churchill up to propose a full test of air 
control at the upcoming Cairo Conference.
110
 
In March 1920, after Trenchard delivered the Preliminary Scheme to the War Office, 
Churchill forwarded it to the rest of the Cabinet with his opinion that Britain should ‘start on 
the control and development of Mesopotamia from an entirely different point of view’.111  
Recognising that responsibilities for the Middle East were divided among different 
departments, for example, Palestine and Transjordan were assigned to the Foreign Office and 
Iraq was assigned to the Secretary of State for India, the Cabinet debated consolidating 
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responsibilities for the region in a new, Middle East Department under the Colonial Office 
instead of under the Foreign Office.
112
   
That same month, almost a year before the Cairo Conference, the Secretary of State for 
India identified the need for a separate department to address the unique concerns of the 
Middle East.  In a memorandum to the Cabinet, the India Office noted that the relationship 
with the Arab Mandates was different than that with the other colonies, other sovereign 
nations, or British protectorates.  ‘Our position falls far short of sovereignty or even 
suzerainty, and our duties will, it is hoped, be transitory and diminishing’.113  The 
memorandum goes on to suggest possible solutions and concludes by recommending a new, 
Middle East Office be established under the Secretary of State for the Colonies.  During the 
discussions, the Secretary of State for India stated,  
It has always appeared to the India Office that the proper solution of the difficulty lies in 
the creation of a new Department (the ‘Middle East Office’ might be a suitable 
designation) to control our relations with all the areas in the Middle East with which we 
have now been brought into direct contact. These would comprise Mesopotamia, the 
Persian Gulf, the whole Arabian Peninsula (including the Gulf littoral, Oman, the Aden 
Hinterland and the Hejaz), Palestine, Syria (in so far as concerns British interests in that 
area), Armenia and Kurdistan.  Egypt and the Sudan would naturally pass under the 
control of the same Department.  Probably also Persia, with whom the agreement of 
1919 has brought us into a new relationship which, while it certainly does not amount 




Tellingly, the India Office’s memorandum made the point that the Mandates were neither 
colonies nor territories and needed to be handled differently.  These new responsibilities, the 
memo said, could not be considered colonies and ‘nothing should be done to encourage the 
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belief that a mandate is merely annexation in disguise’.115  Churchill skilfully used the India 
Office memo, plus all the earlier memoranda to reinforce his proposal to transfer 
responsibility for maintaining order in Mesopotamia to the RAF as soon as suitable 
arrangements could be made.  Continued resistance from the Army and the Royal Navy, 
however, delayed a decision on the air control proposal.   
In February 1921, Churchill gave up his Cabinet posting as the Secretary of State for 
War and Air and replaced Lord Milner as the Secretary of State for the Colonies.  With Lloyd 
George’s blessing, one of Churchill’s first acts was to implement the new Middle Eastern 
Department under the Colonial Office and consolidate all responsibilities for Palestine, 
Transjordan, and Mesopotamia there.
116
  In addition, he secured permission and funding to 
gather together and consult with all responsible ‘civil and military officials in the areas whose 
control had been transferred to the Colonial Office’, plus notable scholars and experts in the 
affairs of the Middle East.  The conference, planned for Cairo, would include T.E. Lawrence; 
Gertrude Bell, a brilliant Arabist, Lawrence’s sometime collaborator, and the only woman in 
an official capacity at the conference; Sir Percy Cox, the High Commissioner for Iraq; and Sir 
Arnold Wilson, the Colonial Administrator for Mesopotamia during and after the war.  Also 
attending were the Iraqi minister of war, Ja’far al Askari, and the Iraqi minister of finance, 
Sasun Effendi.  Churchill’s purpose for the conference was to develop a framework for 
Britain’s political, economic, and military future in the region and also to establish the means 
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After the Cairo Conference’s first session on 12 March 1921, the strong personalities 
that defined the participants were divided into two working groups, political and military, 
with the primary goal of discovering how to manage the Mandates while saving as much 
money as possible.  During the working groups, Trenchard, with Lawrence’s assistance and 
Churchill’s backing, argued to allow the RAF to test the air control scheme in Iraq.118  Other 
attendees, such as Gertrude Bell and Arnold Wilson, thought the air policing scheme doomed 
to failure, but finally acquiesced to Churchill’s wishes.  In Dreamers of the Day, Mary Doria 
Russell cleverly captures the cynic’s position when Gertrude Bell observes, ‘It will cost less 
for the British to fail from the air than from the ground.  And fewer soldiers will die for the 
mistakes of politicians’.119  Not surprisingly, Bell’s observation has survived to the present in 
appraisals of air power’s unique appeal for politicians seeking ‘swift and economical 
solutions to messy and complex problems’.120 
The Cairo Conference, March 1921  
Both Churchill and Trenchard needed the air control scheme to work.  Churchill’s 
political fortunes still had not fully recovered from the stigma of Gallipoli
121
 and even though 
the Armistice had been signed, British troops were still engaged in Russia, Persia, Turkey, 
Ireland, and the North-West Frontier of India.  Churchill needed a way to address the war 
debt and reduce the costs of policing the empire in order for the government to fund the 
social programmes that had been promised to the returning veterans and British citizens who 
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had sacrificed so much.  Trenchard, on the other hand, recognised the opportunity and took it 
as the means to save the RAF as an independent Service.  J.A. Chamier, an ardent advocate 
for Trenchard’s vision of independent air power, attempted a positive spin on the acrimony 
between the Services after the war, suggesting that the challenges of austerity, imperial 
obligations, and Service roles provided ‘stimulus to thought’ as to the possibilities of air 
power, which eventually led to new uses for air forces, including ‘maintenance of order in the 
wild lands of the Empire frontiers’.122   
Churchill accepted that policing poor, desolate, and unproductive Mandates in the 
Middle East was likely to be extremely unpopular in Parliament and among common Britons, 
especially if the effort continued as an expensive and difficult undertaking in a time of 
shrinking military budgets, increasing domestic demands, and other costly military 
commitments.  Both Sir Percy Cox and General Haldane were of the mind that it would take 
thousands of troops to restore order and control Mesopotamia.  If cost savings were Britain’s 
goal, they recommended pulling back from the distant outposts and even considered 
completely leaving the Middle East.  Churchill, upon examining his options and looking at 
future possibilities for the region, primarily oil to fuel the Royal Navy, determined to make 
major cuts in Mesopotamia in order to gain necessary fiscal savings rather than leaving the 
Middle East outright.
123
  The estimated cost to garrison Mesopotamia in the 1920-21 fiscal 
year was £33 million, too high a price to pay, but one Churchill could not avoid unless an 
innovative means of policing the empire was implemented.  In a letter to a constituent in his 
home district, Churchill wrote,  
…the disadvantages and even disgrace of such a procedure [abandoning Mesopotamia] 
should not be under-rated.  We marched into Mesopotamia during the war and uprooted 
the Turkish Government which was the only stable form of government in that country 
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at that time.  We accepted before all the world a mandate for the country and undertook 
to introduce much better methods of government in the place of those we had 
overthrown.  If, following upon this, we now ignominiously scuttle for the coast, leaving 
sheer anarchy behind us and historic cities to be plundered by the wild Bedouin of the 
desert, an event will have occurred not at all in accordance with what has usually been 




The work of the Cairo Conference is well documented in the National Archives and also 
by Aaron S. Klieman and Christopher Catherwood.
125
  Klieman takes a comprehensive look 
at the Cairo Conference in terms of the competing political, social, and economic, as well as 
the military, issues facing Churchill and Britain in the region.  His focused and in-depth 
approach used the personal papers of some of the notables Churchill had invited to 
participate: Trenchard, Cox, Haldane, Lawrence, Bell, and Arnold Wilson, for example, to 
explain the influence these strong personalities had upon the working groups, discussions, 
and final results of the conference.  Catherwood’s work provides a different perspective by 
looking at the events and motivations leading up to and during the conference through the 
prism of Churchill’s eyes.  His extensive research using Churchill’s Chartwell Papers 
provided the perspective of the central figure at the Cairo Conference.  Catherwood spends 
less time on the military aspects of the conference, instead focusing on the political and 
financial issues Churchill was so keen to address.  Omissi also discusses the Cairo 
Conference, but from the military perspective of those who saw the air control scheme as a 
means to preserve the RAF as an independent air force in the challenging economic era of the 
1920s.
126
  Taken together, the three works provide a comprehensive examination of the 
conference.  A short synopsis however, will aid the reader’s understanding of the context and 
the importance of the conference to Churchill and Trenchard’s scheme for air control. 
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While the Cairo Conference formally opened on 12 March 1921, the political 
manoeuvring and sparring by memoranda had begun much earlier.  As early as August 1919, 
Trenchard had proposed that ‘since the Armistice … events in the Near East and India have 
tended to show that against a semi-civilized enemy unprovided [sic] with aircraft, aerial 
operations alone may have such a deterrent effect as to be practically decisive’.127  In 
February 1920, Churchill told the House of Commons that the RAF should lead the security 
and policing efforts in Mesopotamia, and more shockingly for the Army, recommended that 
the General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Mesopotamia should be an airman in order that 
the full effects of the air arm could be applied by one who best knew the capabilities and 
limitations of air power.  If implemented, the RAF would effectively usurp a position, GOC 
of all British forces in a theatre of operations, which had been traditionally reserved for Army 
officers.
128
  That possibility was not met with ‘open arms’ by the Army’s senior leadership. 
During heated Cabinet debates after the conference, the Army pushed back against the 
Colonial Office’s plan to give responsibility for imperial policing in Mesopotamia to the 
RAF.  In June 1920, the War Department and the Air Ministry both submitted numerous 
memoranda highlighting British military shortcomings and liabilities across the globe.  One 
of the more disturbing points from the Army noted that Britain had ‘absolutely no reserves 
whatever (in formations) with which to reinforce our garrisons in any part of the world where 
an emergency may at any moment develop without warning’.129  Andrew Boyle recounts one 
Cabinet meeting in late 1920 when the Prime Minister asked Trenchard why he seemed so 
sure the air scheme would succeed in Mesopotamia when Sir Percy Cox was adamant that air 
power would be the ‘worst possible instrument of pacification’.  Trenchard responded that 
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Cox was only echoing the views of his Army advisors and would change his opinion once he 
saw what air power could do with his own eyes.
130
   
Despite being thinly stretched across the empire, facing reduced budgets, and having to 
reduce force structure to pre-war levels and lower, the Army strongly resisted consideration 
of the Air Ministry’s air control proposals.131  In a very pointed rebuttal to Lord Balfour’s 
report on the Part of the Air Force of the Future in Imperial Defence, the Secretary of State 
for War, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, made the point that for airmen to prepare 
campaigns against opposing armies they would be required to duplicate the Army’s existing 
headquarters and intelligence staffs, which would be a waste of already scarce funding and 
manpower.
132
  In addition, the Secretary of State for War contended that any venture by the 
Air Force would require the full support of the Army’s transportation and administrative 
services…unless, of course, the Air Ministry proposed to duplicate those as well.133   
The parochialism was palpable.  Great Britain and the Army could not afford to maintain 
battalions for colonial policing duties in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Transjordan, and elsewhere 
in the face of post-war budget realities.  The Army however, had no intention of allowing the 
RAF any chance of assuming responsibility for imperial policing because success, if it did 
happen, would add credence to the Air Force’s claim for independence.  The War Office’s 
parting shot in the debate was noteworthy.  In a September 1921 memorandum, the Secretary 
of State for War rebutted Lord Balfour’s report point by point, even going so far as to accuse 
the RAF of being an ‘instrument of terrorism’ and warning that public opinion would not 
abide by a Service that was only able to police the empire by ‘bombing women and 
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children’.134  The Secretary of State for War concluded his criticism of the report and the Air 
Force with, 
Consideration of the above facts makes it abundantly clear that neither in the 
sphere of Air Defence nor in that of savage warfare is there any justification for 
the segregation of the Royal Air Force under a separate Department of State, the 
intervention of which must inevitably complicate administration, hamper 
operations and deplete the funds so sorely needed to keep all machines in the air 
for the maintenance and expansion of a superfluous department.
135
 
Such vitriolic opposition to the Air Force would continue throughout the inter-war 
years, including the CIGS’ ‘hot air and aeroplanes’ slur, even though by 1922 or 1923, 
the independence of the Service was assured.
136
  Rather than being grateful to the RAF 
for relieving them from the financial and manpower burdens of policing the ‘wilder’ 
parts of the empire, the Army continued its niggling parochialism and fuelling 
misunderstanding as to air power’s potential contributions.137 
In the professional forums before the Cairo Conference, eloquent airmen, veterans of the 
First World War, had already begun the campaign to develop support for the air substitution 
scheme and policing the empire from the air.  As noted in an earlier chapter, only fifteen 
months after the end of the war, A.E. Borton presented a lecture, ‘The Use of Aircraft in 
Small Wars’ to RUSI based in part upon his experiences flying in support of Lawrence and 
the Arab irregulars during the 1917 – 18 Palestine campaign.138  Borton described nine 
general characteristics of what he called ‘small wars’ that were fully consistent with the 
primary contemporary work on the subject, Callwell’s, Small Wars:  Their Principles & 
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  In addressing each of the nine characteristics, Borton offered a possible role for 
current and future aircraft.
140
  He proposed that the inherent characteristics of air power:  
speed, range, and flexibility, had the potential to make aeroplanes a ‘decisive factor in 
quelling at the outset a disturbance which might otherwise lead to serious and prolonged 
operations’.141  Borton’s lecture provided an early look at potential role for aviation as a 
preventative measure—stopping a rebellion before it grew to such a point that it would 
require a major commitment of troops and treasure to bring the situation back under control. 
In January 1921, Leslie Gossage presented a lecture to RUSI originally written by his 
friend, J.A. Chamier.  This lecture, ‘The Use of the Air Force for Replacing Military 
Garrisons’, presented a case for substitution of Army battalions by air forces.  With Air 
Commodore Brooke-Popham, who in 1922 would become the first commandant of the RAF 
Staff College at Andover, supporting the presentation, Gossage and Brooke-Popham made 
the point during the post-lecture discussion that substituting air power for battalions had the 
potential to reduce the size of the garrison in Mesopotamia from 47,000 to 7,900 troops, an 
83% reduction in forces, with concomitant reductions in sustainment costs and both friendly 
and civilian casualties.
142
  These were powerful arguments in the climate of post-war fiscal 
retrenchment, even if they were not fully accepted by all attending. 
Controlling Mesopotamia was a two-part challenge.  The first question was how to 
maintain control of a population with three distinct ethno-religious characters—Shi’a Arabs 
in the south, Sunni Arabs in the centre, and Sunni Kurds in the north.  The second part of the 
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challenge was finding an Arab leader willing to rule Mesopotamia in concert with the 
British.
143
  At Lawrence, Bell, and Cox’s urging, Faisal, the son of Sharif Hussein, was 
accepted as Britain’s choice to become the king.144 
According to Catherwood, substituting RAF squadrons for Army battalions as the 
policing force in the region had been agreed-to in principle before the conference.
145
  Both 
the High Commissioner and the GOC in Mesopotamia had reluctantly agreed to the basic 
tenets of the revised military policy that gave the RAF responsibility for controlling Iraq.  In 
1919, when Churchill had made it clear that ‘further reductions in the forces in Mesopotamia 
would be required’, Haldane responded, ‘…after making a thorough inspection of my 
command from end to end, I was puzzled to discover a means whereby those reductions 
could be effected’.146  In 1921 though, writing to Churchill, Haldane admitted, ‘Indeed, I now 
think that had I had sufficient aircraft last year I might have prevented the insurrection 
spreading beyond the first incident at Rumaithah’.147  And as Trenchard had predicted, 
success convinced Sir Percy Cox that substituting aircraft for battalions could be an effective 
means of imperial policing.  Later, in 1925, while Cox was chairing a lecture at RUSI by Sir 
John Salmond, Cox admitted his earlier opposition to the air control scheme prior to and 
during the Cairo Conference had been wrong.
148
 
With the decision to implement the air control scheme a fait accompli, Churchill 
proposed that British troop withdrawals could begin as a soon as possible and the RAF could 
assume responsibility for controlling the tribes and policing the region.  Cox cautioned that 
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rapid reduction of troops would ‘leave him in a very difficult position and he emphasised the 
necessity for the maintenance of troops until such time as the new [Arab] force was trained 
and ready, which could not be before 1922’.149  While Churchill agreed that the situation was 
difficult, he replied that the ‘British taxpayer could not be expected to continue to garrison 
the country at such high expense and that rapid economies must be effected before the new 
financial year’.150 
Trenchard’s role at the Cairo Conference, then, was to convince the other attendees to 
accept the air control scheme based upon the projected financial savings to be gained.  While 
not exactly the strategic role that Trenchard and other airmen had envisioned for British air 
power, by accepting responsibility for imperial policing duties during peacetime they hoped 
to assure the RAF’s survival in a period of austere budgets and give the RAF the opportunity 
to demonstrate that airmen could be as effective as theatre commanders (joint force 
commanders in the modern vernacular) as any soldier.  According to David Ian Hall, 
‘Success in this role [imperial policing] to a large degree preserved the RAF’s independence 
in the early twenties’.151 
On 16 March, Trenchard presented the air control scheme to the Military and Financial 
Committees at the conference.  He was greatly aided by T.E. Lawrence who lent his 
considerable reputation as a an expert on Arab culture and desert warfare, to push for air 
substitution as an effective means of imperial policing in the Middle East.  As the key players 
at the conference had previously accepted air substitution based on the potential for fiscal 
savings, Trenchard won the opportunity to demonstrate that the RAF was a necessary, 
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independent Service, equal to the Army and Royal Navy.  The Military Committee minutes 
reflected Trenchard’s view of the Air Force’s future role,  
The Conference recommended that … consideration should be given to the vital 
necessity of preparing and training an Air Force adequate to war requirements, the 
importance of testing the potentialities of the Air Force, the need for giving to superior 
officers and staffs experience in independent command and responsibility, and the 




Trenchard had overcome a major hurdle.  He had gotten the proposal past the military 
obstacles, although the air scheme still had to pass judgement by the rest of the conference 
attendees.  Here, Lawrence was most useful in garnering support, using his personal 
experiences with aeroplanes and Arab armies from the war as convincing arguments as to the 
effectiveness of air power in an environment such as was Mesopotamia at the time—
relatively flat, vast uninhabited regions with few urban areas, long distances between 
villages, harsh terrain, and predominantly nomadic peoples.  Later on 16 March, at the joint 
meeting of the Political and Military Committees, chaired by Churchill, it is recorded, 
The CAS’s scheme for the control of Mesopotamia was considered by the Committee.  
… The Committee accept in principle the CAS’s scheme.  The Committee explored 
alternative avenues, but came to  the conclusion that the only means by which a 
reduction from the twelve battalion to the four battalion scheme could be effected was by 
the measures set forth in the CAS’s scheme.153  
 
Churchill had his plan to reduce military costs in the Mandates and Trenchard had a 
venue to prove the Air Force could be equal to the Army as a policing force.  Now, what the 
RAF had to do was prove that air substitution could deliver the operational results, as well as 
the hoped for savings.   
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Chapter Three 
Air Control in Practice 
Even though air substitution and colonial policing by air forces had been approved by 
the Cairo Conference, Churchill still needed to gain the approval of the Cabinet before the 
RAF would be allowed to implement the air control scheme.  Although the conference was 
intended to address and allay any political, economic, and military concerns, the Cabinet did 
not immediately embrace the scheme when Churchill and Trenchard presented the plan’s 
fiscal details and proposed manpower reductions.  Dissent against the air control scheme 
continued despite the compromises and conciliations that had been agreed to in Cairo. 
The Army was the principal opponent to air policing and reducing the size of the 
garrison in Iraq, right up to 1 October 1922 when responsibility for military operations in Iraq 
passed to the RAF.  Although the Army was seriously overstretched by the other defence 
commitments across the empire—Irish unrest, Turkish threats to Mosul oil fields, and the 
expedition to put down the Red Army in Russia, the Secretary of State for War pressed to 
retain the large garrison in Mesopotamia and the traditional, ground-centric, means of 
controlling the population.
1
  Comparing the size and composition of the garrisons proposed 
by the two Services offers insight into how the Army and the Air Force each approached the 
problem.  The Army’s memorandum noted that both estimates were based on the same 
assumptions:  no external aggression to Iraq and no serious internal uprisings by the tribes.  
The two Services’ proposals for Iraq were as follows: 2  
 
                                                          
1
 TNA CAB 24/128, CP 3395, Memorandum from the Secretary of State for War, The Situation in Iraq, (12 Oct 
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Turkish threat to Iraq. 
2
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, 1921, (11 July 1921), p. 73.p. 7. 
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Worthington-Evans discounted Churchill and Trenchard’s projected savings in funds and 
manpower, writing, ‘There is, in my opinion, no possibility of a reduction of expenditure 
being thus accomplished’, because the RAF would still have to maintain a basing and support 
structure.
3
  In addition, he raised the question of air power’s efficacy as a tool for controlling 
guerrillas, couching his argument in terms of air power’s humanity, while neglecting to 
mention the equal, if not greater, collateral damage and civilian suffering that was 
commonplace and fully accepted as part of punitive expeditions conducted by land forces 
against ‘savages and semi-civilised races’ or the deterrent effect expected of battalions 
policing the less developed or rougher regions of the empire.
4
   
Although RAF doctrine, policy, and practice sought to mitigate casualties among 
civilians, charges of inhumanity would continue to plague the RAF throughout the inter-war 
period.
5
  The fact is, the British were an occupying power in the colonies and Mandates.
6
  
                                                          
3
 TNA AIR 8/34, CAS Archives on Iraq, 1925-1926, CP 3240, Memorandum from Secretary of State for War, 
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4
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p. 21.   
5
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vol. 13, no. 4, (Dec 1990); and Priya Satia, ‘The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of 
Arabia’, American Historical Review, vol. 111, no. 1, (Feb 2006).  
6
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Thus, anti-imperialist media of the time were willing to spin a phrase to suit their bias.  Even 
the pro-empire Daily Mail reported, ‘of course, innocent people have been killed; that cannot 
be helped.  The subjugation of an unruly village or district involves the punishment of old 
women as well as recalcitrant head men’.7  Such reporting was unfortunate because the 
emotional perspective coloured the argument and encouraged the Army to not consider 
alternative solutions to imperial policing.  As will be shown in the next chapter, over the 
course of the inter-war period the RAF developed a range of air power applications, many of 
them not involving bombs and bullets, in order to influence the ‘targeted audiences’ and 
achieve desired responses.  Still, the RAF felt compelled to publish official documentation to 
counter ‘many of the depreciatory statements regarding the efficacy of air power’ among ‘ill-
informed circles’.8  The Army, though, maintained the characterisation of air policing as a 
brutal and indiscriminate because that position furthered their desire to eliminate the new 
Service and to strengthen their position in the budgetary battles. 
Worthington-Evans, who after the RAF’s successful operations in Somaliland, had 
reluctantly admitted the RAF was able to achieve decisive results at a fraction of the cost of 
an Army expedition, completely reversed that concession when Churchill and Trenchard 
proposed the air control experiment in Mesopotamia.  The Secretary of State for War 
suggested it was ‘undesirable and uneconomical to allow the Air Force to depart from its 
present function of an ancilliary [sic] service’.9  Compromise and accommodation with the 
RAF seemed to be beyond the Army’s ability or willingness.  Perhaps because they perceived 
the RAF as a threat to their long-held, traditional role as the guarantor of imperial stability, or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of use of Air Force in Mesopotamia in its political aspects and as to its utility actual and potential in support of 
the Civil Government of that country, (26 Feb 1921), p.1.  Same note is found at TNA AIR 9/14 and AIR 8/34. 
7
 Sir Percival Phillips, Mesopotamia: The “Daily Mail” Inquiry at Baghdad, (London:  Carmelite House, 1923), 
p. 15. 
8
 TNA AIR 9/12, ASM 48, C.D. 81, Notes on the History of the Employment of Air Power, p. 3. 
9
 Quoted in Omissi, Air power and colonial control:  The Royal Air Force 1919-1939, (Manchester, UK: 
Manchester University Press, 1990), p. 27.   
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it may have been Army unwillingness to create a precedent for giving up a GOC position to 
another Service, the Army resisted the air control scheme politically in the Cabinet and later, 
physically, during the hand-over of command in Iraq.
10
 
Throughout the summer of 1921, Churchill and Trenchard continued to push the air 
control scheme for Iraq within the Cabinet.  Despite the War Department’s opposition, the 
‘argument of the purse’ eventually won out.  Desperate to start realising the fiscal economies 
promised and hoped for, the Cabinet approved an air control ‘experiment’ in Mesopotamia to 
begin in October 1922.  It would take a year for the Air Force to put everything in place:  
squadrons of aeroplanes, RAF armoured car companies, intelligence structure, support and 
maintenance units, and a headquarters, but the RAF now had its opportunity to prove or deny 
that aeroplanes could effectively and inexpensively substitute for Army battalions as a 
constabulary force policing the less-developed regions of the empire.  The Army grudgingly 
accepted the decision, but decided it was not compelled to help the RAF succeed.
11
  
Though the Army’s obstructionism was disappointing, the situation did not dissuade the 
RAF.  In October 1922 Sir John Salmond was installed as the overall commander of British 
forces in Iraq.  The air control experiment was on.  The Army immediately reduced the 
garrison to four battalions (two British and two Indian), plus 15,000 Iraqi Levies 
(predominantly Assyrian Christians), and supporting arms.  The RAF moved eight squadrons 
of aircraft and recognising that air control was an air-land effort, also created Air Force 
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 TNA AIR 5/552, CID 135-C, Confidential Covering Memorandum from the Secretary of State for Air, The 
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armoured car companies to replace the British battalions.
12
  Further reductions in the garrison 
would occur in the ensuing months and years until the cost of garrisoning Iraq dropped by 
almost 75% in fiscal year 1929-30.   
Equally important to successfully implementing the air control scheme was the RAF’s 
effort to build an ‘efficient intelligence system… whereby the earliest possible information 
may be given of any signs of disorder or rebellion, so that the Air may be able to take militant 
measures and check it in its incipient stage’.13  From the very beginning of the experiment, 
Salmond and the RAF brought together the three elements needed to ensure success:  aircraft 
and crews to establish a ubiquitous presence throughout the region, armoured car companies 
on the ground and focused efforts from the air to provide the power to compel compliance, 
and an operational intelligence structure to gather, analyse, and exploit information necessary 
for effective operations, as well as establish expectations and shape perceptions among the 
local tribesmen against whom any influencing actions would be directed.
14
  Sir Basil Liddell 
Hart suggested that the RAF’s scheme would be better described as ‘air and armour control’, 
recognising the important role the armoured car companies played supporting and reinforcing 
the actions of the aeroplanes and political officers.
15
   
It should be remembered that one of the key assumptions from both the Cairo 
Conference and the British Cabinet regarding implementing the air control scheme was that 
                                                          
12
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there would be no external threats to Iraq.
16
  The air control scheme was intended to address 
‘ordinary spasmodic disturbances’, but was primarily intended for internal control.17  
Accordingly, Sir Percy Cox reminded Churchill in August 1922 that the air control scheme 
was based upon peace with Turkey and an Iraqi Army of 15,000 men.  Because those 
conditions had not been met he repeated his previous advice to delay substituting squadrons 
for battalions, especially at that moment due to the risk of a Turkish invasion.
18
  Still, 
Churchill and Trenchard pressed on.  They had to keep pushing as both had staked their 
respective futures on the success of the air control scheme.  By the time Salmond had 
assumed command of imperial forces in Iraq, the Turks had already crossed the border to 
threaten the autonomous Kurdish provinces of northern Iraq, had begun stirring up the 
Persians along the north-eastern border with Iraq, and were supporting Kurdish separatists led 
by Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji in the Sulaimaniyah region.   
Over the next year, the RAF and the Army combined to drive the Turks out of the 
Kurdistan region and back to Turkey or into Persia.  They also forced the Kurdish rebels to 
submit to British-led Iraqi rule.  Each time the RAF and the Army forced a Turkish column 
out of an area, Iraqi police units and Iraqi and British government officials were flown in to 
assume control and to demonstrate that the Iraqi government and their British advisors fully 
intended to exert their combined authority.  In the first 3 months the RAF flew 200 sorties 
across a 100 mile front, conducting reconnaissance, strike, re-supply of ground units, and 
medical evacuation sorties.  By early summer, all Turkish units had left Iraq and Sheikh 
Mahmud had surrendered.  More importantly, Kurdish tribal leaders quickly disavowed their 
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allegiance to the Turks and agreed to comply with the British rule of law.
19
  Cox admitted his 
previous concerns regarding the ability of the RAF to push back the Turks had been wrong.  
He wrote to Churchill, ‘It is difficult to exaggerate the improvement of the political 
situation….The impression that the return of the Turks was imminent has now vanished and 
this has had great effect in Baghdad, Mosul and among the Euphrates tribes’.20 
Once peace had been restored and external threats to Iraq were removed, Salmond and 
the RAF turned their efforts to proving that Trenchard and Churchill’s scheme for 
maintaining internal order with aeroplanes could work.  They began substituting aeroplanes 
for the Army battalions that had been policing the Iraqi tribes.  The Cabinet, equally anxious 
to begin the air substitution experiment and realise the promised savings, ordered the Army to 
begin bringing the soldiers home as soon as transports could be arranged.  Salmond and his 
staff had to develop a local interpretation of the Air Ministry’s air control scheme.   
The RAF took a ‘comprehensive approach’ in setting up its constabulary role in Iraq, 
noting that tribal control required ‘a sufficient Intelligence Service, and a very close liaison 
with political and police officers’.21  Salmond wrote of consulting with local British advisors 
and police, and acquiring the assistance of local political officers, in order to develop an 
appropriate, ‘whole-of-government’ system to compel the sheikhs to comply with the 
government’s requirements.22  In order to explain how air forces co-operated with political 
officers in Iraq, the Air Ministry reported to Parliament that,  
no air operations [were] in any circumstances initiated except at the request of the local 
British civil adviser acting in concert with the local Iraqi Administration, and after that 
request has been considered and approved in succession (a) by the Minister of the 
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Interior in the Iraq Government and his British adviser and (b) by the High 
Commissioner.  …personal consultation is secured between local British advisers and 
intelligence officers and the political and air authorities at Baghdad.
23
   
Including civil administrators and political officers who had the local knowledge and 
relationships helped the RAF build its understanding and gain the cultural awareness they 
needed to implement an effective air policing operation.   
  British and Iraqi civil authorities, with the help of the RAF, began the air control 
experiment by building a comprehensive map showing where the 42 major sheikhs and their 
tribes were generally located.  Then, the Iraqi government summoned all 42 to a conference 
in Samawah.  Only one sheikh appeared.  The next day, RAF armoured car detachments were 
despatched to forward depots and three forward operating bases for aircraft were established 
in areas where the most important tribes were sure to see them.  On the following day, air 
operations against the tribes began.   
Aircraft dropped leaflets explaining that the sheikhs had been summoned to consult with 
the government of Iraq but had failed to appear.  The messages also reminded the tribes of the 
consequences likely to befall them if the sheikhs continued to resist the government’s 
requests.  The people were informed that their homes and flocks would be bombed and 
strafed until their tribal leaders met with the government.  The messages worked and within 
another day, without firing a shot, all 42 sheikhs had surrendered and agreed to meet with 
Iraqi and British officials.
24
  By ensuring that the presence of the aeroplanes and armoured 
cars was conspicuous, reminding the tribes of the RAF’s power, and ensuring the sheikhs 
perceived that the government was willing to apply the full effects of air power should they 
not comply, the government was able to achieve its objectives without dropping a bomb or 
firing a shot. 
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In 1922, early in the air control experiment, the aeroplane’s relative novelty in the 
frontier regions gave it an inherent mystique.  The tribes’ unfamiliarity with the capabilities 
and the limitations of the technology aided the political officers’ positions.  The threat of air 
attack, plus the difficulty of defending against those attacks, was usually enough to compel 
the sheikhs to comply with the government’s demands.  Salmond addressed this issue in his 
post-command report, detailing the results of the experiment, 
It has sometimes been said that the effect of air actions on the tribesmen, at first very 
great, rapidly wears off as he comes to realise that the number of casualties caused by it 
is small.  It can be emphatically stated that the reverse has been our experience in Iraq.  
Here familiarity has increased its power.  At first the tribesman sees that the casualties it 
inflicts are few and fails to realise that it is in other ways that its pressure will bear upon 
him.  As air action has become better known there has been a steadily decreasing 
tendency to offer resistance once the intention of the Government to enforce obedience 




Some analysts, such as David Omissi, challenge long term effects of aerial 
bombardment, pointing out how German and Japanese citizens adapted to Allied bombings 
during the Second World War.
26
  Sufficient evidence exists to concede that point; however, it 
seems to be a false comparison.  The threat of a targeted attack against a single village or 
tribe, directly communicated by a representative of the government, and then backed up by 
the certainty that the British had both the capability and the credibility to destroy said village, 
made the air control threats personal.  That is not the same as ‘strategic bombing’ of area 
targets in an industrialised society.  It is human nature to be more concerned about personal 
threats than with general threats to an organisation or state.  The personal nature of the threats 
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delivered to the village by an SSO or political officer, or via leaflet, was often sufficient to 
induce the desired behaviour from a recalcitrant or misbehaving tribe.
27
   
The RAF and the political officers realised that together they could operate in the moral 
domain, that is, using the threat of aerial action to influence behaviour.  Salmond described 
how air control achieved results, ‘not by inflicting casualties but mainly by its effect on 
morale, by damage to material and by its power to inflict very serious inconvenience for an 
indefinite period’ on the tribesmen.28  The initial air control experiment in Iraq established 
the template for the scheme’s application over the next decade and a half in other frontier 
regions of the empire.  The air control method evolved into a triad of expected behaviours, 
threatened consequences if expectations were not met, and promised rewards or punishment. 
British political and military authorities in Iraq fully understood the characteristics of 
their adversaries.  In 1928, Wing Commander Richard Peck, a staff officer at the Air Ministry 
(alongside then Wing Commander John Slessor) and a veteran of the air control experiment 
in Iraq, gave an intentionally provocative lecture at RUSI, ‘Aircraft in Small Wars’.29  Where 
Borton had taken a ‘what is possible’ perspective during his 1920 RUSI lecture of a similar 
title, Peck noted that the after eight years of air policing the role for aeroplanes in small wars 
was still a ‘subject of prolonged controversy’.30  Like Borton, Peck’s remarks reflected 
Callwell’s chapters on guerrilla and hill warfare.  To set the stage for his lecture Peck 
outlined the nature of the irregular adversary, 
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A very mobile, loosely organised tribal enemy, is able to fight guerrilla warfare without 
lines of communication, to concentrate and disperse rapidly, to escape being brought to 
battle except at his own chosen moment.  They are magnificent shots, possessing little 
wealth that cannot be moved or secreted.  They are fighting in a country they have 
known since childhood yet imperfectly known to us…a country in which hillmen are 
accustomed to move, and know every path which will take them quickly from place to 
place, but which is inaccessible to the heavier arms and even the field pieces and to the 
fighting vehicles and supply train which a civilized army requires.  Supply entirely by 
pack transport is often necessary.
31
   
 
Peck reminded the audience that the challenge of fighting and controlling determined 
guerrillas was not new.  Three centuries before the Christian era, Alexander’s armies, 
organised, trained, and equipped to fight contemporary, conventional armies, were 
confounded by Arab, Persian, and Afghan guerrillas.  Later, the Romans, the French Grand 
Armée, and other conventional armies were frustrated by guerrillas unwilling to submit to the 
demands of the invaders and refusing to fight in the conventional style of the day.  The 
Romans, the French, and others developed extremely harsh tactics, but relatively effective 
means for dealing with their guerrilla problems.
32
  Mass slaughters, enslavement, and 
expulsion may have achieved acceptable levels of stability in troublesome regions during 
ancient eras, but from the late 18th century onward such tactics were usually reproved of 
whenever discovered and publicised.  Still, conventional armies continued to seek ways to 
overcome the guerrillas’ advantages in mobility, intelligence, and influence.  What Peck 
offered that was new, and his contribution to the professional debate, was how best to apply 
the new technology, air power, in an irregular warfare context.
33
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During the inter-war years, the British were unwilling to take as harsh a stance as had 
been acceptable practice in previous eras.  Also, the British were committed to the League of 
Nations’ instructions to help those territories that were able achieve future independence and 
a position among the community of nations.
34
  So, as the British assumed responsibility for 
their assigned Mandates in the Middle East and elsewhere, air power promised an appropriate 
and cost effective tool to counter guerrillas, establish stable and secure environments, and 
give local civilian governments time to assert themselves as legitimate governing bodies, all 
at less cost to the Exchequer and with fewer casualties than using imperial troops to police 
and control the local populations.  British air power policy and doctrine of the time reflected 
the attitude that using aircraft to maintain control of the ‘semi-civilised’ regions would be 
both humane and less costly than conventional colonial control methods.  In Iraq, 
Transjordan, and Aden, but also in North-West Frontier of India, targets for air attack were 
chosen to affect the morale of an adversary and varied ‘according to the habits of life and 
standard of civilisation of the hostile community’.35  The 1929 addendum to the RAF War 
Manual noted that, 
Air action if given full rein can indeed be very severe in its effects, but as it is practised 
in the countries under air control the casualties and material damage inflicted are 
negligible.  The aim of air action is the moral attack upon the nerves, the habits, and the 
means of livelihood of the peoples against whom it is necessary to take action, and its 
moral effect is obviously enhanced in the case of semi-civilised people by the fact that it 
is a weapon against which they cannot effectively retaliate.  It follows that the air 
weapon is both economical and humane, since it inflicts neither great nor permanent 
                                                          
34
 D.H. Miller, ‘The Origin of the Mandate System’; and Treaty of Versailles June 28, 1919:  Covenant of the 
League of Nations, Article 22.  The former German and Ottoman territories were divided into three categories: 
A-mandates—advanced nations that had reached a state of development where their existence as independent 
nations could be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance until 
they were able to stand alone, B-mandates—Mandatory power would be responsible for the administration in 
order to prevent slave trade, arms trafficking, and establishment of military and naval bases or training of 
natives for other than internal  policing duties, and C-mandates—those territories so remote or sparsely 
populated that the region would be administered according to the Mandatory State’s [Britain, France, etc.] laws 
in order to protect the interests of the indigenous peoples. 
35
 TNA AIR 9/12, ASM 19, The Psychological Effects of Air Bombardment on Semi-civilised Peoples, (7 Feb 
1924), p. 2. 
 94  
 
suffering upon the people against whom it is used nor heavy casualties among those who 
have to wield it.
36
 
The War Manual, captured what Glubb and the other SSOs had learned and applied, that in 
order to be economical and humane, air power depended upon correctly identifying the 
targets that would achieve the desired influencing effects—the ‘whole success’ of which 
‘may depend on the availability of an individual who combines thorough knowledge of the 
tribes and country, with a certain amount of experience as an air observer’—the SSO.37   
Peck’s presentation to RUSI went on to suggest that aircraft could be the decisive 
element in these small wars.  Air power, he offered as his premise, was the tool best suited to 
break the resistance of the guerrillas.  No weapon, he asserted, ‘… has given us anything like 
so great an advantage, and none is so admirably suited to warfare against wild men and in 
wild countries, as the aircraft—provided, of course, it is correctly employed’. 38  [emphasis in 
the original]  He also reiterated the common theme espoused by air control advocates, that the 
British goal was to exert the minimum force necessary to elicit the desired behaviour from 
the tribes and to restore stability to an area.
39
  It was the responsibility of the civilian political 
officers or the RAF SSOs to fully explain the government’s expectations, ensure tribal 
leaders understood the consequences of not meeting expectations, and then administer 
appropriate rewards or punishment.
40
  
In Iraq, the political officers or SSOs would meet with tribal or village leaders to lay out 
the government’s demands for order and stability.  Those demands might be orders to cease 
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raiding other tribes, move their herds away from another tribe’s claimed pastoral areas, pay 
current or owed taxes, return stolen property, or any number of actions the colonial 
government deemed necessary from the tribes in order to maintain or restore stability.  
Should the tribes fail to comply, then the political officer or SSO had the ability to threaten 
and deliver air strikes, an obviously negative, but not uncommon incentive given the 
relatively primitive state of air power at the time.  But not all applications were kinetic.  
Aeroplanes made it possible for the RAF SSOs or political officers to spend time with tribes 
and villages in the more desolate reaches of the empire.
41
  For example, SSO reports contain 
details of reconnaissance flights in south-western Iraq, meetings with tribal leaders, 
remaining for days among the tribes, and where necessary, delivering warnings of impending 
attacks should the sheikhs fail to comply with the requirements laid out by civil authorities.
42
  
This enhanced access to the tribes allowed SSOs to build rapport with tribal leaders, 
understand the tribes’ perspectives on issues, and develop their situational awareness.43  The 
SSOs would act as mediators on occasion between the government and the tribes or between 
disputing tribes because of the relationships they had cultivated and their empathy with the 
locals’ perspectives.  Here again, the telegrams and operations summaries found in the SSO 
reports describe efforts to mediate on the tribes’ behalf with political officers and government 
officials, attempting to gain more time to pay back taxes.
44
   
Aircraft were also used on occasion as air ambulances, a capability that did not yet exist 
in civil aviation.  SSOs and political officers could offer the benefits of medical and surgical 
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aid to tribesmen in areas beyond the reach of doctors and ‘the conveyance of patients from 
such districts to the local centres of civilisation, where all facilities for proper treatment 
exist’.45  When a cholera epidemic struck Iraq in 1923, live cultures were transported by air to 
Baghdad from Egypt in order that the medical authorities could produce vaccines in bulk.  
The RAF then carried medical officers and vaccine to the villages and camps in order to stem 
the outbreak.
46
  Another, rather unusual, non-kinetic application of air power happened in 
April 1928 when an SSO in Transjordan arranged for transport aircraft to deliver airmen 
armed with flame-throwers to help combat swarms of locusts destroying valuable 
pasturelands.
47
  In the Middle East and North Africa, RAF aircraft were used to patrol for 
locust migration and swarming, helping civil authorities address this significant threat to the 
economies of the region.
48
   
By 1930, RAF doctrine clearly recognised the value of local medical services to 
maintaining peace, order, and goodwill, ‘it must always be remembered that the people 
against whom we are taking action, we have subsequently to govern…it should be the 
practice once our terms have been accepted, to render medical assistance, wherever such 
action is necessary and possible’.49  In a 1933 lecture, Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, at the time 
the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, reported, ‘One of the most pacifying influences in a wild 
and tribal territory is to set up as soon as possible dispensaries where the tribesmen can go for 
treatment .…’50  
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In order to control and moderate the destructive power of air strikes the colonial 
authorities put a deliberate approval process in place that ran simultaneously through the 
British and Iraqi civilian chains, from the British political officer or SSO on the ground ‘in 
concert with the local Iraqi Administration, and after that request has been considered and 
approved in succession by the Minister of the Interior in the Iraq government and his British 
advisor and by the High Commissioner’.51  While the inherent delays such a process induced 
could be, and often were frustrating to the SSO at the scene, it was a necessary level of 
control as this was peacetime policing and not a state of war.
52
  The Air Officer Commanding 
retained the final authority to release the air attacks, based upon the military necessity and 
propriety.
53
   
Throughout the inter-war period, political and military proponents of air control agreed 
that the threat of force was the foundation of the air control scheme,
54
 just as the threat of a 
punitive expedition by the Army had traditionally been used to keep the peace in the ‘semi-
civilised’ regions of the empire.  And, in order for the threat of an air strike to be credible, it 
required occasional demonstrations of the power of that force.  The RAF’s manual, 
Employment of Aircraft on the North-West Frontier of India, advised airmen that, 
Demonstrations in force without offensive action should accompany such warnings [of 
impending punitive operations] and, if the efficacy of air attack has already been 
demonstrated or is even known by repute to the tribe concerned, may at times be 
sufficient to induce satisfactory submission.
55
 
                                                          
51
 TNA AIR 8/34, Air Staff Note on the Method of Employment of the Air Arm in Iraq, (1 Aug 1924), p. 3.  Also 
in Air Publication 1105, Iraq Command Report, pp. 39 – 40. 
52
 TNA AIR 23/28, Operations Report by 84 (Bombing) Sqn, 12 Oct 1926.  The report begins with the SSO and 
a flight of DH-9A aircraft finding Akhwan (Saudi) raiders and 1,000 stolen camels.  It took seven hours to 
receive permission to begin air action.  
53
 Peter W. Gray, ‘The Myths of Air Control and the Realities of Imperial Policy’, Royal Air Force Air Power 
Review, vol. 4, no. 2, (Summer 2001), p. 44.  
54
 TNA AIR 5/262, Memorandum on the working of air control in Iraq, (undated, circa 1927), pp. 1 – 2. 
55
 TNA AIR 5/1328, Employment of Aircraft on the North-West Frontier of India, (1 Mar 1924), p. 4.  
 98  
 
Small Wars provided instructions for using military power ‘when there is no king to conquer, 
no capital to seize, no organized army to overthrow, and when there are no celebrated 
strongholds to capture’.  Quoting Lord Wolseley, ‘In planning a war against an uncivilized 
nation, … your first object should be the capture of whatever they prize most, and the 
destruction or deprivation of which will probably bring the war most rapidly to a 
conclusion’.56  When Small Wars was written at the end of the 19th century, the typical 
irregular adversary was agrarian.  Thus, the book advocated taking or scattering livestock and 
destroying crops and stored supplies in order to ‘quell insurrections’.57  Callwell’s point was 
simple, and enduring—in irregular conflict, ‘where the enemy cannot be touched in his 
patriotism or his honour’, target what the adversary most values in order to influence his 
behaviour.
58




Lawrence’s observations about guerrilla warfare were made from the perspective of the 
guerrillas, rather than a conventional force charged with countering guerrillas.  In guerrilla 
warfare, wrote Lawrence in Seven Pillars of Wisdom, the adversary was contained ‘by the 
silent threat’ of an attack that was not disclosed until the last moment and which was focused 
on the enemy’s most accessible material rather than his war-fighting strengths or 
weaknesses.
60
  Lawrence suggested that the principles of guerrilla warfare applied equally to 
air warfare.   
What the Arabs did yesterday the Air Forces may do to-morrow.  And in the same 
way—yet more swiftly’; air power’s range, speed, and striking power made it possible to 
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sustain a ‘silent threat’ to the tribes and strike their most accessible materials (villages, 
crops, flocks) rather than their war-fighting strengths.
61
 
Lawrence’s influence with Churchill and his status as an iconic figure in both Britain and the 
Middle East gave his ideas extraordinary weight.  During one of his less discouraged, but also 
less modest moods, Lawrence claimed, 
I take to myself credit for some of Mr Churchill’s pacification of the Middle East for 
while he was carrying it out he had the help of such knowledge and energy as I possess.  
His was the imagination and the courage to take a fresh departure and enough skilled 
knowledge of the political procedure to put his political revolution it into operation.
62
   
One can see the influences of both Callwell and Lawrence as the RAF turned theory into 
practice on the ‘wilder’ frontiers of the empire.  
Through the air control scheme, the British intentionally used air power to frustrate the 
tribesmen’s ethnic and cultural needs to fight man-to-man, while also using air strikes to 
attack the morale and livelihood of nomadic Bedouins.
63
  This was achieved through a 
method Slessor, in Central Blue described as the ‘inverted blockade’.64  Once civil authorities 
decided to take punitive action against a village or encampment, the goal was to secure a 
decision as quickly as possible without undue human casualties on either side.  SSOs or 
political officers would inform the residents of the government’s demands and consequences 
of non-compliance.  The villagers were given notice to remove their families and valuables, 
usually 24 – 48 hours prior to the attacks.  Once the people were out of the way, aeroplanes 
would then scatter the flocks, destroy houses, and generally disrupt the normal livelihood of 
the villagers, keeping them out of their homes and unable to tend to fields and flocks, 
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inconveniencing their lives until the discomfort was unbearable.
65
  Chamier provided a 
graphic description of the discomfort intended by the inverted blockade during a presentation 
to the Royal Central Asian Society,  
Day after day (and frequently at night) they [the air squadrons] keep an unceasing vigil.  
Soon the tribesmen get restless.  Their normal life is dislocated, they cannot carry out 
cattle herding and the cattle often stray, cooking is a matter of difficulty, crops cannot be 





At that point, with a sense of hopelessness instilled among the villagers, the tribal leaders 
would to come to terms.
67
  Once the tribal leadership acquiesced to government demands, air 
power could then be used to bring in the civil administrators, political officers, doctors, and 
veterinarians to offer beneficial government presence and services.
68
  The inverted blockade 
was a leadership-centric model that used the families’ dissatisfaction as an indirect means of 
influencing the will of local decision-makers. 
The inverted blockade made life intolerable for the entire tribe by disrupting traditional 
routines, damaging homes, and unsettling means of livelihood.
69
  Contemporary attitudes of 
the period towards the Bedouin, both among the Iraqi elites and the British, characterised 
them as ‘truculent and treacherous’, semi-civilised, uncivilised, or savages, rationalised, even 
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Air Control on the North-West Frontier of India 
T.R. Moreman called the area between the administered areas of ‘British India’ and the 
border with Afghanistan the ‘most strategically sensitive border of the British Empire’.71  
Between 1849 – 1947 British and Indian troops endured near constant guerrilla conflict with 
the native Pathan tribes in order to maintain imperial rule.  After the First World War, tribal 
control was based on containing the tribes through a combination of ‘bribery and blackmail’. 
Political officers administered the region and kept the peace through personal influence with 
the tribal leaders re-enforced by economic and military coercive means.
72
  The British 
Resident in Waziristan, Lt Col Charles Bruce, argued that control of tribes was achieved 
through political officers’ ‘time honoured methods … intimate knowledge of them, and to 
their appreciation of his character, justice, honesty, and purpose’.73  The use of aeroplanes 
offered potential new means of tribal control, however the Indian General Staff kept the RAF 
in a subordinate role and placed ‘elaborate restrictions on the employment of airpower for a 
mixture of military, political, and ethical reasons’.74 
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In 1922, the Prime Minister sent Sir John Salmond, accompanied by then Wing 
Commander Chamier, on an inspection tour to India to investigate state of decay of RAF 
there.
75
  In addition to examining the status of aircraft serviceability and crew training, 
Salmond was asked to consider if it were possible to achieve ‘economies by the increased use 
of the Air Force, in co-operating with the Army, for controlling territory’.76  The inspiration 
for investigating the possibility of air substitution on the North-West Frontier (NWF) may 
have come from Sir John Maffey, the Chief Commissioner for the NWF, in his 1922 proposal 
to withdraw the army from the unadministered tribal areas in order to reduce provocation and 
temptation.
77
  Salmond’s final report to the Viceroy in India noted that in the course of his 
discussions with military and political officers concerning mission of the RAF in India, he 
concluded that air power offered a means of overcoming the inherent challenges of tribal 
control on the NWF, namely the danger faced by British and imperial forces during punitive 
expeditions into the unadministered areas from ambush and guerrilla attacks, the distances 
between settlements and British frontier outposts, and the difficulty of mountainous and 
inhospitable terrain with rudimentary lines of communication.
78
  In Salmond’s opinion, 
another test of the air control scheme then on-going in Iraq was warranted.
79
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In support of his recommendation Salmond cited willingness by the commanding 
generals of the Northern and Western commands and ‘considerable support from the Frontier 
Political Officers’ to try substitution of air forces for ground troops.80  The Commander-in-
Chief, Lord Rawlinson, who in 1919 had extolled the value of aircraft used in support of 
ground troops, was unconvinced of an independent role for the Air Force.  He wrote, ‘I am 
unable wholly to accept the optimistic predictions’, based upon his experiences during the 
First World War, in northern Russia, and the frontier of India.
81
  Moreover, Rawlinson was 
unwilling to reduce the size of the Army on the Indian frontier, even for an experiment, until 
more evidence was available from the RAF’s air control operations in Iraq.82  In the spring of 
1925, the RAF got its chance. 
The Mahsud tribe in Waziristan had been a regular source of trouble for Government of 
India.  The remoteness of the tribe’s villages along the border with Afghanistan, the 
inhospitable terrain, and the warlike nature of the Mahsud meant that they were left alone by 
British and Indian officials for almost two decades between 1901 and 1919.
83
  With the 
outbreak of the Third Afghan War in May 1919, most of the forward militia posts were 
evacuated from the region, allowing the tribes to raid, steal, and otherwise terrorise their 
neighbours.  In order to address the worsening security situation, the British colonial 
government conducted a series of punitive expeditions between 1919 and 1923.  Peace was 
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restored with all but the most obstinate and isolated tribes.  Despite repeated attempts to 
negotiate with those tribes, the incidents continued.
84
   
In December 1924, the British Resident in Waziristan requested the government allow 
the use of aircraft to punish the worst offenders.  Looking for an opportunity to show that the 
air control scheme could work on the NWF, the Air Officer Commanding at the time, Air 
Vice Marshal Sir Edward Ellington, had No. 1 Wing begin to plan for operations.
85
  In 
February, the Resident delivered warnings to the tribes that unless they complied with 
government terms air actions would be taken.  On 9 Mar 1925, bombing and strafing began.  
Over the following weeks, air actions were taken and then suspended as tribal jirgas met with 
political officers to negotiate.  When negotiations faltered, bombing was resumed.  Although 
there were a number of small successes, officials realized it was going to take some time 
before full control of the area was established.  By the end of March, tactics changed from 
direct attack to air blockade.  And, at the beginning of April, the RAF began using night 
tactics to disrupt the tribes’ ability to gather crops and feed their animals in what had been the 
safety of darkness. 
In mid-April the most hostile of the tribes proposed to negotiate a peaceful ending to the 
operations.  Bombing and surveillance were halted in the Spli Toi region in order for the jirga 
to assemble.  When negotiations again failed, aerial surveillance and bombing resumed, 
including night raids.  Between 17 and 28 April, air operations were started, stopped, and 
started again as the tribes met with political officers to discuss terms, terms were rejected, 
and the negotiators adjusted their demands.  On 1 May, after 54 days of air operations, terms 
were agreed to by all parties and peace was restored.  The official report from the Secretary 
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of State from India estimated there were 11 casualties.
86
  By contrast, punitive operations by 
ground forces in Waziristan over a six-month period in 1919 – 1929 cost 1,800 killed, 3,675 
wounded, and 40,000 sick casualties.
87
  These initial operations in Waziristan established the 
RAF as an effective contributor to imperial policing in the NWF region.  However, as the 
army maintained command over military operations in India, the RAF was never again given 
the opportunity to conduct independent operations, instead playing a key role with the army 
in joint tribal control on the NWF.
88
 
Key to successful policing operations was successful integration of intelligence 
information provided through the district administrators [political officers].
89
  Unlike in Iraq, 
the Government of India insisted on the primacy of the civilian political officers.  Because the 
RAF was not given command of military operations in India, and also because the 
environment was too dangerous for isolated British officers to live among the tribes in the 
unadministered areas of the NWF, the RAF did not create a cadre of Special Service Officers 
and embed them in the villages.
90
  Still, ‘direct contact between the air commander and the 
political authorities handling the tribes and with all intelligence resources’ was essential.91  
Without embedded SSOs or political officers, situational awareness and intelligence 
regarding the movement and intentions of the tribes was the result of ‘political information, 
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or news obtained from local friendlies and agents’ gathered during the civilian political 
officers occasional visits.
92
   
The political officers on the NWF, many of whom were former soldiers, likely 
understood the basics of air support and also the need for accuracy when it came to air 
actions.
93
  Charles Trench’s account of a political agent’s life in India after the First World 
War, offers the story of Arthur (later Sir Arthur) ‘Bunch’ Parsons, the political agent in South 
Waziristan who ‘guided, navigated, and identified targets for the bombers’ in order to ensure 
the bombs ‘spared the just and only fell on the unjust’.  Trench notes that Parsons was the 
exception and that most political officers were content to serve as observers.
94
  By 1930, 
because of better maps indexed to aerial photography, ‘local Political Officers are able to 
identify each village and hamlet … in what was formerly terra incognita’.95  In answering 
questions to the CID’s Defence of India Sub-Committee on the possible roles for air power 
on the NWF, the Air Staff was certain to highlight such comments as ‘by means of the 
aeroplane a Political Officer can obtain a far more intimate knowledge of his charge than was 
possible in the past’ and ‘…it has done an enormous amount towards increasing that 
[intimate] knowledge [of the local political officer]’, and ‘nowhere on the Frontier has so 
much use of aeroplanes been made (for political purposes) as in Waziristan’, in addition to 
the usual RAF messages about air power’s economy, ability to overcome the obstacles 
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preventing effective political control in the inaccessible regions of the NWF, and lack of 
casualties to either side during air operations.
96
   
During the inter-war period, although air control methods were employed for tribal 
control in the unadministered areas of the NWF, there was only one instance where fully 
independent operations by the RAF were permitted.  Still, air policing on the NWF was not 
unsuccessful.  As Salmond noted in his report, ‘some countries are more favourable to 
obtaining rapid results from the air than others’, echoing Lawrence’s caution that air control 
methods were not universally applicable.
97
   The political officers’ lack of access to the tribal 
areas due to the long distances in a region as large as Waziristan, the difficult and forbidding 
terrain, and danger from hostile tribes, plus the government’s desire to employ civilian 
political officers over military intelligence officers, made the environment on the NWF 
different from those found in Iraq, Transjordan, and Aden.  Yet the effects achieved were 
similar.  Air power was the ready coercive force that backed up the civilian political officers’ 
dealings with the tribes, while also enabling the political officers’ access and understanding 
of dangerous and difficult areas.
98
  The lesson to be taken from air policing on the NWF of 
India is that whether in support of civilian political officers or RAF SSOs, it was the political 
officer backed up by credible and capable air power that enabled successful air control in the 
‘wilder’ reaches of the empire. 
The Peculiar Case of Palestine 
It is instructive at this point to examine how the air control scheme was applied to the 
situation in Palestine between the wars, as this was a case where air power was less than 
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successful at achieving Britain’s desired ends.99  To understand Palestine, it helps to begin in 
1917.  After three years of war, the Allies were weary.  Russia and Romania had been 
defeated, Britain and France were nearing exhaustion, Italy was severely demoralised after its 
defeat at Caporetto, and US forces had not yet arrived in sufficient numbers to make a 
difference.
100
  In order to gain support from the world Jewish community, counter Jewish 
pacifism, encourage Jews in Germany to agitate for peace, and influence the Americans to act 
faster, in November 1917 the British Foreign Secretary, A.J. Balfour, sent a letter to Baron 
Rothschild, a leader within the British Jewish community, expressing Britain’s support for a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine.
101
  In a short statement that would become known as the 
Balfour Declaration, the Foreign Secretary outlined the three principles that would guide 
Britain’s future engagement in Palestine. 
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national 
home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the 
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
102
 
During its international dealings after the war, the British Cabinet stood behind the Balfour 
Declaration.  ‘The honour of the Government was involved in the Declaration made by Mr 
Balfour, and to go back on our pledge would seriously reduce the prestige of this country in 
the eyes of Jews throughout the world’.103  The commitment to uphold Balfour’s ‘promise’, 
forced the Cabinet to walk a difficult line trying to balance the expectations of both Jews and 
Arabs in the region. 
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Peace was impossible on the lines of the Balfour Declaration, which involved setting up 
a National Home for the Jews and respecting the rights of the Arab population.  The 
result of this inconsistency must be to estrange both Arabs and Jews, while involving us 




In 1921, the cost of the British garrison in Palestine was approximately £3.5 million per 
year.
105
  In keeping with the fiscal austerity measures that were shaping much of post-war 
British policy, the Cabinet proposed to re-deploy ten Indian battalions from Palestine and 
replace them with aeroplanes, armoured cars, and a strong local levy, hoping to find dramatic 
savings on the scale achieved in Iraq.
106
  If it had succeeded in Palestine, the air substitution 
scheme would have had the added benefit of reducing the cost of India’s contribution to 




Churchill, as the Colonial Secretary, had requested the Cabinet assign Palestine to the 
Colonial Office, as the Cabinet had recently done with Iraq and Transjordan.  His rationale 
for the assignment was first that Palestine and Transjordan were naturally linked together by 
proximity and history, but also to achieve similar cost efficiencies by reducing forces as had 
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been done in the other Mandates.
108
  Omissi goes so far as to suggest that in the end, 
economic factors were the deciding factor.
109
  Where the War Office had resisted the transfer 
of Iraq to the Air Ministry, in 1922 it did not consider Palestine strategically significant and 
did not resist Churchill’s efforts to place an air officer in command in Palestine.110  This 
attitude towards the strategic significance of Palestine would change in 1935 once Haifa 
became the western terminus for the oil pipeline from Kurdistan and Italian incursions into 
Abyssinia threatened access to the Suez Canal.
111
  The British also recognised that ensuring 
peace and security in Palestine would have a wider effect on the Arab populations in other 
Middle Eastern colonies and Mandates, as well as the Muslim population of India.
112
 
The security problems in Palestine were different than those of the other major venues 
where the air control scheme had been implemented.
113
  First, there were the differences in 
the threats to internal peace and stability, and secondly Palestine had a different tactical 
environment from the other mandated territories.  In Iraq, Transjordan, Kurdistan, and Aden, 
the issue was largely one of tribal control—forcing semi-nomadic tribes to pay their taxes and 
stop raiding each other, in a fairly desolate geography.
114
  In Palestine however, the problem 
was to keep an urban civil war between passionate, hopeful Zionists wanting a future Jewish 
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state and equally passionate, indigenous Arabs fearful of losing everything to the Jewish 
immigrants in check.
115
  After reviewing the circumstances behind the 1929 Palestine riots, 
the Air Ministry concluded that ‘the primary cause of disorder has for many years – and 
especially since the Balfour Declaration – been Arab-Jew hatred’.116  Passion cannot be 
regulated by force, thus it hardly mattered whether ground forces or air forces were detailed 
to control the situation.  Brian Bond observed that from the beginning, the British Mandate in 
Palestine was doomed to fail because it was ‘impossible to reconcile the pledge to create a 
Jewish national home with the aspirations of Arab nationalism’.117  The second factor 
limiting the effectiveness of the air control scheme was the urban nature of Palestine.
118
  The 
Air Ministry investigation of the riots also concluded that the ‘limitations of air power in a 
country like Palestine are well known, and aircraft can do little to deal with riots in towns 
once they have broken out’.119 
It must be emphasised that the limitations of air power in an urban setting were well 
known, even before air control was attempted in Palestine.
120
  Callwell and Lawrence had 
both focused on guerrilla operations in open environments.  From the very beginning, 
Trenchard rejected the use of aircraft as instruments of government control in ‘civilised’ 
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settings such as India, Egypt, and Ireland.
121
  In May 1920, the Air Staff published a policy 
memorandum that severely restricted the use of aircraft ‘in civilised countries’.122  In 
February 1922, Churchill had stated that Palestine was not intended to be controlled from the 
air.
123
  Ten years later, official inquiries following the 1929 Palestine riots seemed to give 
critics of the RAF a reason to claim that the air control method had failed.
124
  This was not 
necessarily a fair claim, however.  During the Palestine riots, the employment of air power 
had been severely restricted.
125
  The British political authorities limited air actions to using 
only machine guns when looters were caught in the act or when persons were caught 
committing acts of violence.
126
  Trenchard, in one of his last official statements on air control 
published before the official enquiry into the Palestine riots had been published, reminding 
the Cabinet of his April 1920 memorandum against the use of aeroplanes in ‘civilised’ 
regions and saying, ‘The Air Staff have never contended that air action is an instrument well 
suited to intervene in aid of the civil power in towns’, and then contrasting the use of air 
power in relatively open and rural Transjordan against that in compact, urban, and racially-
charged Palestine.
127
   
Against the advice of the military authorities in Palestine, the size of the British garrison 
was incrementally reduced, relying increasingly on police forces, until by 1929 only a few 
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aeroplanes and armoured cars remained.
128
  In 1930, as Sir John Salmond, now Chief of the 
Air Staff, prepared to answer criticisms on the Air Ministry’s handling of the 1929 riots, he 
wrote to Churchill and reminded him he had been ‘the main instrument in transferring the 
military control of Palestine’ for administrative purposes to the Air Force and that Churchill 
had promised [in the 1922 letter] that transferring control did not mean Palestine was to be 
policed from the air.  Salmond’s letter continued, making the point that the Air Ministry had 
never claimed it could ‘control Palestine from the air, as it is and always has been obviously 
impossible to quell disturbances in large and civilised cities such as Jerusalem, etc., by air 
bombardment’, a point that was entirely consistent with the Air Ministry’s position 
throughout, that the air control scheme was more nuanced than the critics suggested.
129
 
In 1920 British administrators had recognised that a strong military garrison would be 
needed to maintain internal security in Palestine until a competent local security force could 
be created.
130
  Churchill, in a memorandum to the Cabinet, had noted that, ‘Riots are likely to 
break out in large towns such as Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Nablus’ because the enmity 
between Arabs and Jews, based upon the impression that Arab lands were to be forcibly taken 
away by the British and given to the Jews, would cause Jewish settlements to be ‘raided 
whenever religious feeling runs high, or mischief makers succeed in exciting local 
feelings’.131  It was in this urban, ‘civilised’, and politically charged setting that the Air 
Staff’s reluctance to take on responsibility for Palestine must be noted.   
By the mid-1920s, tensions among Arabs and Jews in Palestine seemed to have abated 
and thinking the crisis had passed, the British reduced the military garrison to a single RAF 
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squadron and two companies of RAF armoured cars, all based in Transjordan.
132
  Although 
the security situation seemed to be developing for the better, the ‘High Commissioner took 
the view that the internal condition of the country could not be relied upon to remain stable, 
and insisted upon the need for a military or gendarmerie force’.133  Struggling to provide 
adequate security ‘for as little money as possible’, a gendarmerie was created from locally 
recruited forces with British officers and soldiers mixed in to ‘animate and dominate the local 
gendarmerie and make it an effective instrument’.134  But, in 1925, a new High 
Commissioner abolished the gendarmerie and internal security was entrusted primarily to the 
police backed up by a tiny contingent of air forces, despite recommendations to the contrary 
by the Air Staff.
135
  Although an attractive outcome at the time for a cost-conscious Cabinet, 
in 1929 the police forces were unable to control renewed fighting between the Arabs and 
Jews.  
Further evidence of ‘Palestine was different’ may be found in the assessment of the 
intelligence requirements.  Prior to the 1929 riots, there were no SSOs in Palestine and the 
lone SSO in Transjordan was there to observe and report on external threats.
136
  His 
instructions were, ‘keep in touch with the temper of the tribes, to get early warning of 
impending raids from beyond the borders or of inter-tribal disorders within them, and to 
collect information about the fighting value of the tribes, their rifle strength, number of 
camels, and so on’.137  This external focus did little to help maintain the internal security of 
Palestine.  Because the Palestine problem was one of ‘civil lawlessness and communal 
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hatred’, the intelligence required was ‘civil and political in character; the properly responsible 
party is the civil authority, and the military commander must rely upon the civil intelligence 
organisation to collect and interpret the information’.138  The sharing of intelligence between 
the police and the military failed to happen and British authorities were caught off guard 
when the troubles started. 
During the inquiry after the 1929 riots, Brigadier Dobbie, commander of the infantry 
battalions brought in to quell the violence, testified that air forces had proven inappropriate to 
maintain security in Palestine because they were not allowed to develop their full offensive 
power, could not discriminate innocents from agitators in a crowd, and could not operate at 
night.
139
  These were admitted limitations that the Air Force had previously identified.  
Dobbie went on to note that the rioters realised the threat from the air was a bluff because of 
those limitation.
140
  Where Dobbie stated aircraft had made a valuable contribution, though, 
was as mobility assets.   
On 23 August, the level of violence had escalated to the point that the High 
Commissioner requested additional troops from Egypt.  The next afternoon the RAF moved 
two platoons of the South Wales Borderers from Egypt to Jerusalem via air transport.  The 
rest of the battalion arrived by rail the following day.
141
  On 26 August, with two battalions of 
infantry now in Palestine, Group Captain Playfair, the air officer commanding in Palestine 
and Transjordan, transferred command of military forces to Brigadier Dobbie because the 
Army was now providing the preponderance of military force in Palestine.  In mid-
September, Air Vice Marshal Hugh Dowding arrived and took over command from Dobbie, 
but by that point the worst of the fighting was over.
142
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Looking at the security challenges in Palestine between 1920 and 1929, one may draw 
the following conclusions.  First, security considerations took a back seat to economic ones.  
Motivated to cut defence spending, and encouraged by the air control scheme’s successes in 
Iraq and Transjordan, the Colonial Office ignored the expert advice of those who recognised 
that Palestine was different and who understood the capabilities and limitations of air power.  
Secondly, contemporary aircraft technology was inappropriate for Palestine’s predominantly 
urban setting.  Hobbled by prohibitive ROE, unable to determine enemy from innocent 
bystander, and incapable of operating at night, the Air Force proved largely ineffectual when 
the rioting broke out.  Thirdly, Palestine’s military intelligence structure was optimised for 
tribal and border control, not internal security.  Air power had little influence on either the 
Jews or the Arabs in Palestine’s religious and politically motivated conflict.  Dowding 
recommended during the investigation that the military commander needed a small military 
intelligence section dedicated to internal security.
143
  Among Dowding’s changes was the 
creation of an independent military intelligence structure under the Air Headquarters 
comprised of two branches, a staff section for administration and analysis, and a field section 
for collection and liaison with the local police forces and the population.
144
  By the beginning 
of 1931, there were four RAF SSOs collecting intelligence and maintaining situational 
awareness among the populace and also serving as liaisons between the military and the 
police.
145
  All of the SSOs spoke Arabic and were experienced intelligence officers.
146
  Their 
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duties were to ‘procure information of a military, political, and topographical nature and to 
keep in touch with the feeling in the country by touring their districts’.147  
Because there was no military intelligence structure in Palestine before 1930, and the 
police rarely collaborated with the military, the British were surprised in August when the 
violence escalated to the level it did, a point that reinforced the Air Staff placing such 
importance on an effective intelligence system based upon ‘intimate understanding of the 
habits and mentality’ of the local population.148  Still, the Palestine Police and the RAF SSOs 
did not always get on well and the Police would sometimes underrate the intelligence 
provided by the SSOs.
149
  This was not a helpful situation, even though, at the Cairo 
Conference, airmen had pointed out that an efficient intelligence system was required in order 
to make the air control scheme work.
150
  
Fully Implementing the Air Control Scheme 
Offensive air actions against the tribes, as stated in British doctrine of the period, was 
not intended to inflict physical casualties, but rather to influence and compel the locals’ 
behaviour.  In 1922, C.D. 22, the RAF’s Operations Manual, stated, ‘The susceptibility of a 
savage enemy to moral influences is a most important factor in the campaign’.151  A few 
years later, writing about the use of the RAF against irregular forces in the British Army 
Quarterly, F.W. Bewsher observed,  
It is a matter of the first importance that the population should regard the potentialities of 
aircraft with considerable awe.  If a healthy respect for aircraft and armoured cars is 
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engendered in the minds of the civil population, the presence of aircraft or armoured cars 
should produce the necessary results by intimidation and not by definite action.  …  It 
should be a matter of policy, therefore, to inspire in the minds of the civil population, this 
awe of aircraft on which the moral value of the aeroplane depends.
152
 
Sir John (Pasha) Bagot Glubb, as a captain in 1926, presented a paper to RUSI, ‘Air and 
ground forces in punitive expeditions’.  In 1921, Glubb, had been serving in Iraq as an Army 
officer and accepted a transfer to the RAF.  Glubb’s perspective as an RAF Special Service 
Officer (SSO), one of the intelligence professionals who were fully embedded in the local 
culture and populace, is important.  He was one of the first, and is possibly the most famous, 
of the RAF SSOs.  The roles, functions, and training of the SSOs will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  Glubb’s lecture was based on his years of experience living among and working 
alongside the Iraqi tribes, working with the British political officers, and applying the effects 
of air power in Iraq.  Glubb, like so many airmen of the time, emphasised the moral element 
of air control in the section of his lecture titled the ‘Unattractiveness of Air Operations’.153  
For the Bedouin, described Glubb, 
After a few years of peace, life becomes so intolerably monotonous that anti-government 
hostilities are decided upon.  These tribesmen are usually experts who delight in such 
occupations as robberies, ambushes, cutting off detachments and looting the dead.  
Compared with such operations, hostilities against aircraft are very poor sport.  The 
tribesmen fire away their priceless ammunition with no visible effect whatever, a process 




Haldane, having just left the post of General-Officer-Commanding in Mesopotamia, in 
his November 1922 lecture at RUSI, stated, ‘Arabs, like other Eastern peoples, are 
accustomed to be ruled with the strong hand.  Indeed, there is no denying they respect force 
                                                          
152
 F.W. Bewsher, ‘Cooperation between the Royal Air Force and irregular troops in the desert’, The Army 
Quarterly, vol. 12, (Apr 1926), p. 64.   
153
 Glubb, ‘Air and ground forces in punitive expeditions’, p. 778. 
154
 Glubb, ‘Air and ground forces in punitive expeditions’, p. 778. 




  The articles by Chamier, Bewsher, Glubb, Haldane, and others reflected 
a prevailing sentiment, at least among the imperialists of the era, towards the indigenous 
peoples of the ‘semi-civilised’ world as naturally fierce savages.  Peace in the troubled 
reaches of the empire rested upon ‘the prestige of the white man…backed by force’.156  
Heather Streets, in her study of the martial races myth, noted that popular ideology of the era 
held that ‘savages’ were particularly manly and biologically disposed towards fighting, 
heroics, and loyalty to the cause.
157
  The language and imagery of martial races in British 
popular culture, she says, influenced an ‘aggressive, soldier-centred imperial culture’.158  The 
martial races myth, where all males able to carry a weapon had the potential to become 
enemy combatants, gives at least partial explanation as to why it was considered less 
objectionable at the time to bomb Bedouin villages than it was to bomb Europeans cities. 
One early example of this martial races attitude is found in RUSI’s 1921 Gold Medal 
essay.  C.J. Mackay, in ‘The Influence in the Future of Aircraft upon the Problems of 
Imperial Defence’, makes the case that Arab tribesmen were eternal, if not noble, guerrillas 
and fought for the glory of combat—‘these tribes fight for the mere pleasure of fighting’.  He 
goes on to say, ‘They are past masters in the art of guerrilla warfare’.159  Substituting air 
power for traditional, land-based, punitive expeditions, went the conventional wisdom of the 
day, frustrated the guerrillas by depriving them of their motivations to fight—glory, loot, and 
activity.   
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Air Commodore C.F.A. Portal’s 1937 lecture on air policing at RUSI, although primarily 
intended as a report on the non-kinetic applications of air power as a means of tribal control, 
repeated this same sentiment,  
The air method drives the tribesman away, the army punitive expedition makes him 
stand and fight; the air method gets results…by being impersonal and by giving it 
nothing to hit back at; the army expedition causes intense excitement and its essence is 
battle and death, or glory and loot…160 
The rest of Portal’s lecture described how air control methods had taken a deliberate turn 
towards non-kinetic considerations by the 1930s.  Based upon his experiences in Aden, Portal 
concluded that the air control scheme was incomplete unless aircraft were also used ‘as a 
means of maintaining contact with the natives and improving their lot’.161  He suggested that 
air power could provide a means of relieving economic distress, improving health conditions, 
providing education, and settling disputes in ‘wild country’ where civilian agents were non-
existent or too few.
162
  Portal proposed establishing a network of medical clinics with medical 
officers flown in to see patients and air ambulances used to evacuate the serious cases.  He 
also recommended using aeroplanes for delivering the mail to isolated communities and 
transporting civilian authorities into the districts to settle disputes, provide the news, and keep 
the government informed.
163
  His measure of effectiveness for non-kinetic applications of air 
power was simple.  Success was achieved when the locals thought of the ‘landing ground not 
only as a place from which he might be bombed, but also as a point of contact with 
civilization where he could obtain some of its benefits’.164  Furthermore, ‘the success of 
aircraft in establishing and maintaining the necessary degree of law and order in a wild 
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country cannot be complete unless it is possible to follow up operations by using the air to the 
full as a means of maintaining contact with the natives and improving their lot’.165 
Interestingly, Glubb, Mackay, Portal, and others’ observations from the 1920s and 30s 
regarding local tribesmen fighting for personal glory and activity rather than strategic 
objectives has echoes in the present day.  In 2009, David Kilcullen observed that local 
Afghan farmers, upon witnessing a Taliban ambush of an US patrol, rushed home to grab 
weapons and joined in to fight the Americans soldiers whom they were generally well-
disposed towards.  When asked why, the farmers replied that ‘this was the most exciting 
thing that had happened in their valley in years and it would have shamed them to stand by 
and wait it out’.166  Steven Pressfield, author of the Afghan Campaign, probably captured the 
sentiment best, ‘The heart of every tribal male is that of a warrior.  What the warrior craves 
before all else is respect.  Respect from his own people, and, even more, from his enemy’.167  
Glubb recorded what American and coalition forces had to re-learn almost a century later, 
that taking away any opportunity for the tribesmen to fight back and to demonstrate warrior 
prowess imbued a sense of helplessness.  The ‘tremendous moral effect [from air control] is 
largely due to the demoralization engendered in the tribesman by his feeling of helplessness 
and his inability to reply effectively to the attack’.168 
Air Staff Memorandum 46, Notes on Air Control of Undeveloped Countries, a 
supplement to Chapter XIV of the RAF War Manual, dedicated an entire section to the 
‘Moral Effect of Air Action’.169  It clearly stated that air power was intended to achieve its 
                                                          
165
 Portal, ‘Air Force Co-operation in Policing the Empire', p. 356. 
166
 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla:  Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 40-41.   
167
 Steven Pressfield, ‘It’s the Tribes, Stupid’, originally published in the Seattle Post Intelligencer, (18 June 
2006).  Mr. Pressfield has since posted the article and five cultural awareness videos on his blog, Agora, a forum 
for discussing counter-insurgency, culture, history, and irregular warfare.  www.agora.stevenpressfield.com 
168
 Glubb, ‘Air and ground forces in punitive expeditions’, p. 782. 
169
 TNA AIR 5/170, ASM 46, C.D. 72, Notes on Air Control of Undeveloped Countries, p. 8. 
 122  
 
desired objectives through the threat of force, and also a combination of discomfort and 
‘feeling of impotence due to the impossibility of effective retaliation’.170  This guidance was 
fully congruent with the earliest tenets of air power, that the threat of decisive attack, i.e., 
direct attack of those ‘important centres … upon which the country’s resistance depends’171 
[high value-high payoff targets], would be enough to influence the decisions of the enemy, 
whether a developed, peer adversary or an ‘uncivilized tribe’ of farmers or herders.172  The 
other doctrinally relevant publications from the period also addressed both the direct effects 
possible through vigorous and sustained aerial attack, as well as the indirect effects to be 
achieved by non-kinetic means such as reconnaissance, shows of force, transport of political 
officers to the tribes, and even just the presence of aeroplanes passing overhead.  Throughout, 
the Air Staff’s message consistently reinforced C.D. 22’s original theme of a civic 
administration with the ability to monitor and report the activities and movements of the 
tribes and villages, but also having the ability to influence tribal behaviour through coercive 
techniques.
173
  Even the Army’s doctrinal manuals, despite the earlier, long bureaucratic fight 
against the air control scheme, by 1925 had to concede the value of air power against the 
tribes, ‘…the moral and material effect of a vigorous and sustained aerial offensive may 
render operations by troops unnecessary’.174 
Although the political and military rhetoric focused on the moral domain, achieving 
desired behavioural changes from the tribes still required actions in the physical domain.  
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Physical actions to achieve the moral effects desired by the air control scheme must 
considered in the context of the period, while not forgetting the technology available and the 
cultural attitudes that guided colonial decision-making, in addition to the economic and 
Service issues previously discussed.  Aerial targeting in the early days of combat aviation 
was an imprecise science, primarily because of the immaturity of air power, but also 
hampered by the state of the technology and the nascent state of British and American 
educational and theoretical foundations related to air power.  Meanwhile, nearly all of the 
RAF officers who would later serve as senior leaders during the Second World War were 
gaining experience by policing colonies and Mandates from the air.
175
  It would not be until 
late in the inter-war period that British and American airmen would formulate the strategic 
offensive and industrial web targeting theories that would guide their later employment of 
offensive air power during the Second World War.  The RAF’s collective air control 
experience, using air attack to shape the moral will of the population, was a major influence 
on British strategic offensive theory.
176
 
British doctrine of the period recognised that killing civilians was counter-productive, 
and although attacks against rebellious tribes was considered an acceptable means of 
destroying guerrilla fighters’ morale and willingness to fight, every ‘endeavour should be 
made to spare the women and children as far as possible, and for this purpose a warning 
should be given, whenever practicable’.177  Operational reports, journal articles, and speeches 
given by RAF leaders throughout the inter-war period reinforced this point—controlling the 
actions, and thus the intended and unintended effects of air attack, usually produced a more 
lasting and beneficial result for the government.  Sir Henry Dobbs, the British High 
Commissioner for Iraq in 1923 – 24 reported, 
                                                          
175
 Described at Appendix 1. 
176
 Scot Robertson, ‘The Development of Royal Air Force Strategic Bombing Doctrine between the Wars:  A 
Revolution in Military Affairs?’, Airpower Journal, vol. 12, no. 1, (Spring 1998), p. 43. 
177
 C.D. 22, Operations Manual, p. 128. 
 124  
 
By prompt demonstrations on the first sign of trouble carried out over any area affected, 
however distant, tribal insubordination has been calmed before it could grow dangerous, 
and there has been an immense saving of blood and treasure to the British and Iraq 
Governments.  But now, almost before the would-be rebel has formulated his plans, the 





By the mid-1930s, Trenchard’s air control experiment had become codified in British air 
doctrine and practice.  The RAF’s experiences with air power in small wars, against 
adversaries without any credible ability to defend themselves or to fight back, may have 
provided the wrong lessons for an air force about to fight a war against another continental 
military power.  The impact air control operations in the reaches of the empire had on 
Britain’s preparedness for the Second World War is well beyond the scope of this study and 
has been better covered in other works.
179
  It is sufficient to note however, that more than ten 
years of colonial policing certainly influenced how RAF leaders approached offensive air 
operations.  The moral effects of air power on targeted populations were lessons well learned 
by the RAF after more than a decade of air policing.  In 1923, Sir Percy Cox, nicely summed 
it up,  
In every instance air action was only necessary on a surprisingly limited scale.  Had it 
been necessary to exact obedience by the employment of ground troops the cost in time 
and money, if not also in lives, would have been immensely greater.  A further 
consideration which is very pronounced in dealing with lawlessness, particularly 
amongst the Euphrates tribes, is the entire elimination, in the case of air action, of 
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provocative effect.  Past history has proved that the presence of ground troops in these 
districts serves as a focus for concentrating rebellious action by the tribes, while any 
small success on the part of the latter may magnify a minor disturbance into a serious 




What cannot be denied is that air control saved the independent Royal Air Force.
181
  In 
1923, Trenchard wrote to his friend, Sir John Salmond, expressing his gratitude for making 
the air control experiment in Iraq work.  ‘I cannot emphasize too much,’ said Trenchard, ‘the 
value your successful command in Iraq has been to us’.182  Indeed, as a result, Air Staff 
Memorandum 48, Notes on the History of the Employment of Air Power, stated, 
During the whole period under review, a main factor in the pacification of the country 
[Iraq] has been the Royal Air Force.  By prompt demonstrations on the first sign of 
trouble carried out over any area affected, however distant, tribal insubordination has 
been calmed before it could grow dangerous, and there has been an immense saving of 




After successes in Somaliland and in Iraq the future of an independent RAF was never 
really in doubt.
184
  By 1922, the Cabinet had accepted the RAF’s role as a constabulary force 
and sought more savings through air substitution elsewhere.
185
  Over the next decade, the air 
control scheme would be applied, tested, and refined in Transjordan, Palestine, the North-
West Frontier of India, Sudan, British East Africa, and Aden, sometimes with great success 
and at other times with mixed results.  In 1929, in his final report to the Air Ministry, what 
Slessor called, ‘Boom’s last will and testament’,186 Trenchard observed that because the air 
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control scheme had been so effective and economical, there were additional roles and in other 
regions of the empire where air forces might substitute for the Army and the Royal Navy, 
In the face of the evidence, which has thus accumulated during the last eight years of air 
operations carried out under every different condition of climate, of country and of flying 
weather which are to be found in undeveloped countries, cannot any longer be disputed.  
The economies to be effected by the fuller employment of air forces rests upon an 
equally sure foundation of achievement.
187
 
But Lawrence cautioned, ‘The [air control] system is not capable of universal application’.188  
Even Slessor, one of Trenchard’s most ardent admirers, noted, ‘The Air Method was certainly 
not invariably, instantly and permanently successful in restoring order’.189  RAF doctrine was 
clear in its guidance on this point,  
Aircraft can seldom be effectively used in support of civil police authorities in thickly 
and diversely populated areas.  Under such circumstances the support of air forces is best 
confined to reconnaissance, to the dropping of warning notes, to the conveyance of 
police authorities and to other roles not entailing the use of the offensive armament of 
aircraft.
190
   
As the case studies of Palestine and the NWF showed, application of the air control scheme 
in other regions of the empire was not always as successful as Iraq had been.  
Still, Trenchard’s goal had been to justify and defend the RAF as an independent 
Service, equal to the Army and Royal Navy.  In this he and the air control advocates of the 
RAF were resoundingly successful.  Many of the lessons these officers observed and 
incorporated into the Air Force’s common practices were related to joint operations with the 
land forces—RAF liaison officers assigned to the ground forces, an air-oriented intelligence 
service to provide warning of impending disturbances, aerial insertion of quick reaction 
forces, aerial re-supply of independent columns deep in enemy territory, air-to-ground 
communications to direct and assess the effectiveness of air attacks, and rapid medical 
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evacuation for sick and wounded soldiers.
191
  Sir Percy Cox, during Salmond’s March 1925 
presentation at RUSI, provided the assessment of air control and the conclusion both 
Churchill and Trenchard had hoped for: 
…there certainly was a natural inclination on the part of the Army in Iraq to gauge the 
potentialities of the air arm by what one or two machines could do under very 
unfavourable conditions.  …not unnaturally, one was inclined to be a little sceptical as to 
what aeroplanes could do by themselves.  I have no doubt that I was among the number, 
but I kept an open mind.  …there can be no question of the success of the Air Force 
Scheme as evolved in principle at the Conference in Cairo, and as worked by Sir John 
Salmond.  It has succeeded wonderfully.  I think he will agree that we were quite ready 
to be persuaded that the Air Force could do the trick, and I think he has successfully 




As there were relatively few casualties on both sides during air policing operations, 
especially when compared to those the nations had suffered during the Great War, what 
followed over the next decade and a half were some interesting claims that air power had 
ushered in an era of greater humanity when it came to punitive actions in undeveloped 
regions.  Salmond managed to strike an interesting compromise in his report on the air 
control experiment in Iraq.  He noted that air warfare, like all methods of warfare is 
inherently inhumane.  But, he tempered the statement by affirming what Trenchard, 
Lawrence, and others had proposed earlier, that policing ‘semi-civilised regions’ from the air 
was ‘quicker, more efficient and was accompanied by infinitely less suffering than the older 
methods of waging war’.193  This conclusion would shape British air power doctrine, policy, 
and practices for decades to come. 
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Chapter Four 
Intelligence, Influence, and Air Control 
 
The selection of objectives, the grouping of zones, and determining the order in 




Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air 
  




J.A. Chamier, ‘Air Control of Frontiers’ 
 
A comprehensive and rapid working system of intelligence is essential to the 
success of air control; the authorities cannot keep the necessary contact with the 
enemy's morale without such a system.
3
 
Air Staff Memorandum 41, January 1929 
 
From the moment Italian pilot Lt Giulio Gavotti dropped the first ‘bombs’ on Turkish 
troops in Libya, the employment of air power has been overwhelmingly kinetic.
4
  While 
military aviation in the 1920s was full of potential, the state of air power was primitive.
5
  
Although military aviation after the First World War was rapidly evolving, the primary tools 
were necessarily kinetic—bombs and bullets to attack enemy targets.  Despite this 
intentional, and understandable, orientation on war-fighting, airmen did envision and later 
developed non-kinetic applications for aeroplanes in small wars.  Sebastian Richie notes that 
‘historians of inter-war policing tend to focus on proscription bombing to the exclusion of all 
else’, and ‘standard’ references provide a misleading picture by focusing too narrowly on the 
offensive and kinetic application of air power’.6  Although early non-kinetic applications for 
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air power were rudimentary, the seeds of innovation were there.  The technology was 
evolving and airmen were discovering and refining roles for aircraft beyond war-fighting, in 
reconnaissance, cartography, agriculture, transportation, and communication.  
During the 1919 campaign 
against the ‘Mad Mullah’ in 
Somaliland, one of Z-Unit’s DH-
9A aeroplanes was outfitted as 
an air ambulance.
7
  A coffin-like 
structure, sized to take a stretcher 
and attendant, was fitted to the 
fuselage behind the pilot.
8
  
(Figure 4.1)  According to Z-
Unit’s medical officer, eight patients were evacuated from the field to Berbera, approximately 
175 miles away.
9
  By 1923, the RAF had begun ‘routine AME [aeromedical evacuation] 
flights from bases in the Middle East’, and by 1925 had ‘acquired two dedicated Vickers 
Vernon AME transport aircraft, fitted with bench seats and litter positions for patients’.10   
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In 1922, the RAF introduced the world’s first purpose-built military transport, the 
Vickers Vernon, early evidence of the potential value of air transport as a means of 
connecting widely scattered parts of the empire.
11
  Two squadrons of Vernons, 45 Sqn and 70 
Sqn, were among the eight RAF squadrons Trenchard dedicated to Iraqi air policing duties.  
And, although the commander of 45 Sqn, Arthur Harris, convinced Sir John Salmond to 
allow him to locally modify and experiment with using the transports as bombers, the aircraft 
retained their primary roles of troop transport, re-supply, reconnaissance, and medical 
evacuation throughout the Middle East.
12
  Bombing and strafing, or at least the threat of air 
strikes, was the primary means of influencing locals’ behaviour.  The use of non-kinetic air 
power, however, suggests that other, less destructive, applications were considered as 
possible means of influencing local behaviours.
13
  For example, 14 Sqn records note that 
during 1928, twice weekly reconnaissance flights demonstrated ‘to both friendly and 
unfriendly tribes the mobility and alertness of the Air Force’, and as a result ‘no shots were 
fired nor bombs dropped during the year 1928 on any enemy’.14   And almost as if predicting 
how transports would be used to move troops and supplies between trouble spots, Chamier 
reports how aeroplanes were used to insert troops to arrest the leaders of a group causing 
trouble for British authorities in Mesopotamia, a year before the RAF took control of Iraq.
15
    
This chapter examines the process the RAF used to apply the full range air power, and how 
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local intelligence helped determine the appropriate means of causing desired behaviour from 
the indigenous populations. 
Targeting is defined as the process of matching available means, whether kinetic or non-
kinetic [emphasis added], to attain desired objectives.
16
  Admittedly, calling the process 
‘targeting’ elicits the perception of air power’s lethal orientation.  This kinetic inclination is 
further reinforced by NATO’s placement of theatre-level, joint targeting guidance and local 
targeting processes as appendices under the joint fires annex of operations plans and orders.
17
  
While the RAF of Trenchard and Salmond’s day may have sought to emphasise the moral 
over the physical domain, desired results were often achieved through coercive influence—
actual or threatened physical destruction of what the intended leaders valued most, just as 
Callwell had earlier advised.  Then, as now, air power was applied to influence the decision-
makers, targeting the will of the leadership in order to mould the actions of the tribes and 
villages. The perceived power of aircraft is illustrated by the British Governor of the 
Somaliland Protectorate, Sir Geoffrey Archer’s, request to not return two DH-9s that had 
been borrowed from Aden because, ‘their departure deprives me at once of a powerful moral 
and material factor exercising enormous influence and control over Somalis’.18     
In constabulary operations, whether military or civilian, the power of the policing force 
is based upon the targeted populations believing that any violations will be swiftly dealt with.  
In order to ensure the credibility of air power’s latent impact to compel desired behaviour 
from local populations, some level of force had to be occasionally applied.
19
  Even in those 
‘semi-civilised’ regions of the empire with doubtful economic or social value, and where the 
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colonial objective was primarily stability, indiscriminate applications of air power could be 
counter-productive.
20
  The RAF’s War Manual from 1928 reminded airmen of the era that 
whether the opponent was ‘semi-civilised’ or a peer, the goal was to ‘induce the enemy to 
submit with the minimum destruction of life and property’.21  Later in the same chapter, the 
aim of the air operations was not punitive, ‘it is most desirable to avoid widespread 
destruction which may result in a state of famine or deprive the people of their livelihood, 
thereby creating the very conditions which are most conducive to lawlessness’.22  And, the 
choice of correct objectives depended upon a ‘comprehensive and accurate knowledge of the 
psychology of the enemy and of his customs and characteristics, which can only be expected 
from those who have made a special study of the people’23—one of the key roles and 
responsibilities of the RAF SSOs, in addition to communicating to the local leadership the 
behaviours desired by the government and the consequences of failing to comply.   
After the war the economic potential of the Middle East, especially when compared with 
Britain’s colonies in India and Egypt, was questionable.24  The Times, which before the war 
had been the ‘house organ of imperialism’, in 1920, urged the Cabinet to abandon Iraq as an 
unsustainable expense.
25
  Even Churchill sometimes doubted the viability of a future Iraq.  In 
a September 1922 letter to the Prime Minister he expressed his frustration with Emir Feisal’s 
assertiveness, concern about external threats to Iraq, and failure to develop Iraqi oil fields, 
‘At present we are paying eight millions [£] for the privilege of living on an ungrateful 
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volcano out of which we are in no circumstances to get anything worth having’.26  While the 
presence of Arabian oil was known in 1920, especially in the Kurdish areas around Kirkuk, 
the first successful oil well was not sunk until 1927 and full economic potential of Iraqi oil 
reserves was not to be realised until after the Second World War.
27
  As previously noted, 
some post-war British politicians, such as H.H. Asquith, leader of the Liberal party in 1920, 
and Lord Islington, in the House of Lords, considered the Mandates as unsupportable and 
unpopular drains on a depleted Exchequer.
28
  What Britain needed most from its mandated 
territories during the inter-war period was a stable and peaceful region, at minimal cost, in 
order that she might develop safe and reliable commercial routes to India, Egypt, and 
Australia.
29
  The measure of stability, according to Portal, was simple:  a British official 
could travel unmolested anywhere he wished to go and the tribesmen were not allowed to be 
rude or shoot at the officer or his aeroplane.
30
  Therefore, the British took a constabulary 
approach to control the region.  The tactics and methods of policing were often harsh, 
reflective of lingering 19
th
 century attitudes toward ‘uncivilised’ and ‘savage’ peoples.  But 
times were changing.  British airmen were sensitive to the moral implications of bombing 
civilians.  Portal points out that, 
‘Bomb and scuttle’ fails because its users have given too little thought to the vital 
question, ‘What is the object [emphasis in original] of the operation?’  Surely the object 
of all coercive police action is to bring about a change in the temper or intention of the 
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person or body of persons who are disturbing the peace.  In other words, we want a 
change of heart, and we want to get it by the use of the minimum amount of force.
31
 
By examining how local intelligence guided the RAF’s application of its air control 
scheme—their process for employing air power to achieve the desired behaviours from the 
locals, modern airmen might learn appropriate lessons that may apply to future incarnations 
of irregular warfare. 
From the beginning, British airmen developing the air control scheme recognised that in 
order to substitute air power as an effective means of imperial policing, they needed to be 
both deliberate in how and where aerial effects were applied, as well as discriminating in 
their application of air power.  Air Marshal Brook-Popham’s summation, in the conclusion to 
Portal’s 1937 lecture at RUSI, reminded the attendees that what the RAF was doing was in 
the colonies and Mandates was constabulary, rather than war-fighting in nature.   
What we want to do in these police operations is to achieve peace, and I think if we 
analyse history or our own experience we shall find that what causes resentment and 
desire for revenge is the casualties; it may be our own wounds or it may be the death of 
our relations or friends:  those are what cause the bitterness and resentment, which will 
some day break out again.  Therefore, the more we can achieve results with a minimum 





Early doctrinal publications noted the variety of aerial effects available to control and 
shape the behaviour of indigenous peoples.  In addition to bombing and strafing, non-kinetic 
applications such as reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and transport of civilian political 
officers were available.
33
  The frequent presence of British aeroplanes flying overhead served 
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as a pervasive reminder of the government’s ability to strike where and when it chose.34  RAF 
SSOs or the political officers were sure to remind the tribes in their charge of this visible 
presence of British power—the ‘ubiquity of the air arm serves as a constant reminder over 
widespread areas of the existence of the Government of the country, and this in itself has a 
tranquilising effect’.35 
Aerial effects were not normally applied haphazardly.
36
  In Iraq, Transjordan, and the 
NWF, air policing was a joint effort between the local governments and their British advisors.  
In Palestine, the High Commissioner tended to take a more direct role in order to mediate the 
persistent conflict between the native Arabs and the immigrant Jews.  In each case, though, 
civilian control was maintained over aerial actions and attacks were made ‘only after due 
consultation with the political authorities in the locality’.37  Sir John Salmond, in 1924, 
provided a statement for the record outlining the extent of civilian control in Iraq.
38
  In his 
report Salmond described how requests for air attacks were sent by the British advisor on the 
scene to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, and then to the British High Commissioner.  The High 
Commissioner would consult with his military advisors before approving any actions.
39
  
While the political request process Salmond described ensured a necessary level of civilian 
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control and oversight on proposed military actions, military intelligence officers would 
sometimes complain they were not consulted until it was too late.
40
 
When the tactical situation exceeded the capabilities of local police forces to control or 
for the political official to mediate, the indigenous administrator or his British advisor could 
request aerial action.  If the SSO was available and time permitted, the SSO was supposed to 
be informed in order to ensure the military intelligence aspect was considered.  The request 
was then forwarded to the British Air Officer Commanding (AOC), who might also be the 
overall commander of British military forces in the theatre, for consideration, in consultation 
with the corresponding civil and colonial authorities.  If military action seemed warranted, 
the air staff would analyse the situation and propose a range of military options.  The military 
options would be reviewed by local civilian and security officials, and the SSO if available.  
This group would recommend a course of action to the AOC and the British High 
Commissioner that would achieve the intended effects.  Simultaneously, the leaders of the 
offending tribes or villages would be informed of any measures being considered and the 
consequences of not abiding by the directions of the civil administrators.  Should the 
offenders refuse to comply and continue the unacceptable behaviour, then air attacks would 
begin under the supervision of local civil authorities or the SSO.  These same civilian 
administrators and military-political observers would assess the effects of the air actions and 
make recommendations as to the necessity of continuing or halting the bombing, changing 
the scale, location, or intensity of the bombing, or reverting to other means of influencing the 
villages’ behaviours.41  (Figure 4.2)  The RAF illustrated the process by using an example 
where the Iraqi district governor on the Euphrates River and his British advisor determined 
that an inaccessible district could not be brought under control by peaceful methods.  In order 
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Figure 4.2,  
Air Control Process 
to protect the neighbouring tribes and develop the district, military action was requested.  The 
description highlighted the interaction between Iraqi and civilian 
officers, advised by Iraqi and British police, and consultations with 
‘Special service officers with a knowledge of local conditions’.42 
One gets a sense for the frustration SSOs may have felt while 
trying to work within such a structured, and at times, cumbersome, 
process given they normally were empowered with great autonomy 
to collect intelligence, mediate with and among the tribes, and 
represent the authorities.
43
  At times, even benign reconnaissance 
and demonstration flights were controlled by headquarters.  The 
SSO in Jalibah, Iraq, received a warning from Air Headquarters 
(AHQ) after reporting that he had instructed a group of Saudi 
refugees to move ‘or take the consequences of air action’.  AHQ in 
Baghdad admonished him with, ‘Threats of air action on your own 
responsibility must not be made by you.  Specific permission must 
be obtained from this Headquarters before any air action is 
taken’.44  A similar exchange between another SSO and AHQ 
further illustrates the level of oversight imposed on the SSOs in order to address concerns 
regarding the humanity of air control operations.  When a tribe in his area of responsibility 
refused to pay its taxes the SSO warned them of the possible consequences.  He then 
requested a reconnaissance flight the next day to communicate capability and shape the 
village elders’ perceptions, but also giving the squadron a chance to look at the target before 
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a strike sortie.  AHQ demanded details from the SSO ‘with view to immediate protest being 
lodged’, wanting the name of the SSO who was ‘threatening shepherds’, the identity of the 
shepherds, the taxes demanded, and if the shepherds were Iraqi or Saudi.
45
   
In 1926, the RAF SSO in Nasiriyah ‘noted with regret’ that a pamphlet outlining the 
procedures civil authorities would follow when calling for military assistance made ‘no 
mention of the role of the SSO’.  By not including the SSOs early in the decision process, the 
SSO went on, squadrons would ‘discover the area concerned is unsufficiently [sic] mapped, 
and that no officer is available to guide the machines’.  The success of the operation was 
therefore ‘left to chance’.46  The lack of coordination among the civilian officials and military 
intelligence officers at the local level may be partially explained by the isolation of British 
political officials.
47
  Or, it may have been the normal tension that can exist between civilian 
and military officials.
48
  Concerns regarding the consequences of collateral damage and 
charges of indiscriminate bombing also provided rationale for the deliberate process Salmond 
described for vetting air support requests, ensuring civilian control of a civil policing 
function.  There is no evidence that suggests every SSO action was met with such scrutiny, 
but it does indicate that British civilian and military officials paid attention to how air power 
was being utilised. 
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In The Sling and the Stone, T.X. Hammes described how technological intelligence 
systems were used during the Cold War to dominate conflict through ‘superior targeting 
ability’ based upon amazing intelligence systems that would provide ‘special insight and 
dominance’.49  Hammes concluded that this resulted in a ‘false belief’ among politicians and 
planners that it was possible overcome the chaos and uncertainty of irregular conflicts using 
these same systems.  As recent, non-state conflicts across Africa and in Eastern Europe, Asia, 
the Middle East, and Central America have shown, such an inclination left many airmen ill-
prepared for the challenges of modern warfare characterised by the intersection of terrorist 
groups, transnational criminal organisations, cyber-criminals, humanitarian crises, and 
pandemics.
50
  Hammes went so far as to claim that high technology intelligence systems 
proved to be irrelevant.
51
  Air power historian David Jordan, in Understanding Modern 
Warfare, offered the counterpoint that while air power does offer the commander some 
powerful options, in order to maximise air power’s contributions to irregular warfare the full 
range of capabilities and possible effects must be understood and applied.
52
  Where Hammes 
focused on kinetic attacks, Jordan points out that air mobility, reconnaissance and 
surveillance, and psychological operations have shown they also make powerful 
contributions in an irregular warfare context by helping to shape the decisions of enemy 
leadership and the behaviour of populations.  The tremendous improvements in sensor 
technology, precision guidance, and loiter times have extended beyond attack systems to 
include air mobility and reconnaissance systems, and serve as evidence that airmen and 
aircraft do evolve and will adapt. 
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Between the wars, Sir B.H. Liddell Hart offered a strategist’s perspective on air power’s 
potential as an indirect means of influencing the opposing leadership.  He, like many of his 
contemporaries, nearly always considered bombing as the means to the desired ends.
53
  
Liddell Hart’s later work expanded upon his theme of the indirect approach, but still it meant 
using air power to strike ‘the enemy’s economic and moral centres without having first to 
achieve “the destruction of the enemy’s main forces on the battlefield”.’54  The value of 
Liddell Hart’s perspective on air power should not be overlooked when considering irregular 
warfare.  As guerrillas will tend to refuse battle unless on favourable terms, and ‘destruction 
of enemy forces’ is often difficult to achieve, an air-oriented perspective on the indirect 
approach appears to be especially valuable.  
As with most human endeavours, but especially in those cultures based on social 
relationships, oral traditions, and collective responsibility as were the Bedouins and the 
settled tribes of Iraq and Transjordan between the wars, air policing required a personal ‘face’ 
to be effective.
55
  As early as the Cairo Conference, while the air control scheme was still in 
the early planning stage, RAF planners knew ‘the best officers procurable should be selected 
for the control of the Intelligence Department as this will be of the most vital importance to 
the success of the scheme’.56  Judicious and discriminate applications of air power needed to 
be shaped through an intentional programme of communicating expectations and managing 
perceptions at the local levels.  For air policing to be effective it required airmen on the 
ground and among the local populace to control the messaging, collect and analyse 
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information, and control any application of power.
57
  These needed to be airmen who fully 
understood and respected the ethos, culture, and motivations of the people, who would 
represent the government’s demands, and articulate the consequences of failing to comply in 
a culturally appropriate manner, much as a local police constable might.  Then, should force 
be required, these airmen could direct the aircraft in order to apply whatever amount of force 
was authorised.
58
  Finally, these airmen, by assessing any changes in behaviour resulting 
from air actions, offered an effective means of determining the effectiveness of actions taken 
against the targeted populations.
59
 
Conrad Crane from the US Army War College observed that the requirement for a 
human presence on the ground and among the people has remained absolutely vital to 
information and communications between civil authorities and local populations almost 100 
years after the inter-war period.  Referring to how adversaries use reports of collateral 
damage to manipulate local perceptions and passions he stated, ‘who controls the ground 
controls the message’.60  The most effective of the SSOs used their relationships with tribal 
leaders and the Arabs’ tradition of conversation to ‘prevent and settle disputes and to 
encourage good government by the local rulers’.61  Disputes among tribes and resolving 
issues that disrupted desired levels of stability and security were best achieved through 
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traditional means of mediation and negotiation.  ‘Most tribal control officers warmed to these 
concepts of collective responsibility, mediation, and reconciliation’.62 
The concept of Special Service Officers (SSOs) on the ground had not existed in the 
RAF before the air control scheme.
63
  Before 1920, SSOs were Army intelligence officers 
who provided local, internal intelligence and advice to their British commanders.
64
  The 
problem that the RAF faced as it developed the air control scheme was that not many airmen 
were willing or able to be that ‘face’ of British imperial power among the tribes.65 Like 
modern airmen, most had joined the Air Force to fly and the thought of a hard, lonely 
existence on the edges of the empire was an assignment with overwhelming numbers of 
volunteers.  Still, as Glubb noted during his 1926 lecture to RUSI, the whole success of the 
air control scheme depended ‘on the availability of an individual who combines thorough 
knowledge of the tribes and country, with a certain amount of experience as an air 
observer’.66  As the RAF took responsibility for policing the empire, RAF SSOs were needed 
to understand and apply air-centric methods of policing, as well as learn the local languages, 
dialects, customs, and traditions well enough to insert British authority among the tribes.  The 
SSOs’ secondary role was to represent British military traditions and requirements to the 
civilian political officers.  ‘Success,’ the architects of the air control scheme realised, ‘could 
not be expected as long as the [RAF and civil] authorities remained in complete ignorance of 
Bedouin affairs and of events in the desert’.67   
Although the Air Ministry would have preferred having airmen serving as SSOs, they 
discovered the possible pool of candidates from which to draw its SSOs was rather shallow.  
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Excepting the RAF officers who had served in colonial regiments and had transferred to the 
Royal Flying Corps before or during the First World War, few airmen possessed the requisite 
knowledge of colonial administration and the region, nor the desire to serve in isolated posts 
among the native tribes.
68
  The Army’s traditional role as a colonial constabulary, especially 
among those officers who had served with Indian Army battalions in the Middle East or in 
Egypt before and during the war, meant that most candidates with the inclination to work 
with and among indigenous peoples, live an isolated life in the tribes and village, and having 
the language, cultural, and administrative skills necessary to work in such an environment, 
were soldiers.
69
  The RAF thus began a campaign to recruit from their own ranks and to bring 
qualified Army officers into the RAF, realising it was easier and faster to create an ‘air sense’ 
among soldiers than it was to develop an intuitive level of cultural awareness and language in 
airmen who had never lived the frontier life.   
It took aggressive recruiting to fill the ranks of the SSOs.  Maj Gen H.P.W. Hutson, who 
served as an SSO in Fallujah, Iraq, said he took the job because he was already assigned in 
Mesopotamia when the First World War ended and the RAF would pay him an additional 
£20 (about £850 today) per month for learning Arabic—not an impossible task as he was the 
only Englishman at the time in the city.
70
  Glubb, although an army officer, in 1920 was 
already in Iraq and learning Arabic, so he, too, accepted a position with the RAF. 
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The 1928 version of the RAF War Manual clearly stated the essence of the irregular 
warfare problem.  Without enemy ‘forces to destroy’ or war-making industries to eliminate, 
the RAF had no conventional, potentially decisive targets against which to plan its air 
operations.
71
  For Trenchard’s offensive-minded air force, this could have been a challenge.  
Placing culturally astute airmen who spoke the local dialects and were ‘thoroughly 
acquainted with tribal life’ among the local populace gave the RAF the ability to discover the 
locals’ requirements and vulnerabilities.72  The SSOs’ cultural, psychological, social, and 
economic understanding became the key to effective application of the full range of air 
power’s capabilities during policing operations.  
The material objectives presented by a semi-civilised enemy are seldom of such 
individual importance that the destruction of one or more of these will prove decisive.  In 
the absence of vulnerable organizations, attacks on the mode of life of the enemy have to 
be carried out directly against the people themselves or their possessions, and in this 
connection it is important that the aim of the operation should be borne in mind. For 
these reasons the selection of the correct air objectives demands a comprehensive and 
accurate knowledge of the psychology of the enemy and of his customs and 
characteristics, which can only be expected from those who have made a special study of 
the people.
73  [emphasis added] 
 
Europeans’ efforts to understand the Bedouin and the settled tribes were hindered by the 
tribes’ natural reluctance to share their oral histories, traditions, and news with outsiders.  
This was compounded by long-standing prejudice against the Bedouin among mainstream 
Arabs throughout the Middle East.  Middle-class Arabs, especially those gravitating towards 
the growing urban centres in the region and those who embraced European influences, tended 
to disdain the Bedouin tribesmen as unsophisticated and boorish.
74
  Although the British had 
produced credible area and intelligence studies cataloguing the make-up of Iraq’s non-urban 
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social divisions:  nomads, semi-nomads, and cultivators,
75
  Glubb reported that British and 
Iraqi officials never seemed to understand the essential fact of Middle Eastern nomadic life.
76
  
Bedouin were herders, noted Glubb, and thus their livelihood, income, and ability to pay 
taxes were tied to the changing locations of quality grazing areas.
77
  Glubb also accused the 
Iraqi government of being completely indifferent to the Bedouins and to tribal life.
78
  Iraqi 
government officials often accused the tribes of moving into the desert areas just to cause 
trouble, and when the tribes asked for protection from Saudi raiders they were dismissed and 
told it was best if they not go into the desert if they were afraid.
79
   
Learning to Live Among the Tribes  
Britons seeking insight into the culture, traditions, and motivations of the Bedouins had 
little in the way of credible, Arab sources to use as references.  Arab sources written in 
English were sparse and what documentation that did exist all but ignored the tribes and tribal 
culture.
80
  According to Priya Satia, the casual researchers tended to drift towards 
travelogues, Arabian Nights, and novels.
81
  Taken out of context, this assessment seems a bit 
damning.  Fletcher suggests that the Royal Central Asia Society through its journal and 
meetings offered detailed studies, thoughtful debate, and a perspective beyond Indian 
traditions, in essence an ‘archive of instruction’ that was broad beyond the Indian experience 
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and of sufficient depth to promote a higher degree of professionalism among colonial 
administrators bound for the region.
82
  This should not diminish the contributions of travel 
writing and the published letters of explorers and overseas public servants before and after 
the First World War.   JRCAS and travel writing were ‘inextricably linked to the spread of 
European power’.  The written word sparked imaginations and drew the adventurous and 
imaginative to those unexplored regions on the map in the hope of political and economic 
opportunity.
83
  These writings were a catalyst for ‘imperialism and colonization’.  For British 
military and civilian professionals, there were in-depth, fairly current, and voluminous 




In addition to the professional journals and regional studies, the Admiralty published a 
collection of intelligence handbooks between 1913 and 1917 based in part on the records of 
pre-war European explorers and on recent military intelligence.
85
  These handbooks offered 
detailed descriptions of the regions, settlements, routes, and inhabitants.  In November 1918, 
the Admiralty published an updated version of the Handbook for Mesopotamia.
86
  This four-
volume, 550-page, encyclopaedia broke the country into sections, including Kurdistan, and 
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provided great detail on such topics as the different tribal systems, religion, descriptions of 
towns and cities, census data, descriptions of the inhabitants, administrative structures, 
topography, history, and climate.  Volume 2, which covered the Shatt el-Arab, the Tigris and 
Euphrates River Valleys, and the desert border areas with Kuwait and the (now) Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, even had an assessment of the various types of mules available in the region.  
Similar handbooks were also produced for Syria (including Palestine) and Arabia in 1920.
87
  
Semi-official references available included Gertrude Bell’s, The Arab of Mesopotamia, a 
two-volume collection of essays written specifically for new British officers going to Iraq,
88
 
and Straight Tips for “Mespot”, a volume of practical hints that offered the kinds of advice 
‘your maiden aunt would not be likely to suggest’, such as ‘the value of gin and whiskey to 
aid health’.89   
The most successful SSOs tended towards a combination of self-study and on-the-job 
training.
90
  Once in their assigned regions, the officers would immerse themselves in the 
regional culture and in the process create a personal body of knowledge, an ‘intelligence 
database’ in modern parlance, by learning from the locals they worked with and through 
personal study of the terrain, customs, histories, and relationships among families, clans, and 
tribes.  They essentially became localised versions of a romanticised T.E. Lawrence.
91
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Interestingly, in 2010 US Special Operations Command applied this model by creating 
Project Lawrence in order to increase the language and cultural understanding among its 
Army, Navy, and Air Force operators, and re-orient them back to the traditional US special 
operations approach of indirect engagement.
92
  Project Lawrence used ‘Twenty-Seven 
Articles’, a list of ‘commandments’ written by Lawrence for the 20 August 1917 edition of 
the Arab Bulletin, as its guiding credo.  Among the twenty-seven articles was the direction to 
‘Learn all you can about your [hosts]. Get to know their families, clans and tribes, friends and 
enemies, wells, hills and roads. … Get to speak their dialect of Arabic, not yours’ and ‘the 
beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study of them’.93 
British perception of tribal life in Iraq and Transjordan was generally that Bedouin lived 
according to collective responsibility, with decisions based upon consensus, mediation, and 
reconciliation.
94
  Still, there was always one person who exercised a higher level of 
responsibility within the group.  Rod Thornton pointed out that the second most important 
characteristic of Arab culture is the authoritarian rule—concentration of power in a central 
authority.
95
  Two of Lawrence’s Twenty-seven Articles emphasised the importance of the 
leader in Arab culture.  Therefore, culturally appropriate targeting efforts in the Middle East 
took a leadership-centric approach, but through indirect means, namely inconveniencing the 
families, clans, and tribes in order to influence leadership decisions.  What the RAF achieved 
was a combined, leadership and population-centred approach—shaping leaders’ decisions by 
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affecting what they valued most—peaceful, productive, and stable villages.96  In order to 
maintain the peace and control the behaviour (ends) of the indigenous population, the British 
effectively used non-kinetic means such as aerial reconnaissance, air transport of security 
forces, government officials, and supplies, and leaflet and message drops, in addition to air 
strikes, in order to implement low-cost campaigns of persuasion and coercion (ways).   
Although the British used the tribal sheikhs to gain compliance from the villagers, the 
British avoided the Ottoman practice of imprisoning the local sheikhs whenever members of 
a tribe committed an offence.  The British observed that the Turks’ direct and often brutal 
approach towards local leaders tended to dissuade all but the most stalwart from serving as 
sheikhs.  And, as Glubb stated, without some form of leader to represent the group, the Turks 
lost their conduits to communicate with and control the tribes’ members.97  In general, the 
British appreciated the importance of the various levels of sheikhs because they needed them 
as mediators and regulators of internal matters, but also as empowered representatives of the 
group when dealing with external issues.
98
  For the sheikhs, ‘government recognition brought 
with it responsibility, reward, and prestige’, as well as strengthening their position in the 
tribes and among rivals.
99
   
The better SSOs knew that the best way to collect and understand the population’s 
attitudes and opinions was gained by observing the social behaviour and participating in the 
locals’ conversations first hand.100  Glubb tells the story of one of his first experiences as an 
SSO.
101
  He was sent to deliver the message to a settlement between Baghdad and Basrah that 
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they were to pay their taxes or be bombed.
102
  The British political officer assigned to 
administer the area had confined himself to the larger town in the area because he felt it too 
dangerous to venture out among the locals.  Correspondingly, the village sheikhs were afraid 
to go into town and consult with the political officer for fear of imprisonment.  Glubb and his 
interpreter proceeded alone into the desert and called at the paramount sheikh’s home.  At 
that point Arab hospitality took over.  For two days he and the local sheikhs talked.  Glubb 
learned that the issue was water—because the Iraq government did not regulate water flow, 
upstream users had divert all the water needed to irrigate their crops.  Without water the crops 
died and without crops they had nothing to sell and therefore no money to pay the taxes.  At 
that point, Glubb says he admitted to his hosts that his real role had been to survey the 
villages, create a map, and develop a target list in order that he might guide aeroplane attacks 
to appropriate homes in the villages.  He advised the sheikhs to report to the political officer 
or be bombed.  The next day Glubb led a flight of aeroplanes that overflew the villages.  The 
people scattered and hid after which the RAF bombed houses and scattered the flocks.  No 
one was seriously injured, though.  The sheikhs then came into town where Glubb had 
arranged for the Iraqi Minister of the Interior to meet with them.  Glubb then mediated the 
meeting, during which an agreement was reached to regulate the water, which would, in turn 
enable the tribes to pay their taxes.  Success was achieved because the SSO understood the 
social structure, mediated the differences between the locals’ problems and the government’s 
demands, and then judiciously applied air power to induce the sheikhs to act.
103
 
The SSOs went beyond simple and occasional professional recognition of indigenous 
leadership.  Instead they built relationships with local leaders in order to gain insight into the 
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tribes’ psychological, cultural, and sociological motivations.104  H.P.W. Hutson described 
how he often visited the different nomadic tribes and small villages around Fallujah in order 
to build and maintain relationships with the sheikhs, gain insight into their situations, and 
address their concerns where he could.  Hutson was successful as an SSO because he ‘got 
friendly with many of the sheikhs and especially the younger chaps’.105  His perspective was 
that it was the informal relationships, in addition to formal communication and negotiation, 
which gave SSOs insight and understanding of populations and made them successful. 
In her culturally oriented examination of British intelligence services in Iraq between the 
wars, Satia found that the SSOs were expected to develop a ‘comprehension of another 
universe that was, in the orientalist vision, cosmically ordered, a closed system of 
meanings’.106  In other words, they were to transcend their ‘Britishness’ through extended 
immersion in Arab society, learning the local customs, colloquialisms, slang, and body 
language, and perfecting their language skills to the point of having ‘the feeling of the Middle 
East in their blood’.  In order to develop such depth of understanding, SSOs were ‘appointed 
to districts throughout the country for the duty of getting to know the Sheikhs personally and 
studying the tribes and the country by touring’.107  In the process the best SSOs developed a 
deep, ingrained, level of insight that Satia equated to ‘intuition’.108 
When air attacks were authorised, the intent was for the SSOs to brief the aircrews on 
which targets to be strike and also those that should not be damaged.  On occasion the SSOs 
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would fly in the lead aeroplane or else ride in an RAF armoured car to direct the air strikes, 
serving in what we would recognise as a ‘forward air controller’ role.  After the air action had 
been completed, the SSO would then assess the results and recommend follow-on courses of 
action to be considered by the political authorities.
109
  The SSOs were both intelligence and 
operations professionals, able to exploit the capabilities of air power in order to achieve 
desired effects at the local level. 
Targeting and Effects 
The RAF’s ‘well developed and swift system of intelligence’ was therefore optimised for 
collecting and interpreting information on the local populace and also for developing and 
delivering the government’s messages in a culturally and ethnically appropriate manner.  It 
was no coincidence that British airmen and civil authorities in Iraq initially, and later in other 
colonies, made it a point to maximise the psychological impact of air power in order to 
control the ‘semi-civilised’ tribes.  Air Staff Memorandum 41 stated, ‘It is no exaggeration to 
claim that half the moral effect on which the Air relies to achieve its ends is gained by 
instantaneous action; and for this to be possible the speed of the aeroplane must be 
supplemented by a corresponding rapidity in the service of information’.110  In the oral and 
personal culture of the Arabs, the successful SSOs were those able to sense ‘without the 
intervention of any reasoning process’111 and go beyond simple procedural and declarative 
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knowledge and get to analytic knowledge based upon local mores, relationships, community 
values, and beliefs.
112
   
It is possible to equate what the RAF SSOs did to integrate air power into imperial 
policing practices with the modern targeting process.  Using local political and administrative 
guidance the SSOs had to decide how, where, and to what extent air, ground, and civil 
elements of power might be used to deter disobedience and compel compliance from the local 
population.  In the course of normal interactions with tribal leaders, the SSOs would gather 
and evaluate information, what Lawrence called ‘unremitting study’, in order to develop a 
comprehensive intelligence picture of their assigned regions.
113
  Consistent with Lawrence, 
Sir John Slessor, noted that in order to select ‘those objectives whose destruction or 
interruption will be most inconvenient to the enemy’ the intelligence officer required ‘an 
intimate acquaintance with such details as the locations and condition of his forces’.  He went 
on to say the intelligence staff must ‘put themselves into the enemy’s mind’.114  Nine decades 
later, that guidance still rings true.  In order to discern how air power might achieve desired 
preventative effects in an irregular environment, an airman’s level of knowledge and 
understanding needs to go beyond a conventional military perspective and become more 
esoteric to include the history, customs, language, philosophy, religion, and ethics of the local 
peoples, what Lt Gen Flynn called ‘social radar’ that allows informed decisions regarding 
influencing actions prior to conflict erupting.
115
 
Once immersed in the anthropology of an area, airmen will also need to develop insights 
into the psychology and motivations of the targeted group and its leaders, as well as the 
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interplay between the environment, the local population, and any enemy combatants.  This 
need to sense sometimes induces an uncomfortable, but often necessary, ambiguity into the 
process, which is why Lawrence cautioned to not engage in deep conversations until one 
could understand the allusions and communications nuances.
116
  Sensing requires fluency 
with the subtle, usually non-verbal cues of a culture and communications, awareness of the 
nuanced relationships among families, clans, sects, and classes, and developing one’s own 
relationship with indigenous leadership in order to comprehend the range of opportunities and 
local threats to be addressed.  Successful policemen will often develop such a level of sensing 
within their beats, to the point knowing that something is amiss simply by feeling that 
conditions have changed.  
Effective sensing allows leaders, planners, and targeteers to comprehend the totality of a 
situation so they might understand how air actions will affect the decisions, motivations, 
loyalties, allegiances, and relationships of the intended ‘targets’.117  Understanding how the 
leadership and their followers will likely react to actions allows airmen to develop a 
comprehensive program of positive and negative, and indirect and direct, means that is 
applicable to the whole of the situation—environment, local population, and adversary 
leadership, or a plan to use air power to influence.  Understanding involves the ‘development 
of knowledge to such a level that it enables insight and foresight’.118  The final step then, is to 
assess the effects achieved in order to continuously adjust the plan until desired results are 
attained.   
Assessing the effectiveness of influencing operations can sometimes be a challenge 
because of the subjective nature of human factors measurements.  It is difficult gauge fear, 
                                                          
116
 Lawrence, ‘Twenty-seven Articles’. 
117
 Joint Doctrine Publication 04, Understanding, (Shrivenham, UK:  Development, Concepts and Doctrine 
Centre, Dec 2010), p. 2-1.  Also Sir Stephen Dalton, ‘Combat Operations:  The Asymmetric Advantage of Air 
Power’, RUSI Lord Trenchard Memorial Lecture, 14 Sep 2009, found at www.rusi.org/events/ 
ref:E49F57A7E80B64/. 
118
 JDP 04, Understanding, p. 2-1. 
 155  
 
confidence, trust, perception, etc., especially if trying to do so in a foreign culture.
119
  While a 
few objective indicators, such as taxes paid, weapons turned in, or the absence of inter-tribal 
raiding were available to the RAF during the inter-war period, these measurements did not 
provide the government with metrics regarding discontent, frustration, resentment, or deceit, 
all which might serve as important warnings of impending lawlessness and conflict.  Such 
subjective indicators required an acculturated airman among the population learning, sensing, 
and understanding the operational environment in order to recommend appropriate 
applications of air power.  As Dowding noted after the 1929 Palestine riots, without SSOs in 
and among the people, 
No matter how strong or efficient the normal police may be, they cannot hope to stamp 
out internal disorder before it becomes serious, unless they have behind them an 
intelligence system which will give them full and timely warning of impending 




Influencing the Decision-makers 
In the July 1934 issue of Royal Air Force Quarterly, Flight Lieutenant E.J. Kingston-
McCloughry attempted to answer a question regarding the ‘inhumaneness’ of air control in 
undeveloped countries.  In his essay he described how air actions were ‘aimed at the leader 
and his adherents while leaving the innocent untouched’.121  Using what was considered an 
indirect approach at the time, the ‘inverted blockade’ was developed and used to keep the 
people out of their villages instead of blockading them inside.
122
  This tactic forced the 
villagers and tribesmen out of their homes, scattered the herds and flocks, limited access to 
water sources, damaged buildings, and generally disrupted the normal patterns of life.  The 
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RAF War Manual stated that the intent was to make life for the villagers very uncomfortable, 
but not so egregious as to create a flood of refugees or induce a level of animosity that led to 
lawlessness.
123
  With living patterns disrupted, the people would eventually force their 
leaders to acquiesce to government demands.
124
  Through the inverted blockade, the RAF 
indirectly influenced, or ‘targeted’, the local sheikhs, the decision-makers who represented 
the collective will of the tribes.  But rather than defaulting to capturing or killing the tribal 
leadership, the RAF exploited the Arabs’ culture of collective responsibility and applied 
indirect methods to shape leaders’ decisions.  The goal was to convince the leadership that 
acceding to the government’s demands was a better course of action than resisting.   
In the 1928 version the RAF War Manual, the chapter on ‘Air Operations in 
Undeveloped and Semi-Civilised Countries’ specified that any air strike had to be preceded 
by warnings in order to allow the tribes time to move women, children, and valuables out of 
harm’s way.  While this requirement admittedly forfeited the element of surprise and gave up 
a powerful psychological tool, the warnings help prevent ‘the useless destruction of life 
which would be likely to prejudice the subsequent re-settlement of the district’.125  The 1928 
War Manual went on to recommend non-kinetic demonstrations by aircraft, in conjunction 
with the warnings, in the further hope of avoiding destructive attacks.
126
  The inverted 
blockade tactic used a combination of power, presence, and perception to influence tribal 
behaviour.   
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With RAF aeroplanes flying overhead creating the illusion of a ubiquitous government 
presence,
127
 the SSOs would create and sustain a perception in the civilians’ minds that every 
aeroplane overhead was looking at or for them.  Tactics such as having aircraft patrols take 
circuitous routes in order to ‘pass within sight of as many tribal camps as possible’, making 
the Lewis guns in the rear cockpit conspicuous, and shooting off Very flares after dark to 
advertise their presence, reinforced the perception of power and presence.
128
  And in order to 
gain maximum effect from each air attack, the SSOs would publicise the results of air strikes 
among other camps and villages.
129
  As the news spread among the other tribes and villages 
in a region, the SSOs’ and the British government’s coercive credibility were maintained by 
the locals’ perception that the government would use force as it threatened.130  These same 
sorts of demonstrative tactics continue to be successful today. 
In 2013, Western and African forces seeking to end the decades old campaign of human 
rights abuses and atrocities caused by Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 
central Africa, began using aircraft in innovative ways to neutralise the LRA leadership, 
protect civilians, and promote defections, disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of 
LRA fighters.
131
  The LRA leadership was obsessed with the perceived surveillance 
capabilities of Western aircraft and coalition forces reinforced those perceptions with ground 
actions.  In a tactic reminiscent of the RAF’s 1920s doctrine, ‘from the ground every 
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inhabitant is under the impression that the aeroplane is looking at them’, aircraft of all sorts, 
whether dedicated ISR platforms or not, were used to harass and influence the LRA and their 
family groups living in inaccessible areas of the jungle by making them believe they were 
being actively hunted.  The coalition forces commander noted that aircraft were used ‘to 
make it uncomfortable to be in the LRA’.  Aircraft overflights were used to force the LRA to 
continuously move their camps.  Echoing the effects intended by the inverted blockades 
ninety years earlier, LRA defectors noted that harassing flights had caused such 




Air power doctrine of the inter-war period stated that strategy and tactics needed to be 
‘modified to meet the special conditions’ of an adversary who ‘seldom presents a suitable 
objective, and even if concentrated to oppose a land advance, the targets that they offer to air 
attack are comparatively small and fleeting’.133  Sir John Slessor however, disagreed that 
there were no targets able to force a decision from the sheikhs.  Echoing Callwell’s guidance 
about placing what the guerrilla values most at risk, Slessor wrote that no matter where the 
tribesman, nomad, or villager was from, ‘there are almost always some essentials without 
which he cannot maintain his livelihood; they differ greatly, but they are always there, and it 
is these things that Intelligence has got to know and tell the airman’.134   
The SSOs and political officers, having developed the relationships and intuition needed 
to understand the people, the leaders, and decision-making processes, made it possible for 
Britain to integrate the RAF into its tribal control practices.  The men on the ground 
                                                          
132
 Interview with the commander of the anti-LRA coalition forces, Aug 2013 – May 2014, name withheld by 
request, telephone interview, 16 Jan 2015. 
133
 RAF War Manual, Part 1, Chap XIV, para 21. 
134
 Slessor, Central Blue, p. 65. 
 159  
 
understood what the locals valued and were able to tell the airmen how best to put those 
essentials at risk in order to influence the local leaders.   
Conclusion 
In Iraq, Transjordan, and Aden, the RAF SSOs became a necessary and normal element 
for integrating air control into the political, social, and technological environment of the 
empire, even to the point that senior officers in the theatre of operations would personally 
manage assignments of SSOs.
135
  Prior to extending air control operations into Somaliland in 
1930, the CAS noted, ‘the two most important factors in this connection are reliable SSOs, 
and intimate knowledge on the part of the air officers concerned of the conditions of the 
country and of the tribal and sub-tribal villages and grazing areas’.136  The SSOs, that human 
element which shaped perceptions, built the intelligence ‘picture’ and managed the 
application of air power, formed the critical component of colonial policing by the RAF.  
And, like police forces everywhere, their goal was not to defeat an enemy combatant, but 
rather to control the local population, prevent trouble, achieve an acceptable level of stability, 
i.e., reduce raiding, feuding, and encroaching upon others’ grazing and watering areas, and to 
enforce the payment of taxes without inflaming passions and obscuring reason among the 
local populations.
137
  After the First World War, the RAF embraced Britain’s constabulary 
tradition of coercing compliance from colonial subjects.  The colonial goal did not change 
once Churchill substituted aircraft and SSOs for battalions of soldiers.  With the air control 
scheme, the means of tribal control became air power, informed, managed, and integrated by 
acculturated airmen on the ground in many of the ‘wilder’ reaches of the empire.  
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Chapter Five 
Air Control and Its Influence 
 
When assessing the importance of air control and its potential wider significance and 
relevance in the historiography of air power, it is necessary to look beyond the most common 
characterisation, that of aircraft bombing rash and unsophisticated nomads and villagers. It is 
essential to consider all the components that made air control work:  aeroplanes, RAF 
armoured car companies, and indigenous forces, plus RAF SSOs or political officers 
integrating air power into the workings of tribal control.
1
 All of these disparate components 
would have been useless however, had they been employed inappropriately or unwisely. The 
application of air power as it existed during the inter-war period required ‘targets’, and in the 
case of the colonies and mandated territories, targets came in the form of the tribes and 
peoples who were being controlled and influenced.  As is often the case in irregular forms of 
conflict, the population was the battlespace where the fighting occurred and it was the people 
who provided the enemy fighting force—a hard lesson Britain drew from its experience 
trying to control Palestine from the air during the inter-war period.
2
  In cases such as these, 
the population had to be influenced and its perceptions shaped.  This chapter briefly considers 
the relevance of air control to influencing the people of the colonies and mandated territories, 
particularly the leaders at the local level—an important difference from the perspective air 
power theorists at the strategic levels have taken. The chapter concludes that air control 
moved from the relatively unsophisticated blunt instrument that many historians continue to 
portray it as to something rather more sophisticated and nuanced, particularly in its approach 
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to the population and its leadership, since this is echoed in much modern thinking on the 
subject. 
The idea that the population is at the centre of the air control scheme echoes 
conventional modern wisdom that the primary objective and the focus of political, social, 
informational, and military efforts in irregular warfare is the people.  This axiom is the 
essence of the population-centric model of irregular warfare.
3
  The population-centric model 
though, needs balancing by a leadership-focused model, especially in tribal or clan-based 
cultures. It is a measure of air control’s sophistication that this was a point the RAF fully 
recognised by the 1930s.
4
 This often overlooked point, that the RAF was giving careful 
consideration to whom it influenced and how, rather than simply using bombardment as a 
means of coercing local populations or reactively punishing them for transgressions, further 
challenges the popular notion of air control as nothing more than a blunt, kinetic instrument. 
As an example of current thought, Rupert Smith contends that the people are the 
battlefield, especially in what is increasingly an urban environment.
5
  And, just as 
professional soldiers have traditionally studied geography in order that they might take 
maximum tactical advantage of the physical environment they are fighting on, it would seem 
logical that modern airmen should include anthropology in their studies in order to take 
maximum tactical advantage of the culture, history, traditions, faith, and societal norms that 
help define the psychological environment or cognitive domain.
6
  The merits of this debate 
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are beyond the scope of this thesis. What can be said, though, is that in recent years, the 
British and American militaries have re-discovered the metaphorical concept of human 
terrain as key terrain. The importance of culture, language, history, and societal norms as 
essential elements of successful military operations is not new.  The RAF recognised this (as 
had the British Army before in its long tradition of imperial policing) and thus used SSOs in 
Iraq, Transjordan, and Aden to take full advantage of the human dimension during air control 
operations and then sought to apply those experiences in order to develop effective strategies 
to employ air power to achieve political/civil objectives in the frontier regions of the empire. 
Gaining Control 
‘Air control’, as the term implies, was about compelling the frontier tribes to behave in a 
certain manner, in the early days, often due to the perceived threat of harm or loss – ‘in 
Frontier operations, as a rule our ultimate object is to control and pacify’.  In order to control 
‘barbarians’, coercive force, or more accurately, the threat of that force was the ‘stepping 
stone to control’.7  As seen in preceding chapters, the RAF adopted a number of approaches 
to achieving ‘control’, methods which became more sophisticated over time. It is useful 
though, to place these developments into the context of how and why they achieved the 
degree of success they did. 
In The Mystique of Air Power, Eliot Cohen observed that ‘force works by destroying or 
killing … And fear of violent death only comes from the imminent possibility of the real 
thing’.8  Thomas Hobbes’ observation in Leviathan, that ‘The reputation of power is power’ 
because those who need protection are then drawn to the powerful, provided a basis for 
English political philosophy and insight into the use of power as a means of controlling the 
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  Threats to life and property are made credible by previous applications of power.  
This then, highlights the dual nature of the air control scheme—it rested in both the physical 
and cognitive domains—a fact recognised by British political authorities and the military 
elements charged with policing the colonies and mandated territories.  Air control methods 
used physical actions in order to influence the behaviour and shape the perceptions of 
indigenous groups, thus conditioning their thinking so that they were compelled to behave as 
the civil authorities wanted, rather than risk the consequences of acting as they wished.   
The 1929 supplement to the RAF War Manual struck a coercive tone, stating that, ‘Air 
power … attains its ends by virtue of the fact that the opponent does not know how far we are 
prepared to go’.10  This emphasis on uncertainty is important to note because it reinforces the 
duality of air power’s coercive effects.  An adversary must act to mitigate the destructive 
actions wrought by air forces and the adversary’s actions are shaped by the fear of what 
might happen by failing to comply with the coercer’s requirements.  The 1929 supplement to 
the War Manual concluded the above statement by reminding airmen of the need to take ‘full 
advantage … of this most influential factor of uncertainty’.11   
Successful coercion requires the ability to predict what an adversary can do, but also to 
predict what they might choose to do, a point directly supported by Callwell’s emphasis on 
effective intelligence during irregular warfare.
12
  Key to the enduring value of air power has 
been its ability to influence the behaviour of opponents, either by preventing or dissuading 
them from acting or by forcing an action by manipulating the costs and potential benefits.  
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It is not unfair to suggest that the emphasis placed on coercion in the course of planning 
for and employing the air control scheme between the wars often tended towards kinetic 
targeting, i.e., where best to place the bomb in order to achieve the desired effect at the least 
cost to friendly forces.
14
  Charges of excessive collateral damage during air operations and air 
power being ‘too blunt an instrument’ are not without merit given the often dominant 
emphasis on strike operations, especially during the early part of inter-war period.
15
  The 
undue focus on kinetic effects usually meant that little attention was given to the ways in 
which air power could be used to shape perceptions and influence the targeted populations 
and their supporters through non-kinetic methods.   
Andrew Lambert, in ‘Air Power and Coercion’, observed that if force was to be of utility 
in irregular warfare, it would be in a ‘more subtle, and hence coercive, application’.16  
Reflecting others’ observations about the difficulty of coercing irregular forces, Lambert 
suggested that because irregular adversaries may be comprised of a mix of insurgents, 
criminals, terrorists, opportunists, and unscrupulous sponsors, the challenge was to know who 
to target with available coercive means.
17
  The target for coercive actions must be the one 
who has the authority to make decisions and the strength of position to lead the competing 
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movements to the desired outcome.  Lambert labels those individuals the ‘true power 
brokers’.  Only then, he says, is it possible to design and develop a leadership-centric 
influencing strategy, taking into account all the various complexities such as third-party 
considerations, public opinion, constituents and patrons, and future credibility, that will 
eventually persuade the leadership to accept the desired outcome.
18
 
As Lambert noted, one of the major obstacles to effective coercion in an irregular warfare 
context is determining whom to coerce, that is, determining who the ‘true power broker’ is. 
Closely related to the issue of who or which group to influence is how to coerce, specifically 
discerning what is valuable enough to influence the adversary’s decisions and then holding 
what is valued at risk, a point made long before the inter-war period by Callwell in Small 
Wars.
19
  Successful coercion, said Callwell, depended on understanding the adversary’s value 
system, and how the decision-making structure and authorities within a group affect the value 
structure.  The goal, then, was to develop the knowledge of how to motivate and influence the 
groups’ decision-makers to act in ways that hopefully will achieve the desired results.  This 
was the SSOs’ task—developing relationships with the tribes and villages in order to shape 
the behaviours and mould the attitudes in ways most beneficial to Britain’s colonial goals.  
Karl Mueller, in ‘The Essence of Coercive Air power:  A Primer for Military Strategists’, 
noted that punishment might change the targeted group’s behaviour for a while, but it left 
their capabilities intact and failed to address the root causes of the behavioural problems, a 
point the RAF was not particularly interested in between the World Wars as evidenced by the 
writings that equated indigenous people with unruly children and bombings with spankings.
20
  
The other side of punishment, according to Mueller, was denial, making a particular course of 
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action appear pointless as the means of changing behaviour.
21
  The evidence that this was the 
approach adopted by the RAF is considerable, with the aim being that the application of air 
power would be so disruptive to the villagers that the  leadership would eventually acquiesce 
to government demands after seeing ‘the futility of resistance’.22  Because the British goal in 
the colonies and mandated territories was normally a civil policing one, inducing the local 
populations to comply with government demands rather than attacking the armed combatants, 
Mueller’s emphasis on denial versus destruction was fully in keeping with the British air 
control scheme.  And, as British manuals and journals of the inter-war period noted, the 
people against whom air control methods were applied subsequently had to be governed. 
So long as the tribes continue to raid and commit outrages in British territory… we are 
bound to punish and coerce them, but in our own interest it should be our policy to avoid 
any form of coercion that is likely to result in embittering the tribes against us, and 
anything that we can do to identify their interests with ours and to induce them to side 
with rather than against us will in the long run be very much to our advantage.
23
   
Therefore, punishment must be sufficient, but minimal.
24
  Determining when the ‘moral 
objective’ had been achieved and thus the opportune point to suspend air actions, fell to the 
RAF SSOs who, by virtue of their ‘intimate knowledge of the enemy’ and with their ‘finger 
upon the pulse of the enemy’s nerves and morale’, allowed the RAF to achieve the results 
desired without creating ‘an attitude of sullen resignation’.25 
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Mueller’s orientation of punishment and denial towards the enemy’s will recognised the 
central role of the leaders who make choices for their groups.  Punishment, according to 
Mueller, included the range of punitive measure that may be taken in response to adversary 
actions.  Denial, on the other hand, was using the elements of power in a preventative manner 
to shape expectations and future actions.  Punishment was reactive, after-the-fact, and tended 
to be less effective than denial strategies.  Evidence shows that denial, actions specifically 
intended to convince the targeted group of the hopelessness of their cause, proved to be the 
more powerful influencing factor than threatening future punishment.
26
 
Mueller offered a useful construct that illustrates how the air 
control method worked, breaking it down to the interplay between 
credibility, capability, and communication.  Mueller called these 
elements the requirements for effective coercion.
27
  (Figure 5.1) Threats 
carry weight only if the intended recipient believes the coercer 
possesses and will use whatever capabilities they might threaten to 
employ.  Between the wars, the RAF recognised that credibility was key to the application of 
air control methods—‘the most fundamentally important principle … is that air power 
achieves its end by moral effect … the aim of air action is the moral attack upon the 
nerves’.28  Mueller noted that credibility existed in the opponent’s mind and is established, as 
the RAF manuals from the inter-war period stated, that the efficacy of threats rested upon 
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‘recognition by recalcitrant tribesmen of the fact that stronger measures are in reserve 
[available]’.29 
Mueller’s second element, capability, referred to the ability to carry out the threat.  It 
meant that the coercer had the physical and legal wherewithal to deliver the promised effects, 
whether kinetic or non-kinetic.  Obvious limits on capability included geography, 
topography, and weather, and the technical aspects of weapons and delivery systems.  
Capability to deliver an effect might also depend upon legal, political, cultural, and 
ideological considerations.  As this thesis has shown, the RAF, after establishing that it could 
effectively influence the behaviour of nomadic tribesmen in ‘wilder’ regions, was unable to 
achieve similar effects in urban areas or when constrained by legal and ethical restrictions.
30
 
Although Mueller suggested that the third leg, communication, played a secondary role, 
in a conflict prevention scenario it may be successfully argued that communication is the 
most important of the three elements.  In fact, this was exactly the point made by the airmen 
between the wars; in order to subdue a country one must first create the means of effective 
communications.
31
  While Mueller was making his point from a modern perspective, during 
the inter-war period the RAF placed a special importance on the liaison function of the SSOs, 
ensuring local leaders received and fully understood what the British and colonial 
governments required: the timelines for compliance and the consequences of failing to meet 
the demands.
32
  Where the air control scheme was successful, the RAF embedded SSOs, 
airmen who spoke the local languages and were immersed in the history, traditions, and 
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cultures of the regions among the tribes to serve as acculturated liaisons from the government 
to the people.
33
  The historiography indicates that the RAF was adamant and consistent that 
tribes and villagers would first be contacted to ensure they understood the government’s 
requirements before any air actions were taken.
34
  In the Middle East, the SSOs were 
normally the conduit for those communications, especially in areas that were too dangerous 
for the political officers, too distant from the political officers’ offices, or too difficult to 
reach because of desert, mountains, or lack of roads.  Sir John Slessor, at the time newly in 
command of 3 Wing in India, strongly made the point that the success of air control depended 
upon the airman’s ‘intimate understanding of the habits and mentality of the tribes’, and the 
‘personal influence of the political officer’.35   
Both Mueller and Lambert noted that the challenge was to convincing the opposition’s 
leadership that acceding to government demands is a better course of action than resisting.
36
  
What made the denial strategy effective for the British between the wars was that the air 
control scheme was applied at the local level, where individual leaders could be identified by 
the SSOs or political officers, and then aerial effects developed (capability) and delivered 
(credibility) after informing the villagers of what was about to happen, why, and what it 
would take to avoid the punishment or receive the benefit (communication).  
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Another way of looking at influencing effects in irregular 
warfare is as the interaction between power, presence, and 
perception.
37
  (Figure 5.2)  As Mueller and others noted, coercion 
is primarily about force or the threat of force used to influence the 
will or the decisions of an adversary leader.  Each side in an 
irregular conflict has the power to influence the others’ leadership, 
both directly and indirectly, and in the process, compel the other to 
act.  In such a model, power is the range of civil, judicial, and military powers available to 
compel desired behaviours.  It can be, and often is, comprised of both positive and negative 
incentives; fully in keeping with the theoretical constructs offered by Lambert and Mueller.  
Presence is usually established through demonstration of security, services, and programmes 
that affirm the coercer’s power, but also serve to discredit opposing messages.  As the 
epigram at the beginning of this thesis noted, the perception of presence may be enough to 
achieve desired changes in the behaviour of targeted peoples.  Also included under perception 
is making adversary leaders believe the coercer can and will utilise all legal and ethical 
means at its disposal to achieve the desired outcomes.  In some cases, such as when Glubb 
advised local sheikhs to report to the political officer and arrange to pay their taxes.  When 
they refused to pay, he guided the aeroplanes to scatter the people and bomb the village, 
forcing the sheikhs to meet with the political officer and Iraqi officials.
38
  One of the main 
points the RAF made about air control was that the strength of air power came from the fact 
that the opponent did not know how far the administration was prepared to go.
39
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Power, Presence, & 
Perception 
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Applying Coercive Effects 
There is no doubt that ‘boots on the ground’ were a critical requirement for successful 
control of the civilian populace at the local level, a point that airmen conceded at the 
beginning of the air control scheme.
40
  Then, as now, a soldier or policeman patrolling a 
village provides a very potent deterrent force by operating in all three domains of coercion: 
demonstrating (communicating) the government’s power, providing a credible presence and 
assurance of the government’s commitment to security (credibility), and building the 
perception of the government’s eventual victory (capability).  And, while the preventative-
deterrent role is absolutely critical in the overall scheme to force local fighters to cease 
fighting and neutral civilians to support government policies and programs, influencing 
actions must be directed at the local leadership, either directly or indirectly, in order to induce 
changes in behaviour. As Callwell showed, this was a critical point recognised by the British 
long before the Wright brothers first took to the skies; that was then adapted and applied by 
the RAF in during inter-war period in order to implement the air control scheme. 
This should be no surprise, since the cognitive effects of air power—operations in the 
moral domain—were integral to evolving RAF doctrine and policy between the World Wars. 
As early as 1916, Trenchard noted that, ‘The mere presence of a hostile machine in the air 
inspires those on the ground with exaggerated forebodings with regard to what the machine is 
capable of doing,’ demonstrating the importance placed on the psychological impact of air 
power, almost from the beginnings of military aviation.
41
  The notion of irregulars’ inability 
to counter air strikes and their resulting sense of helplessness from being unable to fight back 
or defend against these measures came to be known to exert a significant preventative 
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influence on enemy behaviour.
42
  Glubb affirms this effect on tribal behaviour between the 
wars, noting that air power exerted its ‘tremendous moral effect’ by demoralising tribesmen 
with a ‘feeling of helplessness and [an] inability to reply effectively to the attack’.43  The 
perception was achieved when the adversary leadership appreciated, or at least thought they 
understood, air power’s ability to restrict and counter their actions, force their leaders into 
difficult areas, limit communications, restrict movements, and change the leadership’s cost-
benefit calculus when considering revolt versus compliance through techniques such as the 
inverted blockade, make life thoroughly miserable for all.   Perception was further achieved 
when such actions convinced the populace that the government was able to effectively protect 
them from threats and intimidation, and, through the use of measures such as the provision of 
medical care and aeromedical evacuation, even in the most isolated areas, to improve their 
quality of life.
44
 We must, of course, be careful not to compare life in the 1920s and 1930s 
with that today, but the general point of the government demonstrably improving the lot of 
the populace and thus being more acceptable is the one which matters here.  
Air power thus had a significant ability to do as Callwell advised, put what insurgent 
leaders most value at risk: political status, power to control the people, and power to threaten 
the government, while placing the authorities in a position where they might challenge the 
narrative of the rebel leadership that they, not the government, offered the best option for the 
population.  Influence, therefore, was sought upon the leadership who were of such 
importance in the uprisings and rebellions which air policing was used to deter, and, when 
required, defeat.  T.E. Lawrence observed that, ‘Rebellions can be made by 2% active in a 
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striking force, and 98% passively sympathetic’.45  According to Lambert, coercive force is 
effective only if what it targets can affect the outcome.  The difficulty for colonial policing 
was first to understand the targeted group’s decision making apparatus and, as Callwell, 
Marks, and others noted, determining what the leadership truly values.  Lambert went on to 
add that effective coercion required ‘an objective assessment of who are the true power 
brokers’, the ones with the power to respond for and lead the group to desired behaviour.46  
This, in many ways, was what the RAF did with air control.  It was heavily based upon a 
leadership-focused strategy accomplished through a combination of both direct and indirect 
measures, most notably through the ‘inverted blockade’ described in Chapter Three above.47  
Although the methodology employed now appears excessive because of the effect on non-
combatants, for that era it was an effective utilisation of air power for coercive purposes, 
seeking to influence leaders not only through direct effect upon them, but also through the 
influence their families and followers would bring to bear upon them as their quality of life 
was degraded over the course of the blockade.  The awareness that the blockade would be 
lifted only upon compliance with the government’s demands served as a powerful ‘carrot’ 
when measured against the ‘stick’ of inverted blockade. The arrival of doctors, veterinarians, 
political officers and administrators upon compliance served as a further demonstration of the 
benefits of ending insurrection, as well as serving as a possible reminder for the future as to 
the consequences of revolt.
48
 
This is not to say that air power went unchallenged, bringing an end to the risk of revolt. 
Omissi pointed out that there was a continuous cycle of reaction and adaptation as targeted 
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groups in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia became familiar with and adjusted their actions 
to minimise the strengths and exploit the limitations of the aircraft then employed.
49
  His 
observation regarding action – reaction – adaptation has remained true. Yet air control 
demonstrated that the ability to insert troops and keep them resupplied without respect to 
ground transport and the attendant vulnerabilities to ambushes, mines, and choke points was 
an asymmetric advantage, albeit one provided by air mobility assets.
50
  The British used their 
air transport advantage during tribal control operations on the North-West Frontier, dropping 
food, fodder, and ammunition to columns in the mountains in order to reduce the number of 
pack animals and also reduce the columns’ vulnerabilities on ground lines of 
communication.
51
 Although detailed examination is beyond the scope of this thesis, a cursory 
examination of the way in which air power was used in subsequent operations illustrates the 
point that the RAF’s work anticipated later air power theory.52 
One can see in RAF’s operational reports, doctrinal manuals, and the professional 
journals from the inter-war period how denial and punishment were utilised to affect tribal 
leadership.  As early as 1921, advocates for air control were stressing the importance of 
perception and credibility: 
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To establish a tradition, therefore, which will prove effective…the Air Force must, if 
called upon to administer punishment, do it with all its might and in the proper manner.  
One objective must be selected—preferably the most inaccessible village of the most 
prominent tribe which it is desired to punish.  …The attack with bombs and machine 
guns must be relentless and unremitting and carried on continuously by day and night….  
No news travels like bad news.  The news of the punishment will spread like wildfire.
53
 
By the 1930s, after more than a decade of air control experiences in multiple regions and in 
multiple ethnic settings, British doctrinal thought had evolved from the punishing effects 
possible through kinetic air power to one of persuasion, yet still backed up by the threat of 
force in order to ensure compliance with government demands, but primarily in a 
preventative/deterrence role. 
Perhaps the simplest task of this kind which one may have to carry out is the restraint of 
the inhabitants of a certain territory without subsequent settlement and administration; 
that is to say, one may wish merely to prevent wild and undisciplined tribesmen from 
doing something which they ought not to do, such as raiding incursions into settled 
territory, robbing caravans, stirring up their neighbours or otherwise making a nuisance 
of themselves.
54
   
 
Air operations during the inter-war period had a dual nature, primarily as a preventative 
influence on the decision-making apparatus of the tribes, but also a means of punishing those 
who failed to comply with government demands.  The advocates for air power’s efficacy in 
imperial policing articulated how the inherent attributes of air power, when appropriately 
applied offered the government asymmetric advantages to achieve its strategic goals.  What 
most air power advocates and modern analysts have failed to explore are the conduits for 
communication between the colonial governments and the intended populations—the means 
of informing the people as to required standards of behaviour and the consequences of failing 
to comply with government demands.  Air control and inverted blockades were not simply 
the use of aerial bombardment for the punishment of those on the receiving end. They were 
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the physical part of a sophisticated nexus of policing, with coercion – through the use or 
threat of force – as but one tool available to the authorities. 
So, while air power offered the government considerable advantages, the ability to realise 
the desired outcomes depended in large measure (as it does today) on how effectively the 
government communicated with the population.  And, while historians have tended to focus 
almost exclusively on the military aspects of air policing, particularly the use of bombing, 
what British colonial administrators discovered, first in Iraq and Transjordan, and then in 
other frontier regions of the empire, that with the correct enablers in place it was sometimes 




Irregular warfare was and remains an inherently land-centric enterprise.  And, despite 
those who advocate air power’s ability to go-it-alone in irregular conflicts, Colin Gray has 
correctly noted that it is unlikely that air power will be a war-winner in irregular warfare.  His 
is not an unreasonable proposition.  To understand the RAF’s colonial policing work though, 
it is useful to look beyond notions of air power as a ‘war-winner’.  Walter Boyne, in The 
Influence of Air Power upon History, observed that until recently, the influence of air power 
was ‘far more important than any question of its decisiveness in battle’.56  And it was in this 
arena, the difficult-to-measure aspects of the influence air power had upon the actions of 
local populations, where the RAF perhaps had the most effect.  Because of the difficulties in 
measuring these effects, as well as the relative paucity of documentary evidence from the 
affected populations’ perspectives by which to assess how influential air power was, it is 
perhaps inevitable that we have seen modern researchers and analysts emphasise bombing as 
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though it was the entirety of the RAF effort in the colonial policing role, rather than just one 
part of it. 
Air control offered Britain a means to establish and maintain acceptable levels of 
security and stability within the colonies and mandated territories, either through the actual or 
threatened use of force, or via persuasion—social, political, economic, and legal incentives, 
acting upon a targeted group’s leadership directly or indirectly.  It is the contention of this 
thesis that these persuasive aspects have not been given due consideration in many historical 
works, and the aim of this work has been to re-balance the historiography, offering new 
insights into the innovative way in which the RAF, and thus air power, made a much more 
sophisticated contribution to imperial policing than is normally presented.   
As has been shown in this chapter, air power’s ability to influence people on the ground 
was one of the primary features of air control.  The air control scheme was predicated on air 
power’s capacity to force compliance with colonial administrators’ demands.  The persuasive 
aspects of air power, though, where non-kinetic capabilities were used to achieve the desired 
effects without destroying or killing, are rarely mentioned by the RAF’s critics.57 This 
ignored the fact that by the end of the inter-war period the RAF recognised the need to 
balance coercive and persuasive means, and were intentionally incorporating non-lethal air 
operations into efforts to maintain control and keep the peace.  The emphasis by most 
historians, theorists, and analysts has been squarely on bombardment, with minimal 
consideration given to what air power might achieve through means other than force.  In 
irregular warfare, planners and politicians who fail to consider the influencing effects 
possible without bombing do so at their peril.  This feature, wielding influence without 
causing harm, has been and will remain a critical requirement for irregular warfare.   
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion:  Air Power, Tribal Control, and Irregular Warfare 
 
Circumstance had driven Britain to reduce its military expenditure, even in the face of 
new demands arising from the colonies and mandated territories.
1
  As we have seen, the 
implementation of the so-called ‘ten-year-rule’, saw a change in direction towards the vast 
territories the British had to control, with the application of air power becoming a critical 
element of attempting to maintain control without the need for large, expensive overseas 
garrisons of the sort which had characterised an earlier period of empire. As noted earlier, 
Peter Gray suggests there is a tendency to use history inappropriately.
2
  Too often, historians 
looking at the RAF’s air control scheme in Iraq and the NWF during the inter-war period 
have done so through the lens of the modern era, applying legal and ethical constructs from 
the post-1945 period to the 1920s and 1930s. The RAF’s air control scheme must be 
examined in context and in a comprehensive manner.  In order to make appropriate 
judgements about air control, one must look beyond the most common characterisation in 
many accounts, that of aircraft bombing unsophisticated nomads and villagers. It is essential 
to consider all the components that made air control work:  aeroplanes, RAF armoured car 
companies, and indigenous forces, plus RAF SSOs or political officers integrating air power 
into the workings of tribal control.
3 
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The seductive allure of air power as a sterile, seemingly low-risk, and quick solution to 
modern warfare’s complexity and messiness has been difficult for politicians to resist and has 
often been easy for airmen to advocate. The existence of the British air control scheme has 
not helped in this respect. Colin Gray, in Understanding Airpower, wrote, ‘When politicians 
want to “do something”…airpower will usually be the first preference for US policy makers 
who feel the need to make a bold, hopefully decisive statement through action’.4  And 
because politicians rarely ‘do something’ until after crisis occurs the theories, doctrines, and 
supporting historiography of counter-insurgency have been reactive rather than preventative.  
What has been missing is consideration of air power in a preventative role, providing the 
perception of governmental power, serving as a deterrent to lawlessness and subversion, and 
administering force only when required.  In order to make Britain’s air control scheme 
between the wars effective, ‘some boots’ were needed on the ground, acting as conduits for 
communication between the tribes and the government, developing relationships and 
maintaining situational awareness, and administering the programmes to influence behaviour 
and maintain the peace in remote regions of the colonies, protectorates, and mandated 
territories.  The RAF SSOs, airmen on the ground and embedded among the local populace, 
who spoke the local language and fully understood the local culture, were the key to the 
RAF’s successful policing efforts during the inter-war period.  
For almost twenty years airmen and aeroplanes of the fledgling RAF showed they could 
maintain an acceptable level of control and stability in certain isolated reaches of the British 
Empire.  The RAF’s air control scheme from the inter-war period has assumed near-mythical 
qualities among modern air power enthusiasts advocating a pre-eminent role for air power in 
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  As with most myths and legends, the air control myth has a basis in truth—the 
RAF did control troublesome native populations on the fringes of its empire using air power 
and Britain did reduce its cost of imperial policing by replacing army battalions with RAF 
squadrons.  Decades of embellishment and countless interpretations of the air control story 
however, have created a perception of the past that exceeds the factual narrative.  Those who 
cite scholarly works on the subject of air control by David Omissi, Philip Towle, Corum and 
Johnson, and Jafna Cox have tended to diminish the role the land elements played despite the 
fact that these scholars stress the critical role of police forces, native levies, and armoured 
cars.
6
  What these scholars have not addressed has been the critical role played by the RAF 
SSOs in the Middle East and their legacy on other imperial frontiers.
7
   
The RAF’s air control story seems to maintain its enduring place of awe among airmen 
as evidenced by the student papers, journal articles, and Service studies that cite RAF 
operations in the Middle East between the World Wars as the example to which modern air 
power should aspire.
8
  What the air-power-can-do-it-alone enthusiasts typically fail to address 
though, are those instances where the air control scheme had limited or mixed results, such as 
in the urban setting of Palestine and the mountains of the North-West Frontier.  The caution, 
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as Peter Gray advises, is to not let the myth so conceal the truth or let it become such a matter 
of faith as to ‘degenerate into a morass of dogma’ and in the process stifle necessary and 
healthy debate, which is what has often been the case.
9
 
This thesis has taken a detailed look at the air control scheme from the 1920s and 30s.  
The research began by questioning what it was that made air control work.  That original 
question was based on the assumption that imperial policing from the air was successful in 
achieving Britain’s strategic and operational objectives where it was applied.  As was shown, 
air control was mostly, but not always successful.  In urban areas such as Palestine, while air 
power demonstrated some ability to influence the behaviour of native populations, its overall 
utility was limited by physical, social, and ethical constraints.  As was pointed out in Chapter 
Three, Trenchard rejected the suggestion that the RAF might be used against ‘civilised 
peoples’ and to control ‘industrial disturbances or risings in what may be called definitely 
settled countries’.10  The substitution scheme was intended to police those regions where the 
Army had historically served in a frontier constabulary role.  As was shown, British attitudes 
towards Arabia and Arabs during the inter-war period are an important contextual difference 
that must also be taken into account when considering air control methods then and now.  
RAF Historian Sebastian Ritchie explained that by 1928, RAF doctrine had been updated to 
reflect popular aversion to air power’s use in ‘civilised’ settings.11 
Legal and political restrictions on using air power to prevent or control domestic 
situations during the inter-war period were to be expected, just as laws, conventions, and 
                                                          
9
 Peter W. Gray, The Myths of Air Control and the Realities of Imperial Policing’, p. 40. 
10
 TNA AIR 9/12, Memorandum by Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard on the subject of the use of aircraft in the 
case of industrial disturbances or risings in what may be called definitely settled countries such as India and 
Egypt, (26 Apr 1920), pp. 1 – 2.  Trenchard also resisted using the RAF during domestic labour strikes and in 
Ireland. 
11
 TNA AIR 10/1911, AP 1300, (1928), Chap. XIV, para. 52.  Sebastian Ritchie, from the RAF’s Air Historical 
Branch, wrote that parts of the 1928 RAF War Manual were written specifically with self-imposed limitations of 
air control in Palestine in mind.  The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919 – 1939, (RAF 
High Wycombe, UK:  HQ Air Command, 2011), p. 50. 
 182  
 
rules of engagement limit the use of surveillance and applications of force today.
12
  Between 
the wars, on the fringes of the empire though, and in areas that were at times labelled 
‘wilder’, ‘uncivilised’, or ‘semi-civilised’ what little public outcry there was about using air 
forces to control troublesome native populations was ignored by most Britons.  Much of the 
general apathy of the time might be attributed to legacy attitudes of the era towards native 
peoples, domestic social welfare programmes being more important to the common man than 
international challenges, or perhaps post-war disregard for minor foreign military ventures.  
No matter the reason, differences in cultural perspective do colour the historical context 
between then and now must be accounted for when attempting to glean appropriate lessons 
from the 1920’s air control scheme.13 
During the course of refining the research for this thesis, it was necessary to go beyond 
the story of aeroplanes keeping desert guerrilla fighters in check or forcing civil compliance 
upon offending villagers.  If the air control scheme ‘worked’, meaning it successfully 
maintained or restored stability in the colonies and mandated territories at an acceptable cost, 
what did Britain do to ensure the air control scheme achieved the effects required?  The 
research led to the conclusions that Trenchard and the Air Staff fully understood Britain’s 
national objectives—reduce the war debt and maintain peace and stability in the empire at an 
acceptable cost.  The Air Staff then translated those strategic goals into theatre campaigns 
using the doctrine, people, and equipment available at the time.  It was a classic ends-ways-
means approach to solving a strategic-level problem—police the imperial frontiers and do so 
‘on the cheap’.  Indicative of the economic impetus for the RAF air control scheme was Portal’s 
assessment of the British constabulary force in Aden.  He noted,  
                                                          
12
 ‘Domestic’ as it is used during the inter-war period went beyond the British Isles and acknowledged the 
elevated status given to ‘white’ colonies and the Dominions. 
13
 Peter W. Gray, ‘The Myths of Air Control and the Realities of Imperial Policing’, p. 37.  ‘The distaste, or 
embarrassment, felt by some authors over the Imperial aspects of the subject and the period does little to aid 
understanding’. 
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It [Aden] has practically no economic value…it supports an unexpectedly large primitive 
population … There is nothing in the Aden Protectorate that justifies the expense, in money and 
life, entailed by military expeditions or occupation if the required standard of law and order can 
be maintained in any other way.
14
    
By substituting ‘mechanical contrivances’ for manpower as WC 616A directed, the costs of 
imperial policing were reduced in some cases up to 90% by significantly reducing or 
eliminating the battalions deployed as frontier constabulary.
15
  More importantly for British 
politicians, the number of British and native casualties suffered while administering punitive 
actions using the air control method, compared to earlier ‘Army methods’, were reduced to 
levels that were politically acceptable in post-war Britain.
16
 
By the 1930s however, the RAF had concluded that the air control scheme needed to go 
beyond bombing and strafing and include indirect (non-kinetic) means to what had been 
heretofore a very kinetic methodology.
17
  Portal’s discussion of how the air control method 
was applied during his tenure in Aden (Yemen) after more than a decade of RAF operations 
demonstrates the evolution of thinking about the role of air power in situations short of war 
and offers evidence that the British did understand the need for non-kinetic activities such as 
air transport, medical evacuation, and communications support (news, mail, and government 
officials) for isolated communities.  Modern interpretations of Britain’s air control experience 
may have tended toward the kinetic aspects of air control, and especially how force and 
threats of force influenced local leaders, in large part because most archival sources focused 
                                                          
14
 C.F.A. Portal, ‘Air Force Co-operation in Policing the Empire’, 17 Feb 1937, The Journal of the Royal United 
Service Institution, vol. 82, no. 526, (May 1937), pp. 348 – 49.   
15
 A.P.C. Hannay, ‘Empire Air Policy’, The Royal Air Force Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 4, (Oct 1930), p. 643. 
16
 A common theme within the professional journals between the wars was that the air control method produced 
fewer civilian casualties than the Army’s ‘burn and scuttle’ method, in large part by comparing the inverted 
blockade to the damage caused by an artillery barrage.  See for example, Salmond (‘The Air Force in Iraq’), 
Glubb (‘Air and Ground Forces in Punitive Expeditions’), and R.H. Peck (‘Aircraft in Small Wars’), all 
previously cited in this thesis.  Similar arguments have recently been made, comparing the civilian casualties 
from drones to those from ground combat.  See for example, Mark Bowden, ‘The Killing Machines’, The 
Atlantic, (Sep 2013).  Accessed at www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/09/the-killing-machines-how-
to-think-about-drones/309434 on 14 Nov 2013. 
17
 Portal, ‘Air Force Co-operation in Policing the Empire’, p. 356. 
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on kinetic applications of air power.
18
  And, as David Jordan has noted, the use of transport 
aircraft for troop mobility and medical evacuation during the inter-war period has been 
‘largely overlooked’.19  Jordan’s conclusion is supported by the paucity of sources from the 
inter-war period which address air mobility operations or the details of intelligence 
integration.  Therefore, it is fairly safe to conclude that the non-kinetic aspects of the air 
control scheme have been understudied by modern students due to lack of sources, which is a 
shame because the non-kinetic applications: mobility, reconnaissance and surveillance, and 
influencing operations, which made such valuable contributions to Western COIN operations 
after the Second World War have their roots in the inter-war period.
20
 
Comparing punitive air operations of the last two decades with the RAF’s air policing 
operations makes for false analogies.  From the narrow perspective of kinetic air operations, 
claims that nine decades of improved aerospace technology now makes it possible to hit 
targets more precisely, at night, and from stand-off distances are correct…but largely 
irrelevant in culturally and ideologically-driven conflicts dominated by interactions in the 
human domain that characterise modern irregular warfare.
21
  A technologically-oriented 
approach misses the point that the RAF’s constabulary duties were intended to be an 
innovative means of ensuring colonial control among largely agrarian and pastoral 
populations in under-developed regions, at the local level…without having to apply force.  
Typical for constabulary operations, the British goal was to prevent rebellion by collecting 
information, representing British authority, and offering a conduit for communications so that 
                                                          
18
 Colin Gray, Understanding Air Power, p. 50, noted that it was highly expedient to resort to kinetic airpower 
as the default option in irregular warfare situations.  
19
 David Jordan, ‘Air and space warfare’, Understanding Modern Warfare, David Jordan, et al, (Cambridge, 
UK:  Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 210.   
20
 David Jordan, in ‘Countering Insurgency from the Air:  The Post-war Lessons’, Contemporary Security 
Policy, vol. 28, no. 1 (Apr 2007), p. 97, breaks air power’s roles in COIN into ‘mobility; observation; and 
presence, harassment, and delivery of direct force’. David Omissi makes a similar claim in the conclusion to Air 
Power and colonial control, p. 212.   
21
 Joint Doctrine Publication 04, Understanding, (Shrivenham, UK: Development, Concepts and Doctrine 
Centre, Dec 2010), p. 3-5.  The human domain considers cultural, institutional, technological, and physical 
environments in order to provide appropriate context for developing understanding.   
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they did not have to drop bombs, destroy villages, or scatter flocks. This is largely impossible 
from an aeroplane overhead and so RAF SSOs were created to provide the connective link 
that made air control possible.  
Policing, whether patrolling the streets of cities or among tribal villages, is an inherently 
personal activity, and the RAF realised personal relationships were impossible from the air.  
The very things that made aeroplanes such powerful weapons, speed and range, also 
prevented airmen from developing relationships with the people Britain sought to control.  
The SSOs though, because they were embedded with their hosts, were able to provide the 
necessary human interface.  Community policing, where police constables are present among 
the people, walking the streets to build relationships, collecting information, and developing a 
sense of situational awareness, yields crime under control.
22
  Imperial policing followed a 
similar theme.
23
  As Salmond, Glubb, Portal, and other RAF airmen of the era explained, 
aeroplanes provided the power to punish and their presence overhead reinforced the 
perception that the British could go anywhere, see everything, and strike at will.  What the 
research revealed though, was the absolute necessity of a human presence on the ground and 
among the populace, just as policemen are among the people in their precincts, to provide the 
crucial linkage between the people, the aircraft, and the decision makers.
24
 
Between the wars, the RAF proved it could exert a powerful deterrent effect in many, 
but not all, regions of the empire.  Over the course of the inter-war period the RAF learned 
                                                          
22
 US Department of Justice reports and statistics, found at http://cops.usdoj.gov.  
23
 An excellent discussion concerning the similarities and differences between community policing and counter-
insurgency in an era of trans-national organised crime is provided by Detective 3
rd
 Class John Zambri, a 25-year 
veteran of the Los Angeles Police Department and also a Reserve Intelligence Officer, in  ‘Counterinsurgency 
and Community Policing:  More Alike than Meets the Eye’, Small Wars Journal, (8 July 2014), found at 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/counterinsurgency-and-community-policing-more-alike-than-meets-the-eye. 
24
 The necessity and employment of SSOs is highlighted in the previous chapters, in AVM Dowding’s report 
after the 1929 riots in Palestine (TNA CAB 53/20, COS 212), the Cairo Conference Report (TNA CAB 24/126, 
CP 3123), and AP 1300, Chap XIV (TNA AIR 10/1911).  Priya Satia devoted five pages to ‘The Human Face of 
Air Control?’ in Spies in Arabia, pp. 254 – 58; Jafna Cox does give passing mention of the SSOs as collectors of 
information and then directing the aerial actions, p. 167. 
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that while the presence of aircraft overhead did influence native behaviours, without someone 
on the ground to manage the message, change was usually fleeting.  People on the receiving 
end of air power’s effects learned to adapt.25  Longer term changes happened when and where 
the SSOs were placed among the tribes and villages.  What the SSOs described in their 
reports, oral histories, and memoirs revealed that in those regions where the air control 
scheme was successful the SSOs served a preventative function.  By communicating with 
community leaders, learning the local habits and customs, and building relationships with 
significant individuals they developed the ability to sense when something was amiss.  Day to 
day, the SSOs’ presence served as a stabilising influence among the tribes.  And like 
policemen, they were able to apply appropriate kinetic or non-kinetic measures when and 
where needed to restore order quickly and with minimum casualties on either side. 
Where air control was less successful, such as in Palestine and the NWF, there were no 
SSOs on the ground to provide the human interface between air power and the intended 
audience.
26
  Where the air control method was most successful, there were ‘some boots’ on 
the ground maintaining situational awareness and providing a personal reminder that British 
authorities could and would use air power to punish should the locals fail to comply with 
political officer’s requirements.  By the end of the era the SSOs were using air power as a 
calmative tool, maintaining order by threats of force, but also bringing the ‘benefits of 
civilisation’ to the frontier inhabitants.27   
Martin Thomas’ analysis of air control between the wars revealed that success was ‘less 
a matter of repressive policing [punitive air operations] than penetrating nomad society to 
secure the cooperation of clan leaders’ and was based upon the officers’ abilities to forge 
                                                          
25
 James S. Corum, ‘The Myth of Air Control:  Reassessing History’, Aerospace Power Journal, vol. 13, no. 4, 
(Winter 2000), p. 71.  ‘Air control may not have won the good will of various native peoples, but it did a pretty 
effective job of keeping many of them in line—at least for a time’. 
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 TNA AIR 9/19, Notes on the Future Garrison of Palestine, p. 1; also AVM Dowding’s report (TNA CAB 
53/20, COS 212). 
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 Portal, ‘Air Force Co-operation in Policing the Empire’, p. 348 and p. 356. 
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working relationships in their assigned communities [preventing misbehaviour].
28
  That 
thread has not been fully explored by those comparing air policing then and now.  Those who 
have considered the role of the airman on the ground during recent air operations have 
limited their consideration to the smallest part of what the SSOs did, directing and controlling 
aerial attacks. 
Between the wars, aeroplanes and armoured cars usually did the things they were 
designed to do:  strike targets when necessary, reconnoitre and map large areas, transport 
people and supplies where they were needed, and provide visible evidence of the 
government’s ability to go where it wished whenever it chose.  Modern manned and 
unmanned aircraft will continue to do what aircraft do—strike, reconnoitre, transport, and 
influence.  But the challenge for air forces looking to be ready for the next, most likely 
irregular, conflict is to restore the air power expert on the ground, a regionally acculturated, 
embedded specialist who is able to provide the human interface at the local level using the 
capabilities of modern air power as an effective deterrent to conflict.  And, should violence 
break out, that airman is then able to bring those asymmetric capabilities to bear to restore the 
peace at the least cost.   
As was noted earlier, there were no SSOs in the RAF before 1920.  Many of the airmen 
recruited to be SSOs during the inter-war period began as pilots or observers who happened 
to speak Arabic.
29
  The RAF planned a two-year program of study of the people, language 
and country in order attain a realistic level of qualification.
30
  The Treasury would not allow 
the Air Ministry to form an intelligence branch after the war, so intelligence functions were 
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 Martin Thomas, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914, (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2008), p. 174. 
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 Official RAF history, found at www.raf.mod.uk/rafregiment/squadrons/iisqnhistory.cfm. 
30
 TNA AIR 2/1196, future organisation of intelligence in Iraq, (15 Nov 1926), p. 1. 
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performed by pilots from the General Duties Branch serving ground tours.
31
  This is an 
important point because like the Army SSOs before them, the RAF SSOs were operators first 
who were absorbed into the intelligence structure.
32
  Service as an intelligence officer was 
generally disdained among pilots who had joined the Air Force to fly, and so the RAF 
intentionally incentivised the airmen by adding marks to their Staff College examination, 
providing an advantage during promotion consideration for having a second language, 
offering flying opportunities at nearby air stations, and providing a cash allowance for horse 
and groom, house-boy, and interpreter.
33
   
‘An adequate intelligence organisation is an important factor in the general scheme of air 
control…it is necessary to maintain a constant flow of officers with a knowledge of 
Middle Eastern languages and experience of intelligence work…  On the conclusion of 
training officers will be posted for a further two years’ duty as intelligence officers in 
Iraq, Aden, Palestine, Transjordan or the Sudan… Officers who have rendered 
satisfactory service in intelligence duties will receive special consideration when 
selection of officers to undergo the Staff College Course’.34 
 
As the need for local intelligence was greater than the pool of available RAF personnel 
with the desired language and foreign area skills could provide, the RAF looked to ex-Army 
officers who had served with the Indian Army before the war or with Allenby’s Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force.
35
  The Army candidates had the needed language, cultural, and 
interpersonal experiences, plus they understood the military’s role in a frontier constabulary, 
so the Army transfers only needed to learn the application of air power, substituting air 
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actions for punitive expeditions, in the various frontier environments.  In order to provide the 
human element necessary to facilitate and enhance the planning and employment of air power 
in modern conflicts, future SSOs will need to balance tactical and technical skills with 
‘softer’ skills such as language expertise, cultural acumen, negotiation, and mediation. 
There is no question that air power offers powerful contributions in an irregular conflict 
environment, whether that be in the era of air control, or today – for example Al Qaeda’s 
anti-surveillance memorandum found in Timbuktu, Mali, offered powerful proof of air 
power’s coercive effects.36  Among the tactics recommended to counter the West’s 
surveillance and targeting advantages were avoiding the use of permanent headquarters, 
hiding under trees, staying in the shadows, using dolls and statues as decoys, and avoiding 
large gatherings in open areas.  Omissi’s comment about familiarity with aircraft leading to 
the targeted people developing ‘unforeseen powers of adaptation and resistance’ 
notwithstanding, the evidence indicates that aircraft overhead do make things difficult for 
irregulars on the ground.
37
 The nature of modern adaption and resistance has a familiar air to 
anyone cognisant of the original air control schemes.  The capability of modern airborne 
sensors has been widely publicised in the news, demonstrated on television and in movies, 
and discussed via the internet.  It is still therefore reasonable for insurgents, rebels, terrorists, 
and criminals to assume that when an aircraft is seen or heard overhead, it really could be 
looking for or at them—just as the epigram on page 1, quoting the RAF Operations Manual 
from 1922 noted.  Perception has become a matter of fact, whether evidenced by al Qaeda’s 
anti-surveillance tips to the jihadists in Mali, the British use of Leigh Lights against Greek 
insurgents, and the El Salvadorans’ use of AC-47 gunships circling and dropping flares to 
break up FMLN formations.  Aircraft overhead with the potential to deliver lethal force do 
influence the behaviour of an intended group—whether bombs are dropped or not.  Whether 
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air power is the sole, primary, or a contributing element of the proposed solution to a problem 
will depend upon what end results are desired, the design of the operation, and the resources 
available. But the origins of these facets of air power in irregular warfare can clearly be 
traced to the inter-war era and the air control scheme. 
As Lawrence pointed out and Trenchard conceded, air power in a leading role will not be 
successful in every situation.  Where air control was tactically successful between the wars, 
aeroplanes, ground forces, and embedded, acculturated airmen combined to achieve Britain’s 
campaign objectives on the ground.  Even when all British 
and Indian battalions had been withdrawn, there were still 
‘boots on the ground’.  As the research revealed, those 
‘boots’ were a critical element of the air control scheme.  
Whether RAF armoured cars, native levies, or police forces 
cooperating with the aircraft overhead, the lesson that 
should be taken from this experience is that it was the 
correct boots on the ground that made the RAF’s air control scheme ‘work’.  The SSOs were 
the enablers of the Power – Presence – Perception model (Figure 6.1), serving as the critical 
linkage between the locals and the government, managing the application of kinetic and non-
kinetic power, and shaping local perceptions of air power’s capabilities in order to maintain 
peace and stability.   
The lesson that should be taken from the RAF’s air control scheme is not that aeroplanes 
could bomb ‘semi-civilised’ irregulars into submission.  That is a superficial view.  Air 
power’s effectiveness and its value was directly related to how well the planners and decision 
makers understood the motivations and needs of people at the local level, what sorts of 
actions will influence local leaders into acting favourably towards government requirements, 
and developing effective means to create the conduits that allow clear and direct 
Figure 6.1,  
SSOs in the Centre 
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communication among decision makers in order to prevent conflict. There is abundant 
evidence that the RAF’s air control scheme did just that. 
Concluding Thoughts 
This thesis has examined the proposition seemingly presented by the general 
understanding of the British air control scheme that air power can replace land power in 
conflicts of an irregular character.  Many of the airmen, scholars, and politicians who have 
advocated such a position in recent years have pointed to the RAF’s successful experiences 
policing the frontiers of the empire between the World Wars as evidence of air power’s 
efficacy, relative low cost, and political convenience in ‘small wars’.  This is misleading, 
since as the thesis has shown.  In certain cases, the RAF successfully did replace Army 
battalions policing the frontiers of the empire.  But it was also true that air control methods 
had their limits, as Lawrence and Slessor cautioned and the case studies of air control in 
Palestine and on the NWF showed.   
This thesis proposes that it was the RAF SSOs in the Middle East who were the key to 
Britain learning how to integrate air power with local political objectives, as shown by the 
way in which the RAF integrated its people, processes, and equipment in pursuit of its 
objectives in the colonies and mandated territories.  These specialist airmen, embedded in the 
local villages in a manner likely impossible today because of political, cultural, and security 
reasons, served as liaisons from the authorities, developed a level of cultural acuity and native 
communication that approached what Priya Satia equated to intuition, and performed a 
critical air-land integration function that enabled the effective employment of air power in 
some very irregular contexts.    
In conclusion then, while Britain’s air control scheme in the Middle East during the 
inter-war period might be dismissed by some modern commentators as archaic, overly harsh, 
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politically unacceptable, and perhaps even illegitimate, the fact remains that Churchill and 
Trenchard’s air control scheme gave the British government what it needed at the time:  an 
acceptable level of colonial stability for relatively low financial and personnel costs.  
Whereas policing the empire likely ensured the RAF remained a separate Service, equal to 
the Army and the Royal Navy, it failed to prove that air power could be decisive in conflicts 
of an irregular nature.  What the RAF’s air control experience did show, however, was that 
air power made a difference.  Air power, even with the fragile machines of the 1920s and 
1930s, offered an unprecedented level of mobility, reconnaissance, and firepower that 
permitted the British to reduce the size of its imperial garrisons, by up to 90% in some cases.  
More importantly, the air control ‘experiment’ showed later generations how air forces might 
offer counter-insurgent forces an asymmetric advantage in what is decidedly political 
warfare. 
What has largely been missed by generations of air power analysts is the contribution of 
the RAF’s SSOs to the effective application of air power in irregular warfare.  By focusing on 
aeroplanes and technology, most analysts have missed the key innovation that ‘made air 
control work’.  Future airmen would do well to re-examine how British airmen of the 1920s 
developed and used their deep understanding of the people and the social, economic, cultural, 
and environmental conditions to collect and provide localised qualitative intelligence and 
targeting recommendations, in co-ordination with civilian colonial administrators that was 
critical to achieving the administration’s desired effects.  It was airmen on the ground who 
made the air control scheme work, serving as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the civilian 
administration in areas too dangerous or isolated for political officials and bringing the 
appropriate elements of air power to bear when and where needed.  
What the RAF accomplished between the World Wars should not be dismissed.  Sir 
Michael Howard reminds us that ‘wars still resemble each other more than they resemble any 
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other human activity’, thus the air control experience from between the wars can inform air 
power thinking and how air power might offer planners and politicians an asymmetric 
advantage during conflicts of an irregular nature; but it is vital that the complexities and 
nuances of the original air control scheme are understood if this is to hold true. The 
limitations of the scheme, especially as seen in Palestine, must be appreciated and 
acknowledged just as much as the successes. Nonetheless, the air control experience showed 
air power as a more subtle and nuanced tool, rather than the blunt instrument some 
commentators have suggested.  Where subtle and nuanced air power was effective, embedded 
acculturated airmen, i.e., the ‘right boots on the ground’, proved to be the key element of 
success.  It is perhaps time that greater consideration were given by historians to this wide-
ranging and important part the RAF’s air control scheme has played in the evolution of air 
power theory, and to the level of relative sophistication it displayed. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Amyas E. Borton commanded the RAF/RFC in the Palestine brigade from 1917.  He returned 
to the Middle East as the Officer Commanding the Mesopotamian Group, renamed the Iraq 
Group, in 1921.  When the RAF assumed responsibility for imperial policing in Iraq in Oct 
1922, Borton continued as the operational commander of the RAF forces until returning to 
England in 1923 and becoming the second Commandant of the RAF College at Cranwell. 
Sir (John) Adrian Chamier served as a staff officer and deputy director in the Directorate of 
Operations and Intelligence from 1919 – 1923.  He was one of Trenchard’s early ‘English 
Merchants’, helping to defend and advocate for an independent air force.  From 1923 – 27, he 
was a staff officer at HQ RAF in India.  After retirement from the RAF in 1929, he served as 
Secretary of the Air League and helped to promote air-mindedness through his writing and 
public speaking.  In 1939, he was recalled to service and in 1941 accepted the position as 
Commandant of the newly formed Air Training Corps, earning the title, ‘Father of the ATC’. 
The Honourable Sir Ralph Cochrane served as a flight commander in 45 Sqn in Iraq under 
Arthur Harris.  He commanded 8 Sqn in Aden in 1929.  During the Second World War he 
commanded Nos. 3, 5, and 7 Gps of Bomber Command.  In 1945 he was appointed head of 
Transport Command 
Sir Arthur Coningham commanded 55 Sqn in Iraq, was on the staff of HQ RAF Middle East, 
and served as the senior airman for the Sudan Defence Force.  During the Second World War 
he commanded 2
nd
 Tactical Air Force. 
Sir (Ernest) Leslie Gossage was a senior air staff officer at RAF Iraq Command in 1934 and 
was the air officer commanding for British forces in Aden from 1935 – 36.  From 1940 to 
1944 he served as commander-in-chief of Balloon Command.     
Sir Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris commanded 31 Sqn on the NW Frontier and 45 Sqn in Iraq under 
Sir John Salmond.  From 1938 – 1939 he was the AOC in Palestine and Transjordan.  Harris 
commanded Bomber Command from 1942 – 1945. 
Edgar J. Kingston-McCloughry was assigned to the staff in RAF India from 1929 and made a 
flight commander in 20 Sqn (Army Co-operation) on the NW Frontier in 1932.  He was a 
prolific writer on air power during the inter-war years.  In 1942, he commanded 44 Gp (Ferry 
Service) and from Dec 1943 was the chief operational planner for the allied expeditionary air 
force for Operation Overlord (D-Day, Allies’ invasion at Normandy).   
Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt was the air officer commanding in Iraq from 1930 – 32.  From Feb 
1933 to Jan 1935 he served as the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.  He commanded Bomber 
Command from 1937 to 1940 when he was replaced by Sir C.F.A. Portal.  From 1940 – 45 he 
was the inspector-general of the RAF.     
Sir Richard H. Peck commanded 84 Sqn in Iraq in 1924.  During the Second World War 
served as the Director-General of Operations and Assistant Chief of the Air Staff.  While 
serving the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence, along with Chamier and Slessor, he 
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was one of Trenchard’s ‘English Merchants’, writing and speaking to advance the cause of 
independent air power. 
Sir (Henry) Robert Brooke-Popham served as air officer commanding in Iraq from 1928 – 30.  
In 1940 he was appointed commander-in-chief Far East.        
Viscount Portal commanded British forces in Aden from 1934 – 36.  From Apr – Oct 1940 he 
commanded Bomber Command.  In October 1940 he succeeded Sir Cyril Newall as Chief of 
the Air Staff, a post he held until December 1945.    
Sir (William) Geoffrey Salmond commanded the Middle East brigade of the RFC from July 
1916 – Aug 1917.  In Dec 1917 he assumed command of Middle East Command and 
remained there until 1922.  In Dec 1926 he was given command of RAF India and was 
responsible for the RAF’s successful evacuation of Kabul in 1928 – 29.  On 1 Apr 1933, he 
was appointed Chief of the Air Staff but died of cancer shortly thereafter. 
Sir John Salmond became the first RAF officer to command all British forces in Iraq on Oct 
1922.  He was the first airman to serve as a joint force commander (modern term) in a theatre 
of operations.  In 1929, he succeeded Trenchard as the Chief of the Air Staff.    
Sir Robert Saundby was a flight commander in 45 Sqn under Arthur Harris and in 1925 he 
commanded the RAF Flight in Aden.  At the beginning of the Second World War he was the 
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operational Requirements and Tactics).  In 1943 he became 
Harris’ deputy at Bomber Command. 
Sir John C. Slessor commanded 3 Wing in Waziristan.  He served in the Directorate of 
Operations and Intelligence with R.H. Peck from 1928 – 30.  In 1943, he became commander 
of Coastal Command.  In 1943, he commanded Coastal Command and in 1944 he replaced 
Sir Arthur Tedder as the commander of the RAF in the Mediterranean and Middle East.  In 
1950, he succeeded Tedder as Chief of the Air Staff. 
James M. Spaight was a lawyer with the civil service who specialised in the law of air war.  
His writings served to establish parallels between lawful uses of force on land and sea with 
the new realm of aerial warfare.  He concluded it was permissible to attack certain targets to 
cause civilian hardship and war weariness in order to create a desire to surrender.  Spaight 
served in the Air Ministry from 1918 – 1937. 
Sir Geoffrey William Tuttle was an engineering (aircraft maintenance) officer in Karachi, 
now Pakistan, from 1932 – 35, and then served as a flight commander in 5 (Army 
Cooperation) Sqn in Waziristan from 1935 – 37.  In 1944 he was appointed the air officer 
commanding of Air Headquarters Greece.   
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